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Abstract 
The corporate finance literature generally views open market share repurchase 
announcements as a signal of equity undervaluation. Managers also frequently 
cite undervaluation as a rationale for their decision to repurchase firm equity. 
However, such an announcement cannot necessarily be viewed as a strong 
signal of firm undervaluation as it lacks characteristics of a credible signal. 
Firstly, managers are increasingly relying on share repurchases as a mechanism 
for distributing cash to shareholders. Secondly, open market buyback 
announcements are not binding obligation on the part of firm management to 
complete. In addition, such programmes have a positive effect on executive 
compensation, so managers can also employ these opportunistically to 
accumulate personal wealth at the expense of shareholders. Thus, buyback 
announcements can be either value signalling or agency driven.  Since these 
two theories (agency vs signalling) are not mutually exclusive and a pure ex 
ante measure of managerial intent does not exist, the challenge is to distinguish 
value signalling announcements from “cosmetic” ones.  
My thesis consists of three papers (chapters 2-4). In my first paper, I 
test whether the market distinguishes between agency driven and value 
signalling open market share buybacks by observing the underlying managerial 
wealth and repurchase incentives. In theory, better convergence between the 
executive and shareholder wealth interests and risk preferences should lower 
agency costs thus increasing the “perceived” credibility of managements’ 
buyback announcements (signals). My results suggest that executive 
compensation arrangements play an important role in explaining the market 
reaction to, and actual share repurchase decisions of, firms that announce 
buyback programmes. This study makes an original contribution to the 
literature by demonstrating that investors approximate the value signalling 
effect of a buyback announcement by observing the underlying managerial 
repurchase incentives and respond accordingly. 
ix 
 
 
My second paper addresses the open market buyback announcement 
credibility issue directly by capitalising on the soft information conveyed in 
such announcements. This is novel to the literature on share buybacks. Recent 
studies show that news disclosure tone affects investor reaction to an 
information event. In my study, I demonstrate that the disclosure tone of 
buyback press releases contains value relevant information and has significant 
explanatory power for short term announcement returns. The hand collected 
data I use in this chapter also allows me to explore other aspects of buyback 
announcements where the extant literature is limited. 
In my third paper, I analyse insider trading behaviour around buyback 
announcements. The key insight of this paper is to infer insiders’ private 
information about firm value by observing their trading behaviour around the 
repurchase announcement event. Insiders add credibility to the (repurchase) 
undervaluation signal by trading parallel to their signal (i.e., purchasing more 
or selling fewer shares in advance of the repurchase announcement). However, 
insiders seeking to time the market (cash out at a higher price) will sell more 
shares post-announcement. My analysis shows that, consistent with the 
undervaluation signalling argument, investors respond more positively to 
buyback announcements where insiders buy more or sell less equity before the 
announcement event. However, I also document that insiders sell more shares 
(time the market) in the first 3-months post-announcement. This is especially 
true for firms that are less (more) likely to be undervalued (overvalued) and for 
smaller firms that present the greatest potential for gain through insider trading. 
My results suggest that net insider sales are significantly positively related to 
repurchase announcement returns. Finally, I show that higher post-
announcement net insider sales are slightly negatively related to longer-term 
returns suggesting such firms do not out perform in the long-run. 
My research adds significantly to the literature on share buybacks by 
addressing the agency issues associated with share repurchase programmes. It 
x 
 
 
finds that the market is conscious of the managerial incentives attached to 
repurchase programmes and the potential for their opportunistic use. Investor 
reaction to repurchase programme announcements is sensitive to executive 
compensation arrangements, the information content and disclosure tone of 
buyback announcement press releases and insider trading behaviour. This study 
seeks to add to our understanding of share buybacks and how the market treats 
and reacts to these announcements. The market realises that managements’ 
promises to spend billions of dollars on share repurchases may not necessarily 
add to shareholders’ wealth. Repurchase announcements cannot be uniformly 
viewed as a signal of equity undervaluation; insiders also use such programmes 
for personal gains. In summary, my research highlights novel factors that 
explain investor reaction to share buyback announcements. 
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Chapter 1   
 
Introduction 
1.1 Background and introduction 
An ideal market provides resource allocation signals and investors can choose 
among securities that represent ownership of firms’ activities. Thus capital 
markets have the key role of resource allocation and distribution of firms’ 
ownership rights in an economy (Fama (1970)). So an efficient capital market, 
in which prices reflect fundamental values, will by implication result in 
efficient resource allocation in an economy (Ahmed (2010)). However, 
information asymmetry among market participants can cause stock prices to 
deviate from fundamental value. Managers are particularly sensitive to stock 
undervaluation and often try to correct it by sending “credible” signals to the 
market.  
The last couple of decades have witnessed a remarkable increase in 
stock repurchase programmes. Managers are increasingly relying on share 
repurchase announcements which are generally viewed as a signal of equity 
undervaluation and/or managerial optimism about firm prospects. According to 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) corporations now distribute a greater portion of their 
earnings to shareholders by repurchasing their own stock (see also Grullon and 
Michaely (2002)).
1
 As a result of increasing popularity of repurchase 
programmes and the amount of money involved in these, the topic has attracted 
enormous attention from academic researchers and business analysts alike.  
Let us begin with the definition of share repurchases and share 
repurchase announcements followed by a discussion of what these actually 
represent.  
                                                          
1
 “Corporate buybacks have been surging since the financial crisis, with S&P 500 companies 
spending nearly $2.3 trillion on them since 2009, according to a new report from Aranca 
Investment Research” by (Farrell (2015, Aug. 18)) in The Wall Street Journal 
2 
 
 
Stock buyback or share repurchase is an act of a company to purchase 
its own shares from the market either by tender offer, Dutch auction or by open 
market operation.  
Share repurchases result in reduction of outstanding share capital by 
distributing cash to selling equity holders. Thus, share repurchases can be seen 
as the reverse of (secondary) equity issues – where companies issue shares and 
raise capital. Out of the three repurchase methods, open market share buybacks 
is the most common method of repurchasing shares (Grullon and Ikenberry 
(2000)). Such repurchase programmes provide managers with the greatest 
flexibility and hence are preferred by executives.
2
 As a result I focus on open 
market repurchase programmes. 
Share repurchase (buyback) announcements represent simple 
authorizations by the company’s board to its management to repurchase a 
certain amount of the firm’s outstanding equity from the market over a given 
time period.
3
 
Thus repurchase announcements represent managerial intention to 
repurchase shares and not actual repurchases. Generally, the market reacts 
positively to such repurchase announcements and announcing firms experience 
significant positive abnormal returns around the announcement date. In the 
academic literature as well as in actual share repurchase announcements 
several reasons are mentioned as to why firms may engage in share repurchase 
activity. Most of the academic research on buybacks has focused on identifying 
                                                          
2
 More than ninety percent of all repurchase programmes rely on open market operations for 
their implementation. 
3
 For example, Applied Material, on April 26, 2015, issued the following press release about its 
share repurchase intentions. 
“Applied Materials, Inc. (NASDAQ: AMAT) today announced that its Board of Directors has 
approved a new share repurchase program authorizing up to $3 billion in repurchases over the 
next three years beginning in the third quarter of fiscal 2015. 
"We are pleased to announce this new share repurchase program," said Gary Dickerson, 
president and chief executive officer of Applied Materials. "This program reflects our 
confidence in our performance and opportunities as well as our strong commitment to 
shareholder returns."........”. Web link: http://www.appliedmaterials.com/company/news/press-
releases/2015/04/applied-materials-announces-3-billion-share-repurchase-authorization  
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the source(s) of gain in firm value as a result of share repurchase 
announcements. 
The corporate finance literature regards repurchase announcements as a 
managerial signal of equity undervaluation assuming managers will only 
repurchase shares when they believe their stock to be trading below its fair 
value.  Brav et al. (2005) document that the primary reason cited by US 
corporate executives for their decision to repurchase shares is, in fact, stock 
undervaluation.
4
 Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991) explain 
positive abnormal returns associated with share repurchase announcement as a 
market response to executives’ undervaluation signals. Ikenberry et al. (1995), 
Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) further show that 
undervalued firms that announce a repurchase programme earn significant 
abnormal returns on announcement and also outperform in the long-run.  
However, recent data shows that managers may not necessarily use 
repurchases to take advantage of low stock prices. Waggoner (2015) claims 
that companies are not particularly good at timing the market. He highlights 
that firms repurchased the highest number of shares in 2007 when the market 
was at its peak, and the least number of shares were purchased in 2009 when 
the market was bearish. Thus, undervaluation is not the sole reason behind 
managements’ decision to initiate a repurchase programme. Repurchases can 
be initiated for several other reasons. For example, as an alternative to 
dividends and a tax efficient way of distributing cash to shareholder (Allen et 
al. (2000); Fatemi and Bildik (2012); Grullon and Michaely (2002)), to alter 
capital structure (Masulis (1980); Skinner (2008)), to manage earnings (Hribar 
et al. (2006); Gong et al. (2008); Young and Yang (2011)), to prevent dilution 
                                                          
4
 “Time Warner may favor a share repurchase rather than an increase of its dividend because 
the stock is “a bargain”…..”by Rabil (2009, Feb. 3) in  Bloomberg 
 “Charlie [Warren Buffet’s partner] and I favour repurchases when two conditions are met; 
first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its 
business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business 
value, conservatively calculated.”- by Rotblut (2012, Feb. 3)  in Forbes  
4 
 
 
and/or fund employee stock grants and options (Jolls (1998); Kahle (2002); 
Bens et al. (2003)). 
More recent studies have focused on the credibility of open market 
repurchase announcements as a managerial signal of stock undervaluation. 
Open market repurchase announcements are simple authorizations and not 
binding obligations on firms’ management and hence do not send a strong 
signal of equity undervaluation. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) show that not 
all firms complete their announced repurchase programmes. In fact, some firms 
do not repurchase a single share post-announcement. Chan et al. (2010) argue 
that minimum regulatory and disclosure requirements in the US around actual 
buybacks also facilitate mimicking behaviour from other firms. US presidential 
candidate Hillary Clinton has also recently called for more timely disclosure on 
share repurchases (Whitehouse (2015, Oct. 16)). Vermaelen (1981) compares 
the relative signalling power of repurchase tender offers, Dutch auctions and 
open market repurchases and concludes that the latter is considered to be the 
least effective tool to signal undervaluation. 
Fried (2001) theoretically argues that open market repurchase 
announcements serve managerial interests and presents his alternative 
hypothesis of “managerial opportunism”. He argues that managers use 
repurchase programmes to maximise their personal wealth instead of signaling 
value to investors. Executive compensation is often linked to firms’ earnings 
per share and stock price performance, which are positively affected by share 
buybacks.
5
 Fenn and Liang (2001), Massa et al. (2007), Louis and White 
(2007) and Chan et al. (2010) provide evidence that repurchase programmes 
are used opportunistically or at least “cosmetically” by managers to mislead 
investors. Thus buyback announcements can be value signalling or agency 
                                                          
5
 “Executives are compensated [based] on EPS, the primary reason they do buybacks.” by 
Murphy and Kester (2014, Oct. 29)  in The Wall Street Journal 
Earnings per share is positively affected when managers actually repurchase shares and stock 
prices generally increase on the repurchase announcement. 
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driven. So, how credibly a share buyback announcement signals firm 
undervaluation represents an empirical question. 
Open market share repurchase announcements thus represent a special 
case that can either be viewed as value signalling or misleading (agency 
driven). This thesis studies open market repurchase announcements in the 
context of agency issues associated with such announcements. It is important to 
note that in this thesis I refer to agency issues as in the traditional agency 
theory where a conflict of interest results from separation of ownership and 
control. By agency driven repurchases I mean repurchase programmes initiated 
by firm management in their self-interests rather than creating value for 
shareholders. This differs from agency theory of free cash flows where a 
repurchase programme announcement is, in fact, a positive news for 
shareholders. Shareholders of cash rich firms with poor investment 
opportunities benefit from repurchase activity as it reduces the amount of cash 
available to managers for empire building and other unproductive uses. 
Specifically, in chapter 2 and 3, I explore factors that can influence 
investors’ perception about the strength of repurchase announcement as a value 
signalling mechanism and more importantly if these factors can explain 
differences in market reaction to the share buyback “signal”. In chapter 4, by 
analyzing insider trades around the repurchase announcement event, I 
empirically explore the possibility of managers timing the market by exploiting 
share repurchase announcements. My final chapter, chapter 5 concludes the 
thesis and highlights areas of further research/work.  
Each of my empirical chapter employs US data and is compiled from 
different data sources. Chapter 2 covers repurchase announcements of S&P 
1500 firms between 1992 and 2008. Executive compensation data is available 
from 1992 onwards. The data period ends in 2008 to allow calculation of long-
term returns up to 4 years post-announcement. In chapter 3, I work with sample 
data of 351 repurchase announcements made between 2000 and 2004. This 
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study requires hand collected data and is run on a relatively small data sample 
due to the nature of data collection process and the time constraints of WBS 
doctoral programme. I will significantly increase the sample size to make it 
consistent with existing literature when revising chapter 3 for publication. 
Chapter 4 is my final empirical chapter of this thesis and thus includes more 
recent data on repurchase announcement as well. This chapter includes 
repurchase programmes announced between 1990 and 2012. The next 
subsections summarise each chapter of this thesis. 
1.2 Executive compensation and repurchases 
In chapter 2, I investigate the relationship between executive compensation 
arrangements and stock market reaction to repurchase announcements and also 
their impact on actual repurchases post-announcement. In theory, an efficient 
market should be able to differentiate between value signalling and “cosmetic” 
repurchase announcements. However, since an ex-ante measure of managerial 
intent does not exist, investors have to rely on noisy proxies to approximate the 
credibility of a buyback announcement as value signalling. In this chapter, I 
explore how investors view and react to an open market share repurchase 
announcement given executive compensation arrangements. Specifically, I test 
whether the market distinguishes between value signalling and agency driven 
or “cosmetic” repurchase announcements by observing the underlying 
managerial wealth and repurchase incentives. I expect that differences in 
degree of agency issues (incentive alignment between the executive and 
shareholders) among repurchasing firms can explain variations in stock price 
reaction to firms’ repurchase announcements and also actual repurchase 
decisions post-announcement. 
 I conjecture that if the executive compensation package is structured in 
a way that reduces agency issues then a repurchase announcement from such 
managers’ should be regarded as a relatively more credible signal of equity 
undervaluation by the market. In cases where shareholders’ and executives’ 
7 
 
 
interests diverge, such firm announcements may provide less value relevant 
information and outside investors may become increasingly suspicious of 
these. Thus, the market reaction to repurchase announcements will be stronger 
for firms with better incentive alignment between executives and shareholders. 
 My study focuses on share-based compensation component of the 
CEO’s remuneration package as this is argued to be highly effective in 
reducing agency issues (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)). To estimate 
managerial wealth incentives and risk preferences, I use delta and vega 
measures following Core and Guay (2001) and Coles et al. (2006). Delta 
represents sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price. Chava and Purnanandam 
(2010) argue that in equilibrium an optimal level of delta aligns executive 
wealth incentives with those of shareholders as managers share gains and 
losses with shareholders. So, higher delta values should reduce agency costs 
and any signal by such a manager should be considered as value signalling in 
relative terms. Percentage of CEO firm equity ownership is also used to 
capture the immediate effect of repurchase announcement on CEO wealth.
6
  
 Vega measures sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility. 
Executives with higher vega have an incentive to increase firm risk, whereas 
shareholders are regarded as risk neutral in theory. Although shareholders may 
not necessarily dislike risk as long as firm value increases, excessive risk can 
result in lower firm value due to the higher discount rate used in evaluating 
expected cash flows. On the other hand, in theory, managers have nothing to 
lose, and in fact all to gain, as the value of their stock options increases with 
higher stock return volatility. So, the market should respond more 
circumspectly to an announcement made by an executive with higher vega.  
 Nonetheless, endogeneity of compensation schemes can be of some 
concern. If compensation contracts were perfectly designed then delta and vega 
measures might be of little use in estimating the severity of agency problems. If 
                                                          
6
 Percentage of CEO equity ownership represents the proportional stake of the executive in the 
firm. 
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this were the case then the coefficients on these variables would be 
insignificantly different from zero in empirical tests. However, my empirical 
tests show that this is not the case. Literature on executive compensation 
arrangements also suggests that compensation contracts are less than perfectly 
designed (see e.g. Morck et al. (1988); Crystal (1991) and Jensen (1993)).
7
 
Lastly, to alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns I use lagged values of 
compensation arrangement variables in all of my regression model 
specifications. 
 I test my predictions using a sample of 2,296 unique share repurchase 
announcements made by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 firms between 1992 
and 2008. My results show that a novel relationship exists between executive 
compensation arrangements and the “perceived” credibility of share buyback 
announcements as value signalling. The market approximates the credibility of 
a buyback announcement (as value signalling) by observing the underlying 
managerial wealth and repurchase incentives. In particular, I find that the 
executive compensation arrangements can explain both the market reaction to, 
and actual repurchase decisions of, firms after the repurchase announcement. 
Short-term repurchase announcement returns are significantly positively 
(negatively) related to percentage of CEO equity holdings (vega). Longer-term 
annual buy-and-hold returns are also significantly positively (negatively) 
related to sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price (volatility). 
Mean three day return (-1, 1) around the share buyback announcement 
is 2.14% for firms in the lowest vega quintile (1) compared with only 0.86% 
for firms in the highest vega quintile (5). Similarly, average annual buy-and-
hold abnormal return for firms in quintile 1 is 5.47% as compared with only 
2.82% for firms in quintile 5. This univariate result suggests that the market 
does respond more circumspectly to buyback announcements where CEO 
                                                          
7
 Core et al. (2003) provide an excellent review of the executive compensation literature. 
Jensen (2005) also shows that executives with high wealth sensitivity to their firm’s equity 
may end up destroying the core value of the business in defending the overvaluation of its 
stock.   
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wealth increases with increase in firm risk. However, a parallel return pattern is 
not so obvious in delta sorted quintiles. 
Multivariate regression results also indicate that short-term 
announcement returns are significantly negatively (positively) related to CEO 
wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility (percentage of CEO equity 
ownership). In further tests, I show that short-term returns are positively related 
to a compensation dummy variable that represents better incentive alignment 
and/or lower agency concerns.
8
 The relationship between compensation 
dummy variable and short-term announcement returns is positive and highly 
significant suggesting that the market reacts more favourably to repurchase 
announcements where executive wealth incentives are better aligned with those 
of shareholders. The coefficients on the separate interactions of compensation 
dummy with proxies of information asymmetry and undervaluation are more 
positive and highly significant. This indicates that investors react more strongly 
to buyback announcements from CEOs with better incentive alignment when 
the firm is more likely to be undervalued or when firms suffer from higher 
information asymmetry  
Consistent with Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) I find that the market under reacts to the repurchase signal and such 
firms earn abnormal returns over the next three years. Longer-term returns of 
repurchase announcing firms are also positively (negatively) related to CEO 
wealth sensitivity to stock price (volatility). However, incentive alignment 
variables have opposite signs when regressed against actual repurchases as a 
dependant variable. Firms that initiate repurchase programmes for 
undervaluation reasons will have a lower incentive to repurchase shares when 
post-announcement returns are high and mispricing is eliminated. Higher post-
announcement returns also make actual repurchases more costly and thus can 
justify the positive (negative) relationship between repurchase rates and CEO 
                                                          
8
 The compensation dummy represents a combination of three incentive alignment variables, 
delta, vega and percentage CEO share ownership. Compensation dummy is 1 when delta is 
high, vega is low and percentage CEO share ownership is high and 0 otherwise. 
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wealth sensitivity to volatility (stock price).  Executives with higher wealth 
sensitivity to volatility are also more likely to repurchase a greater number of 
shares due to the fact that actual repurchases increase firm risk.  
 As a further test, I explore the relationship between executive 
compensation arrangements and firm investment behaviour and operating 
performance. Coles et al. (2006) show that managerial compensation 
arrangements affect firms’ investment policy. Higher CEO wealth sensitivity to 
volatility encourages managers to cut capital expenditure and invest in more 
risky projects resulting in lower operating returns. CEOs with higher equity 
ownership tend to invest more in capital expenditure and deliver better 
operating performance. Consistent with this, I find that higher sensitivity of 
CEO wealth to stock volatility is negatively related to average annual capital 
expenditure and post-announcement operating performance. However, 
percentage of CEO share ownership is positively related to investment 
decisions and operating returns. These findings are also in line with prior 
literature on executive compensation and firm policy and provide further 
evidence on why firms with higher CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price 
(volatility) should earn higher (lower) abnormal returns and repurchase fewer 
(more) shares post-announcement. 
The chapter contributes to the growing literature addressing the 
credibility of open market share repurchase announcements as a signal of firm 
undervaluation. For example, Chan et al. (2010) use earnings quality as a 
measure of managerial propensity to mislead investors using share repurchase 
announcements. Chang et al. (2010) and Bonaimé (2012) show that investors 
draw upon their prior experience of firm repurchases while reacting to their 
subsequent share repurchase announcements. Chen and Wang (2012) show that 
the market reacts more sceptically to repurchase announcements of financially 
constrained firms as they are more likely to under invest and become less 
competitive in future.  
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The empirical research study described in this chapter makes an 
original contribution to the literature on share buybacks and executive 
compensation. It establishes a link between executive compensation 
arrangements and the “perceived” credibility of share buyback announcement 
as a signal of equity undervaluation. My analysis suggests that not all buyback 
announcements are regarded “as equal”. Executive compensation arrangements 
play an important role in determining how the market perceives and reacts to a 
share buyback announcement. Thus, executive compensation arrangements is 
value relevant information and can explain short-term and longer-term returns 
as well as actual repurchase rates of firms that announce a repurchase 
programme. Executives make investment and operating choices based on their 
compensation/incentives which affect firm risk and performance. The market 
appears to understand underlying managerial wealth and repurchase incentives 
and acts accordingly.  
1.3 Language of buyback announcements 
Corporations disclose material information to investors through a variety of 
methods including corporate announcements. One such announcement is about 
the firm’s intention to repurchase shares through open market operations. In 
chapter 3, I analyse actual repurchase announcements to explore if the narrative 
disclosure tone of repurchase announcement press releases can help in 
explaining investor reaction to the repurchase announcement.  
A number of recent studies highlight the importance of qualitative data 
in enhancing our understanding of financial markets. For example, Tetlock et 
al. (2008) suggest that linguistic media content captures otherwise hard-to-
quantify aspects of firm fundamentals. They show that simple quantitative 
measures of language derived from firm-specific news can predict firms’ 
earnings and stock returns.  The objective here is to lever qualitative 
disclosures of share repurchase announcements to analyse if these are value 
relevant information and of some importance to investors. 
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Here, I conjuncture that managers with real good news may use more 
optimistic (positive) language to distinguish themselves from others.
9
 By 
resorting to more positive disclosure tone managers expose themselves to 
higher litigation risk (see for example, Francis et al. (1994); Rogers et al. 
(2011)). The additional litigation risk may add credibility to their repurchase 
announcement as value signaling. Using a content analysis approach, I 
investigate if the language of share repurchase announcement news is value 
relevant information for investors. More specifically, I examine the effect of 
share repurchase announcement disclosure tone on short-term announcement 
returns, longer-term returns and actual repurchase decisions of firms that 
announce a repurchase programme. 
The data for the study is hand collected and allows me to investigate 
several interesting aspects of share repurchase programmes. Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) and Bonaimé (2012) show that the stated motive of 
repurchase programmes is value relevant information for investors. Thus I 
classify repurchase announcements according to their stated motive(s). In 
addition, I collect information on any other material information that may 
accompany a repurchase announcement such as earnings, mergers and 
acquisitions or recent stock performance news etc. I broadly classify these 
either as good news or bad news.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
it introduces a qualitative perspective into the literature on share repurchases. It 
is the first research study to the best of my knowledge that analyses disclosure 
tone of repurchase announcements. My results suggest that the narrative 
disclosure tone of repurchase announcements is significantly positively related 
to short-term announcement returns. Thus, the market reacts more favourably 
to repurchase announcements with more optimistic disclosure tone. Mean three 
day (-1, 1) difference in returns of firms in the highest and the lowest ranked 
                                                          
9
 In the paper I use the term optimistic and positive interchangeably. 
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groups by disclosure tone is 1.71% and is highly significant at the 1% level. 
This suggests that investors regard positive repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone as a proxy for managerial optimism about their firm’s prospects 
and react more strongly. 
 New information (signals) might be more value relevant for firms 
suffering a higher degree of information asymmetry. Following Bonaimé 
(2012), I measure degree of information asymmetry by firm size and find that 
the impact of positive tone is more pronounced for small firms. Initial market 
reaction to positive tone is also stronger for firms with more growth 
opportunities (low Book-to-Market ratio) as compared to value firms. Mercer 
(2004) shows that the presence of numeric terms and numeric precision 
increases the credibility of management disclosure. The impact of positive tone 
of buyback announcement news is further enhanced by the presence of a higher 
number of numeric terms in the repurchase announcement. However, I observe 
no link between narrative disclosure tone and actual repurchases post-
announcement and the longer-term abnormal returns of firms that announce a 
share repurchase programme. 
Second, chapter 3 contributes to the existing literature by allowing a 
better understanding of the stated objectives of repurchase programmes, their 
relative frequency, the market reaction to such repurchase announcements and 
also in terms of their actual completion rates and long-run performance. As 
expected, the initial announcement return is highest for firms that announce 
repurchase programmes citing stock undervaluation as the motive. Mean 3-day 
cumulative abnormal return around the repurchase announcement event is 
1.11% significant at the 5% level. However, the announcement return is 
negative for firms that repurchase for legal reasons. More interestingly, firms 
that do not state any reason in their repurchase announcement earn positive 
abnormal returns both in the short term and long term which are significant at 
conventional levels as compared to firms that repurchase for reasons other than 
undervaluation. An important research question for further exploration here is: 
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why do these latter firms state a reason for their repurchase programme when 
this is associated with under-performance compared to those who simply 
announce a repurchase programme without mentioning any reason for their 
intention to repurchase stock? This study highlights the importance of 
discretionary disclosure options for managers in relation to share repurchases 
and their impact on firm valuation.   
Finally, my hand collected data allows me to analyse other aspects of 
share repurchase announcements. For example, I analyse the relative frequency 
of other news mentioned in share repurchase announcements, its nature and 
impact on the market reaction to the buyback announcement event. Descriptive 
statistical analysis is provided in the chapter. 
1.4 Insider trading and repurchase announcements 
Chapter 4 tests if insiders employ repurchase programmes for their own 
personal benefit by looking at insider trades taking place around repurchase 
announcements. Specifically, I test the relationship between pre- and post-
announcement insider trades and returns of firms that announce a repurchase 
programme. Open market share repurchase announcements do not send a very 
strong signal of firm under-pricing for reasons mentioned earlier in this 
chapter. Investors may also discount the open market repurchase 
announcement “signal” as managers’ personal wealth incentives may lead them 
to announce such programmes. In fact, in this context, Fried (2001; 2005) also 
claims that open market repurchase announcements reflect opportunistic 
managerial behaviour rather than serving as a signal of equity undervaluation. 
Consistent with this, Edmans et al. (2014) show that managers strategically 
time the disclosure of positive news (in months in which their equity vests), so 
that they can cash out at a higher stock price.  
In this chapter I analyse insider trades around open market repurchase 
announcements to infer insiders’ private information about firm value. The 
objectives of this investigation are twofold. First, I argue that a repurchase 
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announcement will be a more credible signal of undervaluation when it is 
supported by insiders actions. Insiders who buy more (or sell less) stock in 
their firm, in advance of the repurchase announcement, signal that they believe 
their stock to be under-priced. Holding additional own firm equity is costly and 
exposes already undiversified insiders to considerable risk. This is particularly 
true if the stock is overpriced. So, investors should take into account pre-
announcement insider trades in evaluating repurchase announcements and 
respond accordingly. Second, there is also a possibility that insiders announce a 
repurchase programme to cash out at a higher price rather than to signal equity 
undervaluation (Fried (2005)).
10
  Such insiders are more likely to sell after the 
repurchase announcement is made. Post-announcement sales will be 
particularly beneficial for insiders when announcement returns are high. So, 
post-announcement insider sales will be higher when repurchase announcement 
returns are high. 
Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that insiders can 
predict long-run price performance in the case of small firms for up to two 
years. They show that smaller firms are more likely to be mispriced and 
insiders can profitably trade in smaller firms as these present the greatest 
potential of gains from insider trading. Finally, insiders will sell more of the 
stock they own in their firm when they believe it to be either over-priced or at 
least not significantly under-priced. Thus such post-announcement insider sales 
also signal insiders private information about the firm’s true value. So, firms 
where insiders sell more shares post-announcement should not outperform or 
underperform in the long-run as compared to other repurchase announcing 
firms. Therefore, I expect post-announcement net insider sales to be either 
unrelated or negatively related to long-term firm performance.   
                                                          
10
 Fried (2001) suggests that repurchase announcements can be used as a false signalling device 
as these are not binding obligations on the part of firm management. Massa et al. (2007) and 
Chan et al. (2010) provide evidence that managers use repurchase programmes to fool the 
market. 
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I test these predictions using a sample of 8,945 open market repurchase 
programmes announced between 1990 and 2012. I find that the market reacts 
more positively to repurchase announcements where insiders’ net sales are 
lower (buy more or sell less) in the pre-announcement period. Firms with lower 
net insider sales earn an average 3-day buy-and-hold abnormal return of 2.4 
percent, 0.80 percent greater than firms where insider net sales are higher 
before the repurchase announcement, with difference highly significant at 
conventional levels.  However, pre-announcement trades affect only short-term 
announcement returns; I find that the difference in longer-term returns of the 
two groups is not statistically significant.  
In line with the insider signalling argument, regression results suggest 
that short-term repurchase announcement returns are significantly positively 
(negatively) related to insider purchases (sales). Similar to earlier studies (such 
as Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)), I find 
announcement returns are higher for undervalued and smaller firms that suffer 
from higher information asymmetry and are thus more likely to be mispriced. 
Similar to the empirical evidence on the value relevance of insider trading (see 
for example, Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Ofek and Yermack (2000) and Jin 
(2002)), I find that insider purchases have a stronger positive effect on 
announcement returns while insider sales are only weakly negatively related. I 
also find that 3-month pre-announcement insider trading has a stronger effect 
on announcement returns as compared to insider trades 6-months before the 
announcement.
11
 
Next, I investigate the relationship between post-announcement insider 
trades and repurchase announcement returns. Consistent with Fried’s (2005) 
theoretical argument that managers may announce repurchase programmes to 
sell their shares at a higher price, I find that insiders sell more shares in the 3-
month window post-announcement than in the pre-announcement 3-month 
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 Regression coefficients on 3-month insider trade variables (purchases, sales, net sales) are 
higher than those of 6-month insider trades. 
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window. However there is no significant difference in insider purchases during 
the two periods. Similar to Huddart et al. (2007) and Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012), I find that insiders trade more cautiously in the 6-month (-3, 3) window 
centred on the repurchase announcement date as compared to the 12-month (-6, 
6) window.  
My analysis suggests that insiders sell (purchase) more (less) shares 
when their firm’s stock is less likely to be undervalued such as firms with 
lower book-to-market value ratios, firms with more negative runup returns and 
firms with higher net insider sales (lower purchases) in the pre-announcement 
period. In line with Fried (2005), I also document that insiders sell more shares 
post-announcement, especially when announcement returns are high, allowing 
them to cash out at higher stock prices. My analysis further indicates that 
controlling for announcement returns, insiders sell more when a firm is less 
likely to be under-priced (low book-to-market value) and more likely to be 
mispriced with potential gains to exploiting insider trades (small firms). 
Finally, I explore the relationship between post-announcement insider 
trades and repurchase announcement returns; and the signalling effect of post-
announcement insider trades on the longer-term returns of firms that announce 
a repurchase programme. I find that insider sales (purchases) are significantly 
positively (negatively) related to short-term announcement returns suggesting 
that insiders sell a greater number of shares when repurchase announcement 
returns are high. This is consistent with Fried (2001; 2005) who posits that 
insiders announce repurchase programmes to sell their equity at higher post-
announcement stock prices. This is the first paper (to the best of my 
knowledge) that empirically documents that insiders sell more equity post-
announcement especially when announcement returns are high. However, I 
find mixed results for the signalling argument in the case of the association 
between post-announcement insider sales and the longer-term returns of 
repurchase announcing firms. Higher post-announcement insider sales signal 
that insiders either believe their stock to be overvalued or fairly valued but not 
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significantly undervalued. Consistent with this, regression results of 1-month 
net insider sales on longer-term returns show that insider sales are not related 
to first year buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) and only weakly 
negatively related to second year BHAR. However, regression results of 3-
month net insider sales post-announcement show that this is positively related 
to first year BHAR but weakly related to second year BHAR of share 
repurchasing firms.
12
  
This chapter of my thesis, in particular, contributes to the growing 
literature addressing the credibility of the share repurchase programme 
announcement as a signal of equity undervaluation and also to the corporate 
payout policy literature, more generally. Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and 
Jarrell (1991) evaluate the relative market reaction to repurchase tender offers, 
Dutch auctions and open market share repurchases and find that the latter is 
considered to be the least effective signalling tool with lowest announcement 
returns as compared to other methods. Fried (2001; 2005) theoretically and 
Chan et al. (2010) empirically show that repurchase announcements are used 
by managers in their self-interest rather than to convey value relevant 
information to the market. Fenn and Liang (2001) show that managers with a 
higher number of stock options use repurchase announcements to artificially 
increase stock prices. I add to the literature by showing that insiders, in fact, 
take advantage of higher post-announcement stock prices and sell more shares. 
Post-announcement insider sales also signal insiders’ private information to 
investors regarding firm value. 
The paper also adds to literature on insider trading. Seyhun (1998), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that insider 
trading contains value relevant information for market participants. My 
research also sheds light on the trading behaviour of insiders around buyback 
announcements and their investment horizon. I contribute to the literature on 
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 The unexpected positive relationship of 3-month net insider sales with first year BHAR 
might be due to higher demand for the firm’s shares due to its repurchase activity resulting in 
higher returns for the year. 
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insider trading by demonstrating that insider trades both before and after the 
repurchase announcement provide value relevant information to investors in 
evaluating share buyback signal. 
My final chapter in this thesis, chapter 5, summarises my findings and 
the overall contribution of my study to the share buyback literature. I also 
suggest future research avenues and opportunities in this area. 
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Chapter 2   
 
Executive Compensation and Open Market Share 
Repurchases 
2.1 Introduction and motivation 
The last couple of decades have witnessed a tremendous surge in the use of 
share repurchase programmes. The corporate finance literature regards these 
repurchase announcements as managerial signal of firm undervaluation.  Brav 
et al. (2005) document that stock undervaluation is in fact the most cited reason 
by managers for their decision to repurchase shares.
13
 Vermaelen (1981) and 
Comment and Jarrell (1991) explain the positive abnormal returns associated 
with share repurchase announcement as a market response to executive’s 
undervaluation signal in the form of share repurchase announcement. Ikenberry 
et al. (1995); Ikenberry et al. (2000) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) further 
show that undervalued firms that make a repurchase announcement 
significantly outperform in the long-run.  
However undervaluation is not the sole reason for managements’ 
decision to initiate a repurchase programme. Corporate America is increasingly 
relying on share repurchases to distribute cash to shareholders.
14
 Though 
distribution of excess cash should increase firm value by reducing agency costs 
of free cash flows for firms suffering from overinvestment problem, excessive 
repurchase activity can also result in underinvestment problems for firms with 
good investment opportunities. In addition, open market repurchase 
                                                          
13
 “Time Warner may favor a share repurchase rather than an increase of its dividend because 
the stock is “a bargain”…..” by Rabil (2009, Feb. 3) 
“Charlie [Warren Buffet’s partner] and I favour repurchases when two conditions are met; 
first, a company has ample funds to take care of the operational and liquidity needs of its 
business; second, its stock is selling at a material discount to the company’s intrinsic business 
value, conservatively calculated.” - Rotblut (2012, Feb. 3) 
14
 See for example “S&P may hit another record for buybacks this year” by Farrell (Aug. 18, 
2015) in The Wall Street Journal. 
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announcements are simple authorizations and not binding obligations on the 
firm management and hence do not send a strong signal of equity 
undervaluation. Vermaelen (1981) compares the relative signalling power of 
repurchase tender offers and open market share repurchases and finds that the 
latter is considered to be less effective tool as a signal firm undervaluation. 
More recent studies have focused on the credibility of open market 
repurchase announcement and have challenged the traditional view that 
repurchase announcements represent managerial signal of stock 
undervaluation. Fried (2001) theoretically argues that open market repurchase 
announcements serve managerial interests and presents his alternative 
hypothesis of “managerial opportunism”. He suggests that buybacks positively 
affect executive wealth as executive compensation is often linked to the firm’s 
earnings per share and stock price performance which are positively affected 
by share buybacks.
15
 Fenn and Liang (2001), Massa et al. (2007), Louis and 
White (2007) and Chan et al. (2010) provide evidence that repurchase 
programmes are used opportunistically or at least “cosmetically” by managers 
to mislead investors. Thus buyback announcements can be value signalling or 
agency driven. So, how credibly a share buyback announcement signals firm 
undervaluation represents an empirical question. 
In theory, the market should be able to differentiate between value 
signalling repurchase announcements from “cosmetic” ones. However, since an 
ex-ante measure of managerial intent does not exist, investors have to rely on 
noisy proxies to approximate the credibility of a buyback announcement as 
value signalling. This chapter addresses how investors view an open market 
share repurchase announcement by drawing upon executive compensation 
literature. Specifically, I test whether the market distinguishes between the two 
motives (value signalling vs agency driven) by observing the underlying 
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 “Executives are compensated [based] on EPS, the primary reason they do buybacks.” by 
Murphy and Kester (2014, Oct. 29)  in The Wall Street Journal. 
Earnings per share is positively affected when managers actually repurchase share and stock 
price increases on average when repurchase programme is announced. 
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managerial wealth and repurchase incentives. I expect that differences in 
degree of agency issues among repurchasing firms can explain the variation in 
stock price reaction to firms’ repurchase announcements.   
I conjecture that if executive compensation package is structured in a 
way that reduces agency issues then managers’ repurchase announcement 
should reflect “inside” information on firm value and hence be regarded as a 
more credible signal of equity undervaluation by the market. In cases where 
shareholders’ and executives’ interests diverge, such firm announcements may 
provide less value relevant information and outside investors may become 
increasingly suspicious of these. Thus, the market reaction to repurchase 
announcements will be stronger for firms with better incentive alignment 
between the executive and shareholders. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that 
undervalued firms earn higher abnormal returns on repurchase announcement. 
Thus, I expect a stronger and more positive market reaction to firm’s 
repurchase announcements where agency issues are lower (better incentive 
alignment) and firm is more likely to be undervalued. Similarly, for firms that 
suffer from higher degree of information asymmetry, any signal (new 
information) to market is more important though also more difficult to verify. 
So, investors’ reaction to repurchase announcement signal will be stronger for 
firms that have higher degree of information asymmetry and where better 
incentive alignment between the executive and shareholders adds credibility to 
their buyback signal. 
This study, in particular, focuses on the share-based compensation 
component of the CEO’s remuneration package as this is argued to be highly 
effective in reducing agency issues (e.g., Jensen and Meckling (1976)). To 
measure managerial wealth incentives and risk preferences, I use delta and 
vega measures following Core and Guay (2001) and Coles et al. (2006). Delta 
represents the sensitivity of CEO wealth to share price. Chava and 
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Purnanandam (2010) argue that in equilibrium an optimal level of delta aligns 
executive wealth incentives with those of shareholders as managers share gains 
and losses with shareholders. So, higher delta values should reduce agency 
costs and any signal by such a manager should be considered as value 
signalling in relative terms. Percentage of CEO firm equity ownership is also 
used to capture the immediate effect of repurchase announcement on CEO 
wealth. Percentage of CEO equity ownership represents the proportional stake 
of the executive in firm value. A signal from an executive that owns a larger 
portion of firm value is more likely to be regarded as value signalling by the 
market.  
Vega measures managerial wealth sensitivity to stock return volatility. 
Managers with higher vega have an incentive to increase firm risk, whereas 
shareholders are regarded as risk neutral in theory. Although shareholders may 
not necessarily dislike risk as long as firm value increases, excessive risk can 
result in lower firm value due to higher discount rate used in evaluating 
expected cash flows. On the other hand, in theory, managers have nothing to 
lose, and in fact all to gain, as their stock options become more valuable with 
increase in stock volatility. So, the market should respond more circumspectly 
to an announcement made by an executive with higher vega.  
Here, endogeneity of compensation schemes can be of some concern. If 
compensation contracts were perfectly designed then measures of delta and 
vega might be of little use in measuring the severity of agency problems. 
However, if this were the case then the coefficient on these variables would 
have been insignificantly different from zero in empirical tests. However, my 
empirical results suggest that this is not the case. Literature on executive 
compensation arrangements also suggests that compensation contracts are less 
than perfectly designed (see e.g., Morck et al. (1988); Crystal (1991) and 
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Jensen (1993)).
16
 Lastly to alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns I use 
lagged values of compensation arrangement variables in all of my regression 
models. 
I test the above mentioned hypotheses using a sample of 2,296 unique 
share repurchase announcements made by Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 1500 
firms between 1992 and 2008. My results show that a novel relationship exists 
between executive compensation arrangements and the stock market reaction 
to share buyback announcements. The market approximates the credibility of a 
buyback announcement (as value signalling) by observing the underlying 
managerial wealth and repurchase incentives. In particular, my analysis 
indicates that executive compensation arrangements can explain both the 
market reaction to, and actual repurchase decisions of, firms after the 
repurchase announcement. Mean 3-day return (-1, 1) around the share buyback 
announcement is 2.14% for firms in the lowest vega quintile (1) compared with 
only 0.86% for firms in the highest vega quintile (5). Similarly, average annual 
buy-and-hold abnormal return for firms in quintile 1 is 5.47% as compared 
with only 2.82% for firms in quintile 5. This shows that the market does 
respond more circumspectly to buyback announcements where CEO wealth is 
more sensitive to changes in risk. However, a parallel return pattern is not so 
obvious in delta sorted quintiles. 
Multivariate regression results show that short term announcement 
returns are significantly negatively (positively) related to sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock return volatility (percentage of CEO equity ownership). In 
further tests, I show that short term returns are positively related to a 
compensation dummy variable that represents better incentive alignment and/or 
lower agency concerns.
17
 The relationship between compensation dummy 
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 Core et al. (2003) provide an excellent review of the executive compensation literature.  
Jensen (2005) also shows that executives with high wealth sensitivity to their firm’s equity 
may end up destroying the core value of the business in defending overvaluation of its stock.  
17
 The compensation dummy represents a combination of three incentive alignment variable, 
delta, vega and percentage CEO share ownership. Compensation dummy is 1 when delta is 
high, vega is low and percentage CEO share ownership is high and 0 otherwise. 
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variable and short term announcement returns is positive and highly significant 
suggesting that the market reacts more favourably to repurchase 
announcements where executive wealth incentives are better aligned with those 
of shareholders. The coefficients on the separate interactions of compensation 
dummy with proxies of information asymmetry and undervaluation are more 
positive and highly significant. This indicates that investors react more strongly 
to buyback announcements from CEOs with better incentive alignment when 
the firm is more likely to be undervalued or firms suffering from higher 
information asymmetry.  
The literature suggests that the market under reacts to share repurchase 
announcements (e-g, Ikenberry et al. (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). 
Also share repurchase announcements represent managerial intention to 
repurchases shares rather than a promise. Thus, I also test the role of CEO 
compensation arrangements in explaining firm’s longer-term returns and actual 
share repurchases post-announcement. My analysis suggests that higher CEO 
wealth sensitivity to stock price (volatility) is positively (negatively) related to 
longer-term buy-and-hold returns post-announcement. The finding indicates 
that the market under reacts to the news and firms with better incentive 
alignment between the executive and shareholders earn higher returns over the 
next 3-year period post-announcement.  
However, incentive alignment variables have opposite signs when 
regressed against actual repurchases as a dependant variable instead of returns. 
Higher post-announcement returns make actual share repurchases more costly 
and thus can justify the positive (negative) relationship between repurchase 
rates and CEO wealth sensitivity to volatility (stock price). Also, firms that 
initiate repurchase programmes for undervaluation reasons will have a lower 
incentive to repurchase shares if the post-announcement returns are high and 
mispricing is eliminated.  Executives with higher wealth sensitivity to volatility 
are also more likely to repurchase higher number of shares due to the fact that 
actual repurchases increase firm risk.  
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 As a further test, I explore the relationship between executive 
compensation and firm’s investments and operating performance for my 
sample firms. Coles et al. (2006) show that managerial compensation 
arrangements affect firm’s investment policy. Higher CEO wealth sensitivity to 
stock return volatility encourages managers to cut capital expenditure and 
invest in more risky projects. Such firms tend to repurchase more shares at the 
expense of capital expenditure and have lower operating returns. Firms with 
higher CEO share ownership tend to invest more in capital expenditure and 
earn higher operating returns post-announcement. 
My results demonstrate that higher sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock 
volatility is negatively related to capital expenditure and operating performance 
in the three year period post-announcement. However, percentage of CEO 
share ownership is positively related to investments and operating returns. 
These findings are consistent with prior literature on executive compensation 
and firm policy and provide further evidence that why firms with higher CEO 
wealth sensitivity to stock price (volatility) should earn higher (lower) 
abnormal returns and repurchase fewer (more) shares post-announcement. 
The paper contributes to the growing literature on the credibility of 
open market share repurchase announcement as a signal of firm 
undervaluation. Chan et al. (2010) use earnings quality as a measure of 
managerial propensity to mislead investors using share repurchase 
announcements. Chang et al. (2010) and Bonaimé (2012) show that investors 
draw upon their prior experience of firm repurchases while reacting to their 
subsequent repurchase announcements. Chen and Wang (2012) show that the 
market reacts more sceptically to repurchase announcements of financially 
constraint firms as they are more likely to under invest and become less 
competitive in future. Fried (2005) even argues that managers, in fact, 
opportunistically employ share repurchase programmes for their own good 
rather than signalling firm undervaluation.  
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This research makes an original contribution to the literature on 
buybacks and executive compensation arrangements. The paper establishes a 
link between executive compensation arrangements and the perceived 
credibility of share buyback announcements as a signal of equity 
undervaluation. The results presented in the paper are robust even after 
controlling for a host of factors that may affect repurchase announcement 
returns and completion rates. 
In conclusion, the analysis in this study suggests that not all buyback 
announcements are regarded “as equal”. Executive compensation design plays 
an important role in determining how the market perceives and reacts to a share 
buyback announcement. Executive compensation design is value relevant 
information and can explain short term and longer-term returns as well as 
actual share repurchases after the repurchase announcement. Executives make 
investment and operating choices based on their compensation/incentives 
which affect firm risk and performance. The market appears to understand 
underlying managerial repurchase incentives and acts accordingly.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 
provides a brief review of relevant literature and lists hypotheses. In section 
2.3, I discuss data sources, research methodology and sample selection. The 
results are discussed in section 2.4 and finally I conclude in section 2.5. 
2.2 Background and hypotheses 
The last few decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in stock repurchase 
activity. Skinner (2008) shows that corporations now distribute a greater 
portion of their earnings by repurchasing their firms’ stock and only dividend 
paying firms are largely extinct. In 2013, the S&P 500 index companies alone 
have spent around $500 billion on share repurchases (Thurm (2013)). Given 
the growth rate and amount of money involved in share repurchases, it remains 
a hot topic in the area of corporate finance.  
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The academic literature as well as managers in their repurchase 
announcements provides several reasons as to why firms engage in repurchase 
activity. One of the earliest explanations is a taxation motive. Stock buybacks 
serve as a tax efficient way of returning cash to shareholders compared to 
dividends (see e.g., John and Williams (1985) and Allen et al. (2000)). 
Repurchases are treated as capital gains which are taxed at a lower rate than 
dividend income (see e.g., Litzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979) and Lie and 
Lie (1999) for empirical evidence). Several papers also document the rise in 
use of buyback programmes as a substitute for dividends (see e.g., Fama and 
French (2001); DeAngelo et al. (2004) and Fatemi and Bildik (2012)). Stock 
buybacks are also used to make capital structure adjustments (Dittmar (2000) 
and Dixon et al. (2008)), to distribute excess cash to shareholders especially in 
firms with low investment opportunities (Oswald and Young (2008)), to 
manage earnings (Gong et al. (2008) and Hribar et al. (2006)), to fund 
outstanding option awards (Kahle (2002)) and as a takeover deterrent (Bagnoli 
et al. (1989); Billett and Xue (2007) and Lin et al. (2012)). 
Finance academics have mainly focused on signalling theory to explain 
abnormal returns experienced by firms that announce a share repurchase 
programme. The signalling hypothesis regards stock buyback announcement as 
a managerial signal of stock undervaluation. I discuss this explanation in some 
detail below. 
2.2.1 Buyback announcements as a market signal 
Information asymmetry in the market place can lead stock prices to deviate 
from their fundamental value. Managers are particularly sensitive to stock 
undervaluation and often take action to correct it by signalling their private 
information to the market. Grullon and Ikenberry (2000) point out that a stock 
can be undervalued either due to market’s failure to correctly process available 
information or its inability to take into account firm’s growth prospects. 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) show that undervaluation can also result from the 
29 
 
 
market’s failure to adjust for expected risk reduction after repurchase 
programme announcement.  
 Ikenberry et al. (1995) conduct the most important empirical study in 
this regard. They use share repurchase announcement data from the Wall Street 
Journal between 1980 and 1990 and show that repurchase announcing firms, on 
average, earn an abnormal return of more than 12% over the next 4 years. They 
show that these results are driven by undervalued firms as value firms (high 
B/M) earn an abnormal return of over 45% in the 4-year period post-repurchase 
announcement as compared to growth firms (low B/M) that do not show any 
abnormal performance.  
To render further support for their findings, Ikenberry et al. (2000) 
conduct a similar study using 1,060 buyback announcements from the 
Canadian market and find evidence similar to their earlier study. Undervalued 
(value) firms significantly outperform growth firms, though growth firms also 
earn abnormal returns post-announcement in the Canadian market. Chan et al. 
(2004) also find evidence consistent with this mispricing (undervaluation) 
hypothesis in the US stock market. 
Managers acting in the interest of their long-term shareholders try to 
correct under-pricing by sending “credible” signals to the market. There is a 
well-established costly signalling literature in finance beginning with Spence 
(1973). Signalling costs are important as they provide credibility to what 
managers say. In the absence of signalling costs, all managers, not just the ones 
with good news, will have an incentive to mimic any signal issued by good 
firms. It results in a “pooling equilibrium” where the market fails to distinguish 
between good and bad firms and assigns an average value to all firms. 
Share repurchase announcements, however, represent firm’s 
authorization to repurchase shares (costless) and not the actual transaction 
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(costly).
18
  In addition, such authorizations are not firm commitments and a 
large number of firms do not complete their announced repurchase 
programmes (see e.g., Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar (2008)).
19
  Massa et al. (2007) and Chan et al. (2010) raise concerns 
that lack of firm commitment and the inherent flexibility of stock buyback 
programmes can induce other managers to engage in mimicking behaviour. In 
addition, Chan et al. (2010) argue that minimal regulatory and disclosure 
requirements around actual repurchase transactions and absence of any 
significant reputational penalty for executives who fail to honour their buyback 
commitments also facilitates such mimicking behaviour. 
2.2.2 Executive compensation and buyback announcements 
In addition to the financial flexibility offered by share repurchase programmes, 
managers’ personal wealth incentives can also induce them to announce such 
repurchase programmes. Share repurchases benefit managers both in terms of 
their personal gains as well as in terms of their performance evaluation. At a 
firm level, share repurchases help to stabilise price and improve liquidity in the 
short run (Cook et al. (2004)) and paint a fairer picture of managerial 
performance by improving earnings per share when actual repurchases take 
place.
20
  
“In a world in which corporate performance and executive 
compensation are linked to earnings per share (EPS) and the firm’s share 
                                                          
18
 The evidence on share buyback announcement signalling costs are mixed. Bonaimé, A. A. 
(2012) finds that firms repurchase reputation has an impact on the market reaction to their 
subsequent repurchase announcements. However, Chan et al. (2010) argue that there are no 
significant reputational penalties for managers who fail to honour their repurchase 
commitments. 
19
 “When it comes to stock-buyback, public traded companies show a lot of bark than bite. It’s 
oh-so-easy for a company to announce a buyback program. And it’s gratifying, no doubt, for a 
company to watch its shares jump as a result of announcements. But the open secret on Wall 
Street is that few companies actually buy anywhere near the amount of stock that they indicate 
they might.” – The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1995) 
20
 In an article in The Wall Street Journal Murphy and Kester (2014, Oct. 29) claim that the 
primary reason managers repurchase shares is to improve firm’s EPS number – a performance 
evaluation measure to which executive compensation is often tied. 
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price, share buybacks are an easy way out.” – Denning (2014, Sep. 19) in 
Forbes 
On a personal level, managers benefit directly by observing an increase 
in the value of their options and stocks, given the fact that the market reacts 
positively to these announcements.  
“In general, buyback programs are more attractive to management 
than dividends, because their stock options do not get the benefit of dividends, 
which lower the stock price by the amount of the dividend when they are 
paid.”- Hutchinson (2012, Sep. 21) in Money Morning 
 Fried (2005) even terms open market repurchase announcements as a 
“false signalling device”. He argues that such announcements are mainly 
driven by managerial incentives. A considerable body of literature documents 
the fact that managers engage in informed trading. For example, Gosnell et al. 
(1992) find that corporate insiders get rid of most of their stake in the company 
in the five months preceding a bankruptcy announcement. Kim and Varaiya 
(2003) find that managers sell more heavily in quarters where their firms are 
repurchasing shares. In a recent paper, Edmans et al. (2014) show that 
managers strategically time the disclosure of discretionary news to coincide 
with months in which their equity vests. They show that managers disclose 
significantly greater number of positive news in months in which their equity 
vests, thus allowing them to sell their stock and exercise their options at a 
higher price. 
Open market share repurchase announcement, thus, represents a special 
case that simultaneously exposes the market with agency and signalling theory 
and it has to weigh the two and act accordingly.
21
 Repurchase programmes can 
                                                          
21
 It is important to note that agency theory here refers to the traditional agency conflict 
between the shareholders and managers and not the agency cost of free cash flows. The former 
represents the possibility that repurchase programmes can be used opportunistically against the 
interests of shareholders. In the later case the repurchase announcement is, in fact, viewed as 
good news by shareholders as it reduces the agency costs of free cash flows by limiting the 
amount of cash available to managers for empire building. 
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signal firm undervaluation or these can be exploited opportunistically or at 
least cosmetically by firm management. Given the flexibility, lack of firm 
commitment and managerial incentives attached to open market repurchase 
programmes, such announcements lack characteristics of a strong market 
signal. In an efficient market one would expect market participants to be able 
to differentiate value signalling announcements from agency driven or 
cosmetic ones. However, managerial intentions of repurchase announcement 
are unobservable. Chan et al. (2010) acknowledge the fact that no true, ex-ante 
measure of managerial intent exists. Any measure used to proxy this will at 
best be indirect and noisy.  
I use executive compensation design to proxy the “perceived” strength 
of open market share repurchase announcements by the market as a signal of 
equity undervaluation, which in turn determines the market reaction to the 
news. Executive compensation arrangements are designed to reduce agency 
costs and to align the interests of the executive with those of shareholders. A 
perfect compensation package should, in theory, eliminate all agency costs. 
However, unfortunately, such a compensation package does not exist. So, in 
relative terms, a better compensation package is one that reduces agency costs 
and at the same time sufficiently compensates managers to attract and retain 
better managerial talent (Coles et al. (2006)).  
If executive compensation packages are structured in a way that reduces 
agency problems then managerial announcements should be regarded as more 
credible and lead to reduction in information asymmetry. On the other hand in 
cases where shareholders and executives interests diverge, one should expect 
outside investors to view their buyback signal more sceptically. I particularly 
focus on share-based component of executive compensation package as it is 
argued to be highly effective in resolving agency issues between the executive 
and shareholders as compared to fixed cash compensation (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)).  
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I follow prior literature on share-based executive compensation and 
measure managerial wealth alignment and risk preferences by calculating delta 
and vega for the executive’s portfolio of stocks and options held in the firm 
(see e.g., Core and Guay (2001), Coles et al. (2006) and Low (2009)). Delta 
measures the change in managerial wealth for one percentage point change in 
share price. So delta measures the change in executive wealth as the stock price 
changes. Jensen and Murphy (1990) argue that higher pay performance 
sensitivity is important to incentivise executives to act in the interests of 
shareholders. More recent studies also suggest that CEOs may indulge in 
unethical behaviours, such as earning management, income smoothing and 
gaming the market, when their compensation is more closely tied to firms’ 
operating and stock performance (see Beneish and Vargus (2002); Bergstresser 
and Philippon (2006) and Bergstresser et al. (2006)). Jensen – who initially 
proposed pay for performance compensation in 1990s – also acknowledges the 
fact in his (2005) study that a higher portion of stock based compensation in an 
overvalued market is akin to adding fuel to fire.  
In an agency context however as initially proposed a compensation 
contract that closely ties executive compensation with firm performance 
reduces agency conflict between the executive and shareholders (Jensen and 
Murphy (1990)). Lower agency concerns through better incentive alignment 
encourage managers to take actions/decisions that increase firm value. Thus, a 
signal is more likely to be perceived as credible when agency issues between 
the executive and shareholders are lower. Chava and Purnanandam (2010) 
argue that in equilibrium an optimally chosen delta level aligns executives’ 
incentives with those of shareholders. So, a higher delta value should reduce 
agency costs and any signal from such a manager should be considered as a 
stronger (more credible) signal in relative terms. Formally, I formulate the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relationship between CEO wealth sensitivity 
to stock price (delta) and the market reaction to share buyback announcement.  
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The above relationship is particularly important for the longer-term 
returns as restricted stock grants and stock options normally have a vesting 
period. So, delta associated with stock grants and options aligns incentives over 
medium to long-term period. Similarly, a higher percentage of CEO firm 
ownership also reduces agency issues. However, unlike delta, CEO share 
holdings capture immediate effect on CEO wealth. So, 
Hypothesis 2: There is a positive relationship between CEO share ownership 
and the market reaction to a buyback announcement. 
Vega estimates the dollar change in managerial wealth for one 
percentage point change in stock return volatility. Amihud and Lev (1981) and 
Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that managers hold an undiversified portfolio as 
compared to diversified shareholders due to their heavy investment in firm-
specific wealth. Managers’ concerns over job security and under diversification 
may lead them to forgo risk increasing but positive net present value (NPV) 
projects against the interests of shareholders – an effect that is similar to the 
underinvestment problem explained by Myers (1977). Coles et al. (2006) show 
that higher sensitivity of executives’ pay to stock return volatility (vega) is, in 
fact, related with riskier policy choices, such as investment in more risky 
projects, concentrated business lines and higher debt to equity ratios. Although 
a higher vega can help reduce risk-related agency issues, it can also increase 
other types of agency issues. Ju et al. (2014) study the effect of stock options in 
executive compensation and find that depending upon executive risk aversion 
and investment technology, a call option contract can induce either too little or 
too much risk taking. Since stock options are like call options on the firm’s 
stock and have a convex payoff shape, managers are protected on the downside 
as they cannot lose more than the value of their share options. This downward 
protection encourages them to take on risky projects and increase overall firm 
risk. Thus, managers with higher vega definitely have an incentive to increase 
firm risk.  
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Shareholders on the other hand are considered risk neutral in the 
traditional finance literature. They may not necessarily dislike risk as long as 
firm value increases. However, if firm value declines due to excessive risk, 
shareholders will bear the cost (reduction in stock price due to higher discount 
rates associated with higher risk in evaluating future cash flows), while 
managers are still better off as the value of their stock options increases with 
risk. On this basis, the market should respond more circumspectly to an 
announcement made by an executive with high vega. Formally, I set up 
hypothesis 3; 
Hypothesis 3: There is a negative relationship between CEO wealth sensitivity 
to stock return volatility (vega), and the market reaction to buyback 
announcement. 
To further test the role of executive compensation arrangements as a 
proxy for the perceived credibility of repurchase announcement as a signal of 
firm undervaluation, I define a compensation dummy variable that represents a 
combination of three incentive alignment variables i.e., delta, vega and 
percentage CEO share ownership. It also eliminates concerns of any outliers in 
the data. Compensation dummy variable takes value of 1 when delta is high, 
vega is low and percentage CEO share ownership is high and 0 otherwise. The 
value of 1 represents better incentive alignment between the executive and 
shareholders. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between this dummy 
variable and share repurchase announcement returns.  
Hypothesis 4a: There is positive relationship between executive compensation 
dummy variable and share buyback announcement returns. 
The above setting also allows me to further test the role of CEO 
compensation arrangements on the market reaction to repurchase 
announcement for different types of firms. Agency issues are of more serious 
concern to investors when a firm suffers from a higher degree of information 
asymmetry. Any new information in such a case reduces information 
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asymmetry between investors and firm management. Thus the role of CEO 
compensation design will be more pronounced for firms that suffer from higher 
information asymmetry as better incentive alignment also adds credibility to 
the new information as value signaling. So, firms with better CEO 
compensation design (lowers agency concerns) and higher information 
asymmetry should experience stronger market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement.  
Hypothesis 4b: The market reaction to repurchase announcements is stronger 
for firms that suffer from higher information asymmetry and have lower 
agency concerns. 
Similarly, firms that are more likely to be undervalued and where CEO 
compensation arrangements also alleviate agency concerns, the market reaction 
will be stronger as investors may view such announcements as a more credible 
signal of stock undervaluation. Thus, firms that are both undervalued and have 
better compensation arrangements that reduce agency concerns should 
experience a stronger market reaction to the repurchase announcement.  
Hypothesis 4c: The market reaction to repurchase announcements is stronger 
for firms that are undervalued and have lower agency concerns. 
2.2.3 Longer-term returns and actual repurchases  
The presence of longer term abnormal returns after share repurchase 
announcement points toward market under reaction to the news. An obvious 
explanation of any potential under reaction might be due the credibility issues 
associated with share buyback announcements. Ikenberry and Vermaelen 
(1996) borrow from the real options literature and regard the share buyback 
announcement as an option to exchange the market value of the firm for its true 
value. Through share repurchase announcements the company effectively 
creates an option that may be exercised in the future.  
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 Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) using recent data confirm their earlier 
finding of market under reaction to repurchase announcements, and claim that 
unlike many other market anomalies that disappeared over time, this one 
persists and repurchase announcing firms earn superior longer-term returns. 
They explain these abnormal returns post-repurchase announcement as a 
market correction to a prior over-reaction to bad news. I argue that CEOs with 
better incentive alignment with those of shareholder make investment and 
operating choices that result in better performance of these firms. Coles et al. 
(2006) empirically demonstrate that executive compensation arrangements 
influence managers’ operating and investment choices. Since the firm’s 
operating performance is linked to its stock price performance, repurchase 
announcing firms with better incentive alignment tend to outperform in the 
long-run and earn higher stock returns on average. Thus CEO compensation 
arrangements can also explain the longer-term returns of firms that announce a 
share repurchase programme. To test this explanation I establish hypothesis 5 
as follows  
Hypothesis 5: There is a positive relationship between CEO wealth sensitivity 
to price (Delta and CEO share ownership) and longer-term returns of 
repurchase announcing firms and, there is a negative relationship between CEO 
wealth sensitivity to volatility (Vega) and longer-term returns of repurchase 
announcing firms. 
As repurchase authorizations are not firm commitments, many firms 
fail to complete their announced repurchase programmes. Bhattacharya and 
Dittmar (2008) analyse repurchase announcements between 1985 and 1995 and 
estimated that nearly 46% of their sample firms do not repurchase any shares 
post-announcement. See also Stephens and Weisbach (1998). However, it is 
important to understand that noncompliance with the announced repurchase 
programme does not necessarily represent opportunistic management behavior. 
There is an endogeneity issue with management’s decision to announce the 
repurchase programme and actual share repurchases. For example, repurchase 
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programmes initiated due to stock undervaluation should not be completed if 
the market corrects for any mispricing post-repurchase programme 
announcement. In this case, one should expect a negative relationship between 
post-announcement returns and actual repurchase rates. Therefore, I expect 
opposite signs on CEO wealth sensitivity measures in relation to actual share 
repurchases as compared to their sign with returns. Hypothesis 6 tests this idea 
formally; 
Hypothesis 6: There is a positive (negative) relationship between vega (delta 
and percentage of CEO share ownership) and actual share repurchases. 
 Lastly, I explore the relationship between executive compensation 
arrangements and firm’s investment decisions and operating performance. The 
tests will provide further evidence in relation to above mentioned hypotheses. 
Here, I draw upon executive compensation and firm policy literature to 
formulate my hypothesis. For example, Coles et al. (2006) show that 
executives with higher wealth sensitivity to changes in risk invest more in risky 
projects and cut capital expenditure. Therefore, I would expect a negative 
relationship between vega and capital expenditure, as such executives are more 
likely to substitute investment in capital expenditure with investment in 
repurchasing shares and other risky investments such as research and 
development (R&D). The expectation of negative relationship between 
operating returns and vega is consistent with expectation of lower market 
returns for such firms. Contrary to this, higher CEO wealth sensitivity to 
changes in stock price is expected to be positively related to capital expenditure 
and average operating returns as such managers are more likely to focus on 
long-term firm value maximization given their wealth incentives.  
Hypothesis 7: There is a negative (positive) relationship between CEO wealth 
sensitivity to volatility (price) and firm’s capital expenditure (operating 
performance). 
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2.3 Data and methodology 
Share repurchase announcement data are from Thomson Financial Security 
Data Company (SDC) US Mergers and Acquisitions database. The sample data 
includes all open market share repurchase programmes announced between 
1992 and 2008. I start with year 1992 as data on executive compensation is 
only available from the year 1992. Executive compensation arrangements data 
are taken from the Compustat’s Execucomp database. Other financial 
statements data are taken from the annual and quarterly COMPUSTAT files. 
Stock return data are from the CRSP. Since I calculate longer-term returns for a 
period of three to four years post repurchase announcement, CRSP data covers 
period between 1991 and 2011. 
In order to be included in the final dataset, I require event firms to have 
executive compensation data available in the Execucomp database. Since the 
Execucomp database covers Standard & Poor’s 1500 (S&P 500, S&P Midcap 
400 and S&P Smallcap 600) firms, so my sample data is reduced to repurchase 
programmes announced by S&P 1500 firms during the sample period. I further 
require these firms to be listed in the CRSP and the COMPUSTAT files in 
order to ensure availability of returns and accounting data. Following Chen and 
Wang (2012), I delete all observations with price lower than three dollars at the 
time of announcement to avoid skewing longer-term returns. I also delete 
observations that appear more than once within a two year period. An 
announcement may appear more than once in the same year because of the way 
SDC collects and reports data. SDC may report an announcement more than 
once if it appears in different news source on different dates (Banyi et al. 
(2008)).  
Table 2.1 presents details of my data sampling procedure. SDC search 
provides me with an initial total of 12,795 share repurchase announcements 
over the sample period. I keep the first observation if a firm appears more than 
once during the next two year period. This also deletes duplicate 
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announcements that appear in the SDC data. Then I delete repurchase 
announcements made by firms trading at price below $3 at the time of 
repurchase announcement, leaving only 7,879 repurchase announcements in 
the dataset. CRSP and COMPUSTAT data availability criteria further reduces 
the number of observations to 6,034. Requiring repurchasing firms to be 
covered by Execucomp reduces the number of observations to 2,395 of which 
2,296 are open market share repurchase announcements. This large reduction 
in repurchase announcement is due to the fact that the Execucomp covers only 
S&P 1,500 firms. 
Short term announcement returns are calculated using event study 
methodology. I calculate 3-day (-1, 1) Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
around the share repurchase announcement (event) date (day 0). Abnormal 
returns are excess returns due to the announcement over unconditional (without 
announcement) expected returns 
              
 
(1.1) 
Where     is the abnormal return on security i at time t.     is the 
conditional return and     is the expected return on the market portfolio. Both 
equal weighted and value weighted market portfolio are used to calculate 
abnormal returns. The CAR approach accumulates daily abnormal return (AR) 
over a time horizon of t1 and t2 (estimation window). 
 
                
  
    
 (1.2) 
and the mean CAR is calculated as, 
  
 
            
 
   
 (1.3) 
where n is the number of firms in the sample. 
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Methodology becomes more crucial for longer-term performance 
measurement because of issues addressed by Franks et al. (1991). They show 
that the use of different benchmarks leads to different conclusions. The results 
become highly sensitive to model choice and benchmark selection. Following 
Ikenberry et al. (1995), the Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) approach 
is used for longer-term performance analysis. Taffler et al. (2004) while 
discussing the pros and cons of BHAR approach favor it as it captures actual 
investor experience. The BHAR approach is simple and intuitive. It simply 
compares the multi-year returns from a buy-and-hold strategy of event firms 
against that of the market portfolio. Thus the abnormal return of stock 
repurchase firms is simply the difference between their return and the return on 
benchmark portfolio.  
                      
       
           
       
 
 
(1.4) 
The returns are calculated for time T for security i. RB is the return on 
the benchmark. Just as in short term return calculations, I use both equal 
weighted and value weighted market portfolios as benchmarks. Average buy 
and hold abnormal returns for the event firms and the market portfolio are 
calculated using monthly returns data. BHAR is calculated over a period of 
three years post announcement (i-e. from the month of the announcement to 
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 month after the announcement or up to the end of the period for which data 
is available).
22
 Average annual abnormal return is the difference between the 
average annual buy-and-hold return of the event firms and that of the 
benchmark portfolio. 
2.3.1 Measuring managerial incentives 
Managerial incentives are measured by mainly focussing on the stock-based 
part of executive compensation package rather than fixed cash compensation as 
                                                          
22
 If the firm is delisted during the BHAR calculation period, I adjust for delisting returns. 
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this explains the changes in managerial wealth in relation to stock price returns 
and volatility. In line with extant literature, I use delta and vega as measures of 
executive’s wealth sensitivity to changes in stock price and risk respectively. 
The variables are derived from the executive’s portfolio of stock based 
compensation. Following Core and Guay (2002) and Coles et al. (2006), delta 
is defined as the change in dollar value of executive’s wealth for a one 
percentage point change in stock price.
23
 Similarly, vega is defined as the 
change in dollar value of executive’s wealth for a one percentage point change 
in annualized stock return volatility. In fact delta and vega are the first 
derivatives of Merton’s modified version of Black and Scholes (1973) option 
valuation model with respect to price and volatility respectively. The details of 
the estimation procedure are presented in appendix I. CEO ownership is simply 
the percentage of firm shares owned by the CEO. 
For further tests of my hypotheses, I define a compensation dummy 
variable that proxy’s the “perceived” credibility of open market share 
repurchase announcement as a signal of undervaluation. Compensation dummy 
variable combines my three variables of interest – delta, vega and percentage 
of CEO firm ownership – into one variable. I define compensation dummy 
equal to 1 when delta is high, vega is low and CEO firm ownership is high. 
More specifically, compensation dummy assumes value of 1 when firm’s delta 
is in the highest three delta quintiles, vega is in the lowest three vega quintiles 
and percentage CEO firm ownership is above the median value, else 
compensation dummy assumes value of 0. Thus, it represents a combination of 
these three variables based on CEO compensation arrangements and proxy 
incentive alignment between the executive and shareholders.  
 
 
                                                          
23
 I thank the authors for providing detailed description of their methodology and data. 
http://www.lebow.drexel.edu/academics/disciplines/finance/faculty/naveendaniel. 
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2.3.2 Variables definitions 
In multivariate analysis, I use the following general equation to estimate the 
impact of delta, vega and CEO ownership on returns of firms that announce a 
share buyback programme. 
                                     
                       
    
 
   
                            
(1.5) 
where Rit is the announcement return (short term or longer term) during time t 
and delta, vega and CEO ownership are as defined above. Based on prior 
literature, I control for other variables that might affect dependant variables. 
Chen and Wang (2012) show that financially constrained firms experience 
lower share repurchase announcement returns on average as compared to 
unconstrained firms. Financial constraints are measured by Kaplan and 
Zingales (1997) (KZ) index following Chen and Wang (2012) who calculate it 
as follows; 
                                          
                             
            
(1.6) 
where CFt is the cash flow for the year t, DIVt and CAt represent the 
dividend and  current assets of the company for the year t. All these variables 
are scaled by lagged total assets of the firm, i.e. total assets of the firm in year 
t-1. LEVt is the ratio of total debt and book value of assets in the year t and Qt 
is the ratio of market-to-book (M/B) value of firm’s assets in year t. 
 Gong et al. (2008), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), Chan et al. (2010), 
and Chen and Wang (2012) suggest a number of other control variables in their 
multivariate regression models. Following prior literature, in equation 5, I 
control for a number of variables that can affect announcement returns and 
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actual repurchases of firms that announce a repurchase programme. Firm size 
is the market value of the firm at the beginning of the fiscal year prior to the 
announcement. Book-to-market (B/M) is the ratio of book value of firm’s 
assets to its market value. Chan et al. (2010) use quality of accruals as a proxy 
of managerial intent and show that discretionary accruals (DA) play an 
important role in explaining announcement returns of repurchase announcing 
firms. Discretionary accruals also serves as a control for the opportunistic use 
of repurchase announcements where CEO total compensation is highly 
sensitive to stock performance. I estimate earnings quality using Sloan (1996) 
model, and decompose it into discretionary and non-discretionary accrual using 
Jones (1991) model. The details of the estimation procedure are explained in 
appendix II. 
In addition, I also control for firm’s cash flows, 30-days buy-and-hold 
return prior to the announcement and percentage of outstanding shares that the 
firm intends to buyback (percent sought). Estimating firm’s actual repurchase 
rate requires an accurate measure of actual repurchase activity. However, 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) highlight problems in estimating actual share 
repurchases as these can neither be observed at the time of announcement nor 
can be estimated with accuracy afterwards. An SEC rule change in December 
2003 now requires firms to report the number of shares repurchased in each 
quarter.
24
  
 Banyi et al. (2008) show that although no proxy of actual repurchases is 
without error, however, they find Compustat’s data items purchase of common 
and preferred stock minus any decrease in redeemable preferred stock to be 
least problematic, especially for firms with high levels of equity offerings or 
option exercises. To calculate the number of shares repurchased, I divide this 
                                                          
24
 On Dec. 17, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring all 
repurchasing firms to report the total number of shares repurchased, the average price paid per 
share, the number of shares that were purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase 
plan, and the maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares remaining under other 
plans. This regulation applies to all quarterly and annual filings for periods ending on or after 
Mar. 15, 2004. 
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number by the quarterly closing price of the firm. This yields the number of 
shares repurchased which are then scaled to by the total number of shares 
outstanding to estimate the percentage of shares repurchased. These quarterly 
number are summed over a period of one year (4 quarters) following Chan et 
al. (2010). Finally, to determine the number of shares actually repurchased in 
relation to the announced repurchase programme, the above number is divided 
by the intended repurchase percentage of the firm at the time of repurchase 
announcement. 
Firm investments are measured by its capital expenditures scaled by 
total firm assets. I follow prior literature and measure firm operating 
performance by return on assets (ROA) which is defined as the ratio of 
earnings before interest, tax, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
assets. I define capital expenditures as the ratio of firm investment in capital 
expenditures (CAPEX) to its total firm assets (TA). I use 3-year average of 
investments and ROA post-announcement in my regression models. 
2.4 Results 
This section presents descriptive statistics of my sample data followed by 
univariate and multivariate analysis. 
2.4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the frequency distribution of open market share repurchase 
announcements by fiscal year along with average size, book-to-market ratio, 
and their intended repurchase percentage. My sample data consists of 2,296 
unique repurchase announcements. The highest number of buyback 
announcements is made in the year 2006 representing 11.5 percent of the 
sample. On average, sample firms intend to repurchase around 8.26 percent of 
their outstanding shares. The average book-to-market ratio for the whole 
sample is 41.1% and the average size of repurchasing firms as measured by 
their market value is around $8,500 million. Descriptive statistics presented in 
table 2.2 are in line with those reported in earlier studies.   
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Table 2.3 presents summary statistics of announcement returns, CEO 
compensation variables and other firm characteristics. Mean 3-day return (-1, 
1) around the repurchase announcement is 1.36% using either value weighted 
or equal weighted market return as the benchmark. Repurchase announcing 
firms earn an average buy-and-hold abnormal return of 12.03% in the three 
years period following the repurchase announcement. In line with findings 
reported in earlier studies, my descriptive return statistics show that 
repurchasing firms earn significant abnormal returns after the repurchase 
programme announcement, signalling market under reaction to the news 
(Ikenberry et al. (1995), Peyer and Vermaelen (2009)). 
The median delta and vega values (in thousands) of repurchase 
announcing firms are $304.42 and $52.32 respectively. Minimum values are 
zero as managers cannot lose more than the value of their share options and the 
lower bound on options is always zero. Figure 2.1 and 2.2 show distribution of 
mean and median values for delta and vega respectively by year for sample 
firms.  
The mean and median percentage of CEO firm ownership is 2.51 and 
0.32 respectively. Event firms lose around 5% of their value in the 30-day 
period prior to the repurchase announcement. Average cash balance and cash 
flow of these firms as a fraction of total assets are 0.12 and 0.13 respectively. 
Event firms each year invest 5% of total assets value in capital expenditures, on 
average, and earn average annual return of 15% on firm assets in the 3-year 
period after the repurchase announcement. 
2.4.2 Univariate results 
Table 2.4 shows the correlation matrix of abnormal returns with my main 
explanatory variables. Vega is significantly negatively related to short-term 
announcement returns.  This shows that the market reacts less favorably to firm 
repurchase announcements where the executive has a higher incentive to 
increase firm risk. The longer-term abnormal returns are also negatively related 
47 
 
 
to vega with correlation coefficient significant at the 10% level. In contrast to 
vega, longer-term returns are significantly positively related to delta. This 
suggests that the higher the CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price the higher the 
abnormal returns following share repurchase announcement. However, the 
relationship between delta and short term announcement returns is not 
significant at conventional significance levels.  
CEO ownership percentage represents the direct claim of the CEO on 
firm’s assets. Higher CEO ownership should lower agency costs and is a more 
direct measure of managerial short-term incentive alignment than the indirect 
stock-based wealth alignment measure represented by delta, which better aligns 
incentives over the medium to the long term period. In fact table 2.4 shows that 
correlation for both initial and longer-term returns is significant and positively 
related to the percentage of firm equity owned by the executive.  
Cumulative buy-and-hold return for 30 days prior to the announcement 
to 2 days before the announcement (-30,-2) is also significantly negatively 
related to both short term and longer-term abnormal returns of firms that 
announced a share repurchase programme.  This finding is also consistent with 
prior research. The higher the negative returns observed by the firm prior to the 
announcement, the greater will be the potential undervaluation, and thus the 
stronger will be the market reaction to the buyback announcement. 
Table 2.5 present univariate analysis of mean returns with respect to 
CEO wealth sensitivity measures (delta and vega). For each year of data, I sort 
all firms in Execucomp into quintiles based on delta and vega values 
respectively. Quintile 1 contains firms with lowest delta and vega values, and 
quintile 5 has firms with highest delta and vega values. I then assign my 
sample firms to these quintiles based on their delta and vega values prior to the 
repurchase announcement.  
Panel A of Table 2.5 shows mean 3-day (-1, 1) announcement return for 
vega sorted quintile firms along with other descriptive statistics. Broadly 
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speaking, there appears a downward trend in mean announcement returns from 
low to high vega firms. Firms in the lowest vega quintile (quintile 1) earn an 
average abnormal return of 2.14% whereas firms in the highest vega quintile 
(quintile 5) earn an abnormal return of only 0.86%. This is in line with 
hypothesis 3 that there is a negative relationship between vega and initial share 
repurchase announcement returns. Firms with higher vega earn a lower return 
on average as compared to firms with lower vega. Although not reported, mean 
difference in returns of quintile 1 and quintile 5 firms is statistically significant. 
Panel B of table 2.5 shows mean CAR for delta sorted quintile firms. Mean 
abnormal return for each quintile is statistically different from zero, however, 
there is no clear trend as was the case with vega sorted quintile returns.  
Panels C and D of the table show mean annual buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAAR) for vega- and delta-sorted quintile firms respectively. 
BHAAR is the 3-year (36-month) buy-and-hold abnormal return post-
announcement starting from the announcement month divided by 3. Here again 
higher vega firms earn lower returns as compared to firms with lower vega 
values. Mean BHAAR for vega sorted quintile 1 is 5.47% compared with mean 
return of 2.82% for quintile 5 firms. Delta sorted quintiles in panel D show that 
mean BHAAR of quintile 1 is 3.4% and is significant only at the 10% 
significance level, as compared to mean return of 5.45% for quintile 5 firms 
which is highly significant at the 1% significance level.  
2.4.3 Multivariate results 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 present regression results of short-term and longer-term 
repurchase announcement returns on executive wealth sensitivity measures 
respectively. Table 2.6 regresses short term (-1, 1) announcement returns on 
CEO wealth sensitivity measures (delta and vega). Following Coles et al. 
(2006), I regress both delta and vega together to isolate the effect of each of 
these incentive measures and also to control for their effect on each other as 
these variables tend to vary substantially across firms. I use Petersen (2009) 
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two-way clustering for robust standard errors. I cluster on year and industry to 
control for their effects on regression parameter estimates and standard errors. 
The relationship between my dependent variables (returns and actual 
repurchases) and independent variables (delta, vega and CEO ownership) 
might suffer from potential endogeneity. In order to alleviate some of the 
endogeneity related concerns, I use lagged values of independent variables in 
all of my regression model specifications. Model I of table 2.6 regresses 
buyback announcement returns on delta and vega without any control 
variables. Sign on delta and vega coefficient are positive and negative, as 
predicted in hypothesis 1 and 3 respectively. The delta and vega coefficients 
are significant at the 5% and 1% significance level respectively. In model II, I 
regress short-term announcement returns on CEO ownership, and find a highly 
significant positive relationship which is in line with hypothesis 2. In model III, 
announcement returns are regressed on delta, vega and CEO ownership 
variables together. The delta loses its significance although vega is still 
significantly negatively and CEO ownership positively related to short term 
announcement returns. As per the predictions in hypothesis 3, higher vega 
results in lower announcement returns consistent with shareholders taking into 
account managerial incentives to increase firm risk.  
In model IV, I include all the control variables. Both vega and CEO 
ownership retain significant negative and positive relationship respectively 
with short-term announcement returns. Prior buy-and-hold return (-30,-2), 
which proxy for undervaluation, and financial constraints are also significantly 
negatively related to buyback announcement returns. These results indicate that 
short-term buyback announcement returns are sensitive to the degree of 
undervaluation, financial constraints, CEO wealth sensitivity to changes in 
stock return volatility, and percentage equity stake of the executive in firm 
value. Similar to Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) I find that undervaluation has 
the greatest economic impact on short term buyback announcement returns. 
However, I add to the literature by showing that CEO incentive measures also 
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have incremental explanatory power for share buyback announcement returns. 
After undervaluation, vega has the highest economic impact on returns 
followed by financial constraints (as shown by Chen and Wang (2012)), and 
CEO ownership.  
The insignificance of delta can also be justified as it aligns incentives 
over the medium to long-term because stock options have a vesting period of 
typically three years. Compared to delta, executive wealth increase associated 
with a buyback announcement is directly related to CEO stock ownership. So 
in the short-run, it is reasonable for the market to pay more attention to CEO 
share ownership as opposed to delta.
25
 
Table 2.7 presents results from regressing longer-term returns 
(BHAAR) on CEO wealth sensitivity variables in different model 
specifications. Model I shows that both delta and vega are highly significant 
and can explain long-run stock performance of share repurchasing firms. 
Model II shows that CEO ownership is also important in explaining longer-
term returns of share repurchasing firms. Model III and IV confirm that all the 
CEO wealth alignment variables are important and can explain longer-term 
returns of share repurchasing firms. The findings support the assertions in 
hypothesis 5. 
As discussed earlier, delta measures wealth incentive alignment over 
the medium to long term and consistent with this, I find delta to be empirically 
significant and positively related to longer-term returns in model III. Although 
the coefficient on vega is higher as compared to delta coefficient but in 
economic terms delta is slightly more important. A one standard deviation 
change in delta results in 1.43 percent change in BHAAR as compared to 1.08 
percent change in BHAAR for one standard deviation change in vega. In 
                                                          
25
 One interpretation of these results also comes from behavioural finance theory. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) prospect theory shows that people put more weight on negative outcomes 
(losses) than on good ones (gains). The market appears to under-weight information contained 
in delta measure and over-weight information in vega measure in its initial reaction to stock 
repurchase news. 
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addition, in model IV I find that size is negatively related to announcement 
returns showing that small firm earn higher abnormal returns. However, unlike 
Chen and Wang (2012), I do not find a significant negative relationship 
between financial constraints and long-run stock performance. The only control 
variable that has some statistical significance for longer-term post-
announcement returns is prior buy-and-hold return although only significant at 
the 10% level. This result is consistent with papers that suggest undervalued 
firms earn higher returns post-repurchase programme announcement.  
2.4.4 Further tests 
To test the robustness of my results, I define a compensation dummy variable 
that reflects better incentive alignment between the executive and shareholders. 
Compensation dummy variable combines the three incentive alignment 
variables i-e, delta, vega and percentage CEO share ownership and it takes the 
value of 1 when delta is high, vega is low and percentage CEO share 
ownership is high and 0 otherwise. This specification also allows me to test the 
impact of compensation design across different types of firm.  A value of 1 on 
compensation dummy variable represents better incentive alignment or lower 
agency issues. Therefore, I expect a positive relationship between 
compensation dummy and short-term repurchase announcement returns.  
Model I in table 2.8 provides clear support to proposition that executive 
compensation design has value relevant information for investors in relation to 
share repurchase announcements. The coefficient on the compensation dummy 
variable is positive and significant providing evidence on my hypothesis 4a. 
The market appears to understand executives’ underlying wealth incentives and 
responds to repurchase announcement accordingly. The market reaction is 
stronger for repurchase announcements that are “perceived” as value signalling 
by the market based on executive compensation arrangements.  
The credibility of the repurchase announcement as value signalling will 
be a more important issue for the market when information asymmetry is high. 
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Following Bonaimé (2012), I proxy information asymmetry by firm size. 
Smaller firms have lower analyst following and media coverage, they are more 
likely to suffer from higher information asymmetry and less efficiently priced 
(Lakonishok and Lee (2001)). Model II of table 2.8 interacts compensation 
dummy with firm size dummy. The size dummy takes the value of 1 for (small) 
firms with size below the sample median and 0 other wise. As can be seen, the 
interaction term coefficient is statistically significant at the 1% level and is 
much higher than the one on compensation dummy alone. The finding supports 
hypothesis 4b that the market reaction to share buyback announcement is 
stronger where information asymmetry is higher and executive wealth 
incentives are well aligned with those of shareholders.  
The negative coefficient on the compensation dummy variable in model 
II suggests that larger firms do not experience higher announcement returns as 
compared to small firms. The coefficient however is much smaller and may 
reflect a managerial entrenchment effect. As managers are more likely to be 
entrenched in large firms, any signal from such managers is more likely to be 
discounted by the market leading to lower announcement returns. 
Similarly, model III shows that the market reaction is stronger for firms 
that are more likely to be undervalued and executive’s wealth incentives are 
well aligned with those of shareholders. Undervaluation is measured by the 
firm’s buy-and-hold returns prior to the repurchase announcement. Firms that 
lose more during this period are more likely to be undervalued (Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009)). Undervaluation dummy variable is 1 for firm whose buy-
and-hold return prior to the announcement are below the median for my sample 
firms and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on interaction between compensation 
dummy and undervaluation dummy is 1.64 and significant at the 5% level. The 
result is consistent with hypothesis 4c that the market reaction to share buyback 
announcement is stronger for firms that are more likely to be undervalued and 
where executive wealth incentives are well aligned with those of shareholders. 
53 
 
 
To test the robustness of longer-term regression results, I use the 
Carhart (1997) four factor model to calculate longer-term abnormal returns 
post-repurchase programme announcement. Following Fama (1998), and 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000), I use the calendar-time regression approach to 
calculate event firms monthly abnormal performance. Specifically, I run the 
following regression model 
                                            
  
  
           
(1.7) 
where     is the return of firm i in month t;     is the risk free rate as 
measured by the return on the US one-month Treasury bills in month t;     is 
the return on the value weighted market index in month t;      is the return 
difference between a portfolio of small firms and that of large firms in month t; 
     is the difference in returns of a portfolio of value stocks (high book-to-
market) and glamour (low book-to-market) stocks in month t;      is the 
difference in returns between previous years’ winner (high return) and loser 
(low return) stocks in month t; and      is the unexplained error term of the 
regression model for firm i in month t. The intercept term ( ) estimates the 
monthly average abnormal performance of firm i over the following 4-year 
period post-buyback announcement. I regress the estimated intercept term 
against my independent variables (delta, vega and CEO ownership). Results of 
the regression analysis are reported in table 2.9. 
Table 2.9 shows that both delta and vega variables have signs as 
expected and are significant. Vega loses some of its significance but the 
coefficient is still significant at the 10% level when I include all of the control 
variables. CEO percentage of share ownership loses its significance in this 
regression although delta remains significant. So, delta plays an important role 
in explaining longer-term abnormal returns following firm’s share repurchase 
announcement. These findings are consistent with my hypothesis 1 and 3. The 
table provides evidence that both delta and vega are important and are able to 
explain post-announcement returns of share repurchasing firms. 
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To further test the robustness of my results I delete all buyback 
announcements made by firms operating in, or associated with, financial 
services sector. Results are unaffected by elimination of such firms; in fact they 
become stronger. Thus the findings reported in the paper are empirically 
robust.  
2.4.5 Actual repurchases 
Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) argue that share 
repurchase announcements signal firm undervaluation and firms will want to 
take advantage of this mispricing by repurchasing their shares. However, if the 
market corrects the mispricing post-announcement then there will be no 
incentive for managers to actually repurchase any shares. Also for those firms 
that experience higher post-announcement returns, actual repurchases become 
more costly. So CEO wealth sensitivity variables that have a positive 
(negative) relationship with returns should have a negative (positive) 
relationship with actual repurchases (see hypothesis 6). I test this in table 2.10 
where dependent variable is actual repurchases post-announcement. 
Models I and II are linear regression models and model III is a tobit 
regression model where actual repurchases are truncated at 100% of the 
intended share repurchases (percent sought). Regression results of model II 
show that vega (delta) is in fact positively (negatively) related to actual 
repurchase rate significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. Tobit 
regression results in model III confirm that vega is positively related to actual 
repurchases. Delta in this model is not significant; however, CEO ownership is 
significant and positively related. The findings are in line with hypothesis 6. 
CEOs with higher wealth sensitivity to change in risk, in fact, repurchase more 
shares and where CEO wealth is more sensitive to changes in price such 
executive repurchase fewer shares post-announcement. The findings suggest 
the managerial decision of actual repurchase is also influenced by their wealth 
incentives and hence compensation arrangements. 
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2.4.6 Investment decisions and operating performance 
In table 2.11 I show that firms with better CEO compensation design earn 
higher returns after open market share repurchase announcement as they make 
better investment and operating decisions. Regression results in table 2.11 
show that CEOs with higher equity ownership of their firm invest more in 
capital expenditure and deliver better operating performance. Whereas CEOs 
with greater wealth sensitive to stock return volatility tend to cut capital 
expenditure investments and have lower operating returns. The findings are 
consistent with executive compensation and firm policy literature that shows 
that executives with higher incentives to increase firm risk under invest and 
take on more risky projects.  
The table provide evidence on hypothesis 7. The results show that 
executives make investment and operating decisions taking into account their 
compensation incentives. The higher CEO wealth sensitivity to changes in risk 
(price) is negatively (positively) related to average annual capital expenditure 
investments in the 3-year period post-announcement. The table also shows that 
higher CEO wealth sensitivity to changes in risk (price) is negatively 
(positively) related to average annual return on assets in the 3-year period post-
announcement. I conjecture that better investment and operating performance 
feeds back in to better stock return performance and lower repurchase rate for 
firms with better CEO compensation design.  
2.5 Conclusion 
The past couple of decades have witnessed a tremendous increase in the use of 
share buyback programmes (Grullon and Michaely (2002)). The market views 
buyback programme announcements as a good news based on signalling 
theory, and responds favourably to these on average. However, among all the 
possible ways of share repurchases, open market share repurchases seem to be 
the preferred way of executives. Such programmes provide the greatest 
flexibility to managers, lack characteristics of a strong signal and have fewer 
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reporting and regulatory requirements around actual buyback transactions 
(Chan et al. (2010)). With the increasing use of stock based compensation 
schemes, executives wealth incentives are also related to share repurchases 
which creates potential for their opportunistic use.  
In this paper, I argue that open market share repurchase programmes 
can be either value signalling or cosmetic and even opportunistic. I show that 
the market seems to proxy the credibility of repurchase programme 
announcement as value signalling by observing the underlying repurchase 
incentives of the executive, on the basis of his/her compensation arrangements. 
In particular, I focus on executives’ wealth sensitivity to changes in stock price 
(delta and CEO ownership) and volatility (vega). My results suggest that the 
market reaction is stronger to a firm’s share repurchase announcement where 
CEO incentives are better aligned with those of shareholders. In fact, the effect 
of executive compensation arrangements - that better align the wealth 
incentives of executives with those of shareholders - on repurchase 
announcement returns are particularly stronger for firms where the repurchase 
announcing firm is either undervalued or suffers from higher information 
asymmetry. Longer-term returns of repurchase announcing firms are also in 
line with the incentive alignment story. Specifically, higher sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to changes in stock price (volatility) is positively (negatively) related to 
longer-term returns of event firms. However, actual repurchases are positively 
(negatively) related to sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in volatility (stock 
price) as these become more costly for firms that experience higher returns 
post-announcement. 
I further show that higher CEO sensitivity to changes in stock price 
(volatility) encourages managers to invest more (less) in capital expenditure in 
the 3-year period post-repurchase programme announcement. These findings 
are in line with the literature on executive compensation and firms’ investment 
policy (see for example, Coles et al. (2006)). The operating performance of 
share repurchasing firms is also related to executive compensation 
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arrangements. Average return on assets is positively (negatively) related to 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price (volatility).  
This paper contributes to literature on share repurchases – with 
particular focus on how the market views an announcement given executive 
compensation arrangements. The study explores the relationship between 
executive compensation arrangements and the perceived credibility of buyback 
announcements as value signalling. The analysis in the paper shows that 
executive compensation design has value relevant information in relation to 
news events such as open market share repurchase announcements. My results 
show that the market appears to understand the underlying managerial wealth 
incentives associated with share repurchases, and responds accordingly. 
Executive compensation arrangements appear to be able explain the market 
reaction to, and actual repurchase decisions of, firms that announce share 
repurchase programme. 
Although compensation arrangements represent a corporate governance 
mechanism, it will also be interesting to analyse the effect of other corporate 
governance measures in reducing agency concerns and their effect on the 
perceived credibility of repurchase announcements. As a next step I aim to test 
the effect of compensation arrangements on credibility of repurchase 
announcements after controlling for other corporate governance measures. 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection 
Data source N 
SDC data 12795 
Deleting observation within 2 years 8345 
Deleting observation with price lower than 3 7879 
CRSP data 7875 
COMPUSTAT data 6034 
Execucomp data 2395 
Open market share repurchases 2296 
 
 
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of share repurchasing firms 
The table reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by year. Year 
represents the year of the announcement. N shows the number of announcements 
made in the year for my sample. Frequency is the percentage to total announcements 
in the given year. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm assets to its market value at 
the beginning of the year. Size is measured by the market value of the firm and is 
shown in millions of dollars. Intended buyback ratio is the percentage of outstanding 
shares that management states it intends to buyback at the time of announcement. 
Year N 
Frequency 
(%) 
B/M (%) Size ($M) Intended ratio (%) 
1992 22 1.0 35.0 5423.8 4.0 
1993 104 4.5 41.3 4667.7 7.5 
1994 132 5.8 44.9 3203.5 8.2 
1995 183 8.0 45.2 5428.0 6.8 
1996 142 6.2 42.1 3751.6 8.9 
1997 239 10.4 42.0 4380.9 9.8 
1998 151 6.6 42.5 5262.5 8.4 
1999 95 4.1 37.8 12223.8 8.0 
2000 89 3.9 32.4 15802.5 7.2 
2001 108 4.7 36.6 10582.5 8.3 
2002 108 4.7 41.2 6053.9 7.5 
2003 177 7.7 39.7 14125.5 10.9 
2004 176 7.7 43.0 11920.5 7.7 
2005 201 8.8 42.0 12913.3 9.1 
2006 264 11.5 39.5 9948.3 8.0 
2007 105 4.6 41.2 9103.2 7.1 
All 2296 100.00 41.1 8508.6 8.3 
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of returns, CEO wealth sensitivity 
measures and firm characteristic 
CAR is the 3 day (-1 to +1) cumulative abnormal return around the announcement 
date (day 0) using value weighted market return as benchmark. BHAR is the mean 
buy-and-hold abnormal return of event firms over the value weighted market portfolio 
return. Delta is the dollar change in the executive wealth for 1 percentage point change 
in stock price. Vega is the dollar change in the executive wealth for 1 percentage point 
change in annual volatility. CEO ownership is the CEO’s stock ownership of the firm 
expressed as a fraction of total shares outstanding. Size is the market value of the firm. 
B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its market value. Prior BHR is the cumulative 
buy-and-hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before 
the announcement (-30 to -2). Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the 
firm. Cash is cash level of the firm scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is the operating 
cash flow of the company scaled by total assets. Financial constraints are measured by 
KZ index (discussed in methodology section). DA is the discretionary accruals of the 
firm. All variables are in the fiscal year prior to the announcement except actual 
buyback dummy. Actual repurchases is the percentage of shares repurchased as a 
fraction of intended repurchase programme size (percent sought). Actual repurchase 
are untruncated but windorised at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. Sales growth is the 
increase in revenues over previous year revenues. Average CAPEX and Average ROA 
is the average annual capital expenditure and return on asset over the next three year 
post OMSR announcement respectively.  
        Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std Dev 25th Median 75th 
CAR 2296 1.36 6.72 -1.32 1.15 3.98 
BHAR 2296 12.03 28.61 -12.27 0.20 14.63 
Delta ($000) 2296 1355.72 7930.75 118.72 304.45 811.36 
Vega  ($000) 2296 161.38 378.22 17.16 52.32 159.14 
CEO ownership (%) 2296 2.51 5.58 0.09 0.32 1.61 
Size 2296 8508.65 23279.18 715.69 1995.99 6450.17 
Book-to-market 2296 41.10 32.49 23.64 37.52 54.48 
Prior BHR 2296 -0.05 0.16 -0.13 -0.03 0.05 
Leverage 2296 0.52 0.22 0.36 0.52 0.66 
Cash 2296 0.12 0.19 0.02 0.06 0.15 
Cash Flow 2296 0.13 0.11 0.07 0.12 0.18 
Financial Constraints(KZ) 2296 1.80 2.31 1.14 1.76 2.42 
Discretionary Accruals
 
2049 -0.01 0.33 -0.06 0.00 0.06 
Actual Repurchases
a 
2211 0.78 0.80 0.27 0.59 1.03 
Sales growth 2102 1.18 0.63 1.04 1.11 1.22 
Average CAPEX 1970 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.07 
Average ROA 1979 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.14 0.19 
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of mean and median delta values by year 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Distribution of mean and median vega values by year 
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Table 2.4: Correlation Analysis of announcement returns and the 
executive compensation sensitivity measures. 
The table report the correlation coefficients. CAR represents three day (-1 to +1) 
cumulative abnormal return around the event date (day 0). Vega is the dollar change in 
manager wealth for 1 percentage point change in firm annual volatility. Delta is the 
dollar change in manager wealth for 1 percentage point change in firm share price. 
Prior BHR is the cumulative buy and hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement date (-30 to -2). BHAAR is the buy 
and hold average annual abnormal return calculated as the cumulative buy and hold 
abnormal return over the 36 months from the event month (0) divided by 3. 
Ownership represents the executive percentage share ownership of the firm. N shows 
the number of observations. 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1.CAR 1      
2.Vega -0.045** 1     
3.Delta -0.001 0.316*** 1    
4.Prior BHR -0.096*** 0.032 0.034 1   
5.BHAAR -0.0199 -0.040* 0.067*** -0.076*** 1  
6.Ownership 0.067*** -0.039* 0.267*** -0.092*** 0.075*** 1 
   N 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 2296 
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 2.5: Mean short-term and longer-term returns by vega and delta 
quintiles 
The table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum 
values of CAR and BHAAR by delta and vega quintiles. CAR represents three day (-1 
to +1) cumulative abnormal return around the repurchase announcement event (day 0). 
Vega is the dollar change in manager wealth for 1 percentage point change in firm 
annual volatility. Delta is the dollar change in manager wealth for 1 percentage point 
change in firm stock price. BHAAR is the buy and hold average annual abnormal 
return calculated as the cumulative buy and hold abnormal return over the 36 months 
from the event month (0) divided by 3. In order to sort firms into quintiles, for each 
year of data in Execucomp I sort all the firms into quintiles based on their delta and 
vega values. I then assign my repurchase sample firms to these groups based on their 
delta and vega values for the fiscal year prior to the repurchase announcement. 
Quintile 1 contains firms with lowest delta and vega values and quintile 5 has firms 
with highest delta and vega values. N shows the number of firms in each quintile.  
 
Panel A: Mean short term return (CAR) by vega quintiles 
Quintiles N MEAN MEDIAN STD MIN MAX 
1 333 2.14*** 1.64 7.73 -27.92 57.34 
2 412 1.52*** 1.34 6.97 -35.78 38.17 
3 461 1.54*** 1.03 7.52 -45.59 44.40 
4 501 1.15*** 1.21 5.90 -28.29 28.29 
5 586 0.86*** 0.92 5.84 -48.63 35.00 
Panel B: Mean short term return (CAR) by delta quintiles 
1 261 1.67*** 1.55 8.03 -35.78 57.34 
2 445 0.96*** 1.03 7.02 -31.98 44.40 
3 451 1.89*** 1.40 6.35 -28.29 38.17 
4 552 1.27*** 1.00 5.89 -30.33 27.12 
5 587 1.20*** 1.16 6.84 -48.63 35.00 
Panel C: Mean long term return (BHAAR) by vega quintiles 
1 333 5.47*** 0.10 32.30 -58.25 250.39 
2 412 4.10*** -1.03 30.88 -57.46 156.48 
3 461 3.79*** 0.85 27.43 -60.21 238.30 
4 501 4.52*** 0.96 29.07 -47.99 223.99 
5 586 2.82*** 0.53 25.06 -49.40 221.09 
Panel D: Mean long term return (BHAAR) by delta quintiles 
1 261   3.40* -0.87 28.63 -45.83 122.53 
2 445   4.43*** 0.93 30.29 -60.21 250.39 
3 451 3.81*** 0.47 25.70 -58.25 130.24 
4 552   2.57** 0.57 24.34 -57.46 156.44 
5 587   5.45*** 0.36 32.83 -49.40 238.30 
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 2.6: Effect of executive compensation on short-term returns 
The table presents the results of regressing initial buyback announcement abnormal returns 
(CAR) on executive compensation variables, CEO share ownership and control variables in 
different models. CAR represents 3- day (-1 to 1) cumulative abnormal return around the 
repurchase announcement date (day 0). Vega is the dollar change in manager wealth for 1 
percentage point change in firm annual volatility. Delta is the dollar change in manager wealth 
for 1 percentage point change in firm stock price.  Delta and vega values are in $000’s. CEO 
ownership is the CEO’s stock ownership of the firm expressed as a fraction of total shares 
outstanding. Percent sought is the percentage of outstanding shares that the management states 
that it intends to buyback. Prior BHR is the buy and hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to 
the announcement to 2 days before the announcement (-30 to -2). Financial constraints are 
measured by KZ index (discussed in methodology section). Size is the market value of the 
firm. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its market value. Cash Flow is the operating cash 
flow of the company scaled by total assets. Actual buyback dummy is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if actual repurchase is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise. DA is the 
discretionary accruals of the firm. All variables are in the fiscal year prior to the announcement 
except actual buyback dummy. 
Label   Parameter Estimate 
  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Intercept  1.49*** 1.16*** 1.28*** 1.46*** 
  
(8.83) (7.63) (11.00) (4.85) 
Delta 
 
0.0126** 
 
-0.005 0.0046 
  
(2.09) (0.13) (0.51) 
Vega 
 
-0.88*** 
 
-0.72*** -0.476*** 
  
(5.17) (3.86) (3.09) 
CEO ownership 
 
0.08*** 0.08*** 0.0795*** 
   
(4.70) (3.92) (4.38) 
Percent sought 
  
  0.173 
   
  (0.73) 
Prior BHR 
   
-4.12*** 
   
(3.63) 
Financial constraint 
   
-0.146*** 
   
(3.35) 
Size 
    
-0.000 
   
(0.09) 
B/M 
    
0.0002 
   
(0.06) 
Cash Flow 
  
-1.34 
    
 (0.66) 
Actual buyback dummy 
  
 -0.146 
    
 (0.11) 
DA 
   
 0.015 
    
 (0.47) 
Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 
 
0.0022 0.0045 0.006 0.018 
F-value   5.22*** 9.89*** 6.08*** 3.6*** 
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 2.7: Effect of executive compensation on long-term returns 
The table presents the results of regressing long term buyback announcement abnormal returns 
(BHAAR) on executive compensation variables, CEO share ownership and control variables in 
different models. BHAAR is the buy and hold average annual abnormal return calculated as the 
cumulative buy and hold abnormal return over the 36 months from the event month (0) divided 
by 3. Vega is the dollar change in manager wealth for 1 percentage point change in firm annual 
volatility. Delta is the dollar change in manager wealth for 1 percentage point change in firm 
stock price.  Delta and vega values are in $000’s. CEO ownership is the CEO’s stock 
ownership of the firm expressed as a fraction of total shares outstanding. % sought is the 
percentage of outstanding shares that the management states that it intends to buyback on the 
announcement date. Prior BHR is the buy and hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement (-30 to -2). Financial constraints are 
measured by KZ index (discussed in methodology section). Size is the market value of the 
firm. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its market value. Cash Flow is the operating cash 
flow of the company scaled by total assets. Actual buyback dummy is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if actual repurchase is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise. DA is the 
discretionary accruals of the firm. All variables are in the fiscal year prior to the announcement 
except actual buyback dummy. 
Label   Parameter Estimate 
  
Model I Model II Model III Model IV 
Intercept  4.41* 3.04 3.71 2.58 
  
(2.30) (1.50) (1.64) (0.75) 
Delta 
 
0.318***  0.26*** 0.18*** 
  
(3.26)  (2.65) (3.33) 
Vega 
 
-5.16***  -4.61*** -2.87** 
  
(4.23)  (3.23) (2.03) 
CEO ownership 
 
0.38*** 0.27*** 0.22*** 
   
(3.28) (3.05) (2.68) 
Percent sought 
  
  0.0300 
   
  (0.28) 
Prior BHR 
   
-12.3* 
   
(1.73) 
Financial constraint 
   
0.380 
   
(1.25) 
Size 
    
-0.000 
   
(1.22) 
B/M 
    
-0.014 
   
(0.45) 
Cash Flow 
  
9.17 
    
 (0.82) 
Actual buyback dummy 
  
 -0.78 
    
 (0.56) 
DA 
   
 -0.42 
    
 (0.44) 
Year cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 
 
0.009 0.0056 0.0112 0.0157 
F-value   4.66** 4.40** 3.53** 2.98*** 
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 2.8: Effect of executive compensation arrangements on short-term 
returns 
The table presents the results of regressing initial buyback announcement abnormal 
returns (CAR) on compensation dummy and control variables in different models. 
CAR represents three day (-1 to +1) cumulative abnormal return around the 
repurchase announcement date (day 0). Compensation dummy proxy’s for the wealth 
alignment between the executive and shareholder. It takes the value of 1 when delta is 
high (in bottom 3 quintile), vega is low (in top 3 quintiles) and CEO ownership is 
above median and 0 otherwise. Percent sought is the percentage of outstanding shares 
that the management intends to buyback on announcement date. Prior BHR is the buy 
and hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement (-30 to -2). Financial constraints are measured by KZ index (discussed 
in methodology section). Size is the market value of the firm. B/M is the ratio of book 
value of firm to its market value. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow of the company 
scaled by total assets. Actual buyback dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if actual 
repurchase is higher than the sample median and zero otherwise. DA is the 
discretionary accruals of the firm. All variables are in the fiscal year prior to the 
announcement except actual buyback dummy. Size and value dummy is 1 for small 
and value firms respectively and 0 otherwise.  
Parameter Estimates 
  Model I   Model II   Model III 
Variables Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 1.46 4.56 
 
1.42 4.54 
 
1.56 4.11 
Compensation dummy 0.70** 2.59 
 
-0.40** -2.02 
 
-0.20 -0.50 
Percent sought 0.02 0.66 
 
0.02 0.57 
 
0.01 0.27 
Prior BHR -4.19*** -3.62 
 
-4.15*** -3.41 
   
Financial constraint -0.15*** -3.35 
 
-0.15*** 3.05 
 
-0.14*** -3.66 
Size (x10
-5
) -0.32 -0.60 
    
-0.38 -0.74 
B/M (x10
-2
) 0.10 0.28 
 
0.10 0.85 
 
0.10 0.31 
Cash Flow -1.21 -0.62 
 
-1.13 0.42 
 
-1.26 -0.62 
Actual buyback dummy -0.20*** -3.74 
 
-0.20 0.52 
 
-0.28 
 
DA 0.04 0.08 
 
0.06 0.94 
 
0.04 0.07 
Size dummy 
   
-0.04 -0.08 
   
Compensation x size dummy 
   
1.55*** 3.65 
   
Value dummy 
      
0.37 0.98 
Compensation x value dummy 
      
1.64** 1.97 
         R-squared 0.0151     0.0169     0.0106   
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Table 2.9: The effect of executive compensation on longer-term returns 
calculated using Carhart’s 4-factor model 
The table shows results of regressing Carhart’s (1997) four factor model abnormal return 
(intercept) on executive compensation variables, CEO share ownership and control variables in 
different models. Vega is the dollar change in manager’s wealth for a 1 percent change in 
firm’s annual volatility. Delta is the dollar change in manager’s wealth for a 1 percent change 
in firm’s share price. Delta and vega values are in $000’s. CEO ownership is the CEO’s stock 
ownership of the firm expressed as a fraction of total shares outstanding. % sought is the 
percentage of outstanding shares that the management intends to buyback. Prior BHR is the 
buy and hold return of the firm for 30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement. Financial constraints are measured by KZ index (discussed in methodology 
section). Size is the market value of the firm. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its 
market value. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow of the company scaled by total assets. 
Actual buyback dummy is a dummy variable equal to 1 if actual repurchase is higher than the 
sample median and zero otherwise. DA is the discretionary accruals of the firm. All variables 
are in the fiscal year prior to the announcement except actual buyback dummy. 
Label   Parameter Estimate 
  
Model I Model II Model III 
Intercept  0.55*** 0.55*** 0.87*** 
  
(4.80) (6.05) (4.40) 
Delta 
 
0.0069*** 0.006** 0.009** 
  
(3.81) (2.14) (2.11) 
Vega 
 
-0.348*** -0.34** -0.296* 
  
(2.71) (2.63) (1.98) 
CEO ownership 
 
0.003 0.006 
   
(0.19) (0.45) 
Percent sought 
  
 0.005 
   
 (0.36) 
Prior BHR 
  
0.28 
   
(0.55) 
Financial constraint 
  
0.013 
   
(1.17) 
Size 
   
-0.000* 
   
(1.86) 
B/M 
   
-0.003 
   
(1.19) 
Cash Flow 
 
-0.64 
   
 (1.01) 
Actual buyback dummy  -0.27*** 
   
 (3.51) 
DA 
  
 0.16** 
   
 (2.03) 
Year cluster Yes Yes Yes 
Industry cluster Yes Yes Yes 
R-square 
 
0.0021 0.0021 0.0079 
F-value   3.83** 2.62* 2.89*** 
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
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Table 2.10: Effect of executive compensation on actual share repurchases. 
The table regresses actual repurchases on CEO compensation sensitivity measures and 
other control variables. Model I and II are linear regression models and Model III is a 
tobit regression model where actual repurchases are truncated at 100% of intended 
number of share repurchases. Actual repurchases are firms’ actual share re-
acquisitions in the first four quarters from the quarter of OMSR announcement. Delta 
is the dollar change in manager’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s share price. 
Vega is the dollar change in manager’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s annual 
volatility. Delta and vega values are in $000’s. CEO ownership is the CEO’s stock 
ownership of the firm expressed as a fraction of total shares outstanding. ln Size is the 
natural log of the market value of the firm. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its 
market value. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. Cash is cash 
level of the firm scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow of the 
company scaled by total assets. Prior return is the buy-and-hold return of the firm for 
30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before the announcement (-30 to -2). 
Annual return is the average annual abnormal return over the 3 year period post 
announcement. Financial constraints are measured by KZ index (discussed in 
methodology section). Percent sought is the percentage of outstanding shares that the 
management states that it intends to buyback. DA is the discretionary accruals of the 
firm. 
Parameter Estimates 
  Model I   Model II   Model III 
Variables Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept/sigma 0.745 19.5 
 
0.906 10.1 
 
0.448 
 
Delta -0.002 -1.52 
 
-0.002* -1.79 
 
-0.001 -0.70 
Vega 0.278*** 4.51 
 
0.275*** 3.90 
 
0.086** 2.36 
CEO ownership -0.002 -0.44 
 
-0.002 -0.41 
 
-0.004** -2.10 
ln Size 
   
-0.003 -0.24 
 
0.008 0.89 
B/M    
0.001** 2.00 
 
0.000 0.64 
Leverage 
   
0.046 1.11 
 
-0.016 -0.27 
Cash  
   
-0.019 -0.33 
 
-0.028 -0.48 
Cash flow 
   
0.363*** 8.55 
 
0.188* 1.78 
Prior return 
   
0.248** 2.15 
 
0.191*** 2.86 
Annual return 
   
-0.001* -1.75 
 
-0.001 -1.43 
Financial constraint 
   
0.002 0.27 
 
0.002 0.40 
Percent sought 
   
-0.031*** -6.93 
 
-0.015*** -7.75 
DA 
   
-0.150*** -3.09 
 
-0.068** -2.17 
         pseudo/R-squared 0.0166     0.0699     0.0338   
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively.  
68 
 
Table 2.11: Effect of executive compensation on post-announcement 
investments and operating performance 
CAPEX is the average annual investment in capital expenditure over the next three 
years post OMSR announcement scaled by total assets in each year. ROA is the 
average annual return on asset over the next three years post OMSR announcement. 
ROA is the ratio of EBITDA and total assets. Delta is the dollar change in manager’s 
wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s share price. Vega is the dollar change in 
manager’s wealth for a 1 percent change in firm’s annual volatility. Delta and vega 
values are in $000’s. CEO ownership is the CEO’s stock ownership of the firm 
expressed as a fraction of total shares outstanding. ln Size is the natural log of the 
market value of the firm. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm to its market value. 
Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. Cash is cash level of the 
firm scaled by total assets. Cash Flow is the operating cash flow of the company 
scaled by total assets. Prior return is the buy-and-hold return of the firm for 30 days 
prior to the announcement to 2 days before the announcement (-30 to -2). Annual 
return is the average annual abnormal return over the 3 year period post 
announcement. Financial constraints are measured by KZ index (discussed in 
methodology section). Percent sought is the percentage of outstanding shares that the 
management states that it intends to buyback. DA is the discretionary accruals of the 
firm. 
Parameter Estimates 
  CAPEX   CAPEX   ROA 
Variables Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 0.045 2.64 
 
0.042 2.43 
 
0.122 3.15 
Delta(x10
-3
) -0.086 -0.75 
 
-0.167 -1.51 
 
0.214 0.86 
Vega -0.007*** -3.14 
 
-0.007*** -2.97 
 
-0.009* -1.69 
CEO ownership 0.001*** 3.33 
 
0.000** 2.78 
 
0.001* 1.85 
ln Size 
   
-0.001 -0.99 
 
0.003** 2.26 
B/M (x10
-2
)    
-0.041 -1.49 
 
-0.462*** -7.48 
Leverage 
   
-0.001 -0.15 
 
0.057*** 5.58 
Cash  
   
-0.029*** -5.96 
 
-0.061*** -5.61 
Cash flow 
   
0.116*** 13.76 
 
0.344*** 18.15 
Annual return 
   
0.000 0.03 
 
0.001*** 9.67 
Financial constraint 
   
-0.001** -2.47 
 
-0.007*** -8.14 
Sales growth 
   
0.004*** 3.23 
 
0.000 0.12 
         Industry FE Yes 
  
Yes 
  
Yes 
 
Adj. R-squared 0.14   
0.23 
  
0.28 
 
N 1970     1968     1977   
* ,**,*** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% significance level respectively. 
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Chapter 3   
 
How Informative is the Language of Buyback 
Announcements? 
3.1 Introduction 
Corporations disclose material information to investors through a variety of 
methods including corporate announcements. One such announcement is about 
firm’s intention to repurchase its shares from the market through open market 
operations generally known as open market share repurchase announcements. 
Firms may opt to repurchase their own shares for a variety of reasons; 
however, the corporate finance literature considers such announcements as a 
signal of firm undervaluation and the market responds favourably to these, on 
average. However, Chan et al. (2010) view Open Market Share Repurchase 
programmes (OMSRs)  as a dubious signal due to their inherent flexibility and 
absence of firm commitment. They argue that such repurchase announcements 
can be opportunistically used by the management to mislead the market. 
Hence, share repurchase announcements can either disclose valuable 
information about the firm and its prospects or these can be used to deceive the 
market. Thus, an interesting research question is; if the market can distinguish 
between value signalling repurchase announcements from those of cosmetic 
ones. 
Given the dubious nature of open market buyback signal, in this chapter 
I analyse the qualitative information that accompanies a share buyback 
announcement to explore how the market perceives the buyback announcement 
given this narrative disclosure. It is reasonable to assume that the market 
reaction will be stronger for repurchase announcements that it regards as value 
signalling.  Solving the credibility puzzle of OMSR programmes at the time of 
announcement is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The objective here is to 
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lever the qualitative disclosure of share repurchase announcements to analyse if 
it is value relevant information and is of some importance to investors. 
Chan et al. (2010) suggest that managers may announce repurchase 
programmes to mislead the market. Massa et al. (2007) show that competing 
firms may also mimic repurchases to counter the negative effect of peer 
repurchases on their valuation, especially in concentrated industries. In 
addition, repurchase announcements are not binding obligations. Traditionally, 
academics in financial economics have relied on quantitative data for stock 
valuation and to explain the observed variations in stock price performance. A 
number of recent studies however highlight the importance of qualitative data 
in enhancing our understanding of financial markets. For example, Tetlock et 
al. (2008) and Xuan et al. (2014) suggest that linguistic media content captures 
otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of firm fundamentals. They show that 
simple quantitative measure of language derived from firm-specific news can 
predict firm’s earnings and stock returns.  
Here, I conjuncture that managers with real good news may use more 
optimistic (positive) language (disclosure tone) to distinguish themselves from 
others.
26
 By resorting to more positive disclosure tone managers expose 
themselves to higher litigation risk. For example, Francis et al. (1994) and 
Rogers et al. (2011) show that a positive disclosure tone is related to higher 
litigation risk. Thus the additional cost of higher litigation risk may add 
credibility to management’s share repurchase announcement as value 
signalling. Using a content analysis approach, I investigate if the language of 
share repurchase announcement news is value relevant information for 
investors. More specifically, I examine the effect of narrative disclosure tone of 
share repurchase announcement news on short-term announcement returns and 
actual repurchase decisions of firms that announce a repurchase programme. 
                                                          
26
 In this chapter I use the terms optimistic and positive interchangeably. 
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The data for the paper is hand collected and allows me to investigate 
several interesting aspects of share repurchase programmes. Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) and Bonaimé (2012) show that the stated motive of 
repurchase programme is value relevant information for investors. Thus I 
classify repurchase announcements according to the stated motive(s) of the 
repurchase programme. In addition, I collect information on any other material 
information that may accompany a repurchase programme announcement such 
as earnings, mergers and acquisitions or recent stock price performance etc. I 
broadly classify these either as good news or bad news.  
This chapter contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, 
it introduces qualitative perspective into the literature on share repurchases. 
This is the first study to the best of my knowledge that analyses the disclosure 
tone of share repurchase programme announcements. My results suggest that 
the narrative tone of repurchase announcement is significantly positively 
related to short-term announcement returns. Thus, the market views OMSR 
announcement as a stronger signal when the disclosure tone of repurchase 
announcement news is more optimistic. Three day (-1, 1) return difference 
around share buyback announcement between firms in the highest and the 
lowest rank group of disclosure tone is 1.71% and is highly significant at the 
1% level. This suggests that the market regards positive repurchase 
announcement disclosure tone as a proxy for managerial optimism about firm’s 
prospects. 
 For short-term repurchase announcement returns, the regression 
coefficient on positive tone variable is 1.59 and is highly significant at the 1% 
level indicating a positive relationship between the two variables. New 
information (signals) might be more value relevant for firms suffering from a 
higher degree of information asymmetry. Following Bonaimé (2012), I 
measure degree of information asymmetry by firm size and find that the impact 
of positive tone is more pronounced for small firms that have higher 
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information asymmetry. Initial market reaction to positive tone is also stronger 
for firms with more growth opportunities (low Book-to-Market ratio) as 
compared to value firms (high Book-to-Market ratio). Mercer (2004) shows 
that the presence of numeric terms and numeric precision increases the 
credibility of management disclosure. The impact of positive tone of buyback 
announcement news is further enhanced by the presence of higher number of 
numeric terms in the buyback announcement press release. However, I observe 
no link between narrative disclosure tone and actual repurchase rates post-
announcement and the longer-term abnormal returns of firms that announce a 
repurchase programme. 
Second, this chapter contributes to the existing literature by allowing a 
better understanding of the stated objectives of repurchase programmes, their 
relative frequency, the market reaction to such repurchase announcements and 
also in terms of their actual completion rates and relative long-run 
performance. As expected, the initial announcement return is highest for firms 
that announce repurchase programmes citing stock undervaluation as the 
motive. Mean 3-day cumulative abnormal return around the repurchase 
announcement event is 1.11% significant at the 5% level. However, the 
announcement return is negative for firms that repurchase for legal reasons. 
These firms lose around 2.61% of their market value in the 3-day period 
around the repurchase announcement. However, most of these repurchase 
announcements were made around the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks 
when the market was down and investor confidence was at its lowest. More 
interestingly, firms that do not state any reason for their repurchase programme 
announcement earn abnormal returns both in the short term and longer-term 
which are significant at the conventional levels as compared to firms that 
repurchase for reasons other than undervaluation. An important research 
question for further exploration here is: why do these latter firms state a reason 
for their repurchase programme when this is associated with underperformance 
compared to those who simply announce a repurchase programme without 
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mentioning any reason for their intention to repurchase stock? This study 
highlights the importance of discretionary disclosure options for managers in 
relation to share repurchases and their impact on firm valuation.   
Finally, my hand collected data allows me to analyse other aspects of 
share repurchase announcements about which literature is limited. For 
example, I look for any other news information contained in share repurchase 
announcements and broadly classify it by the nature of news in terms of good 
versus bad news. I analyse the relative frequency of additional news content in 
share repurchase announcements as well as its impact on the market reaction to 
such repurchase announcements. Descriptive statistics of such analysis is also 
discussed in the paper. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The next section presents 
a review of the relevant literature with emphasis on the importance and role of 
qualitative information in better understanding the market we operate in. 
Research hypothesises are developed in the light of relevant literature and 
presented in the same section. The next section after that describes data, data 
sources and research design. In section 3.4, I present results of my statistical 
analysis. And finally section 3.5 concludes the study.  
3.2 Related literature 
Efficient pricing is the outcome of incorporating all available information in 
firm valuation. The corporate world and financial press provide us with a 
wealth of information in both quantitative and qualitative forms. Researchers in 
accounting and financial economics have predominantly relied on quantitative 
data and have utilised the available economic models and statistical tools to 
examine its  value relevance and information content in stock valuation 
(Feldman et al. (2010)). Until recently, only a few studies had examined the 
role of qualitative information in firm valuation and its impact on stock prices. 
It is reasonable to assume that researchers in accounting and finance preferred 
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to work with quantitative data in determining firm value and to analyse stock 
price movements as such archival data is easily downloadable, objective in 
nature and definitely less ambiguous than qualitative data. Jegadeesh and Wu 
(2013) attribute such lack of qualitative research in the finance literature to 
difficulty in objectively quantifying qualitative information. However, 
following such extant work would have meant ignoring valuable qualitative 
information from our analysis.  
Although these quantitative studies have significantly improved our 
understanding of financial markets, there is also a growing realization that 
quantitative data alone is inadequate in explaining stock price movements. See 
for example, Shiller (1981), and Roll (1988) and Pike et al. (1993), as early 
acknowledgers of the fact in the areas of finance and accounting. Corporations 
and even government regulatory bodies frequently provide a wealth of 
information to market players in different forms and through diverse forums 
and media (Feldman et al. (2010)). Certainly market participants are expected 
to analyse and process this information in their firm valuations and decision 
making. The need to incorporate qualitative information in firm valuation 
process has also gained considerable importance following recent financial 
scandals and corporate frauds like Enron, Worldcom etc. and an increased 
emphasis on transparency and corporate governance.  
Li (2010a) highlights at least three reasons for the use of qualitative 
analysis in enhancing our understanding of financial markets and its players. 
First, textual analysis can provide useful insights and context in understanding 
financial data and testing important economic hypotheses. For example, Li 
(2008), using Fog index from computational linguistic literature shows that 
firms with annual reports that are longer and harder to read have lower 
earnings whereas firms with easy to read annual reports show persistent 
positive earnings.  
75 
 
Second, the rise of behavioural economics (see e.g., Barberis and 
Thaler (2003) and Nofsinger (2011)) in recent years has highlighted several 
cognitive biases that preclude human judgement from rational decision making. 
Since pure quantitative measures of investors’ or managers’ behavioural biases 
are hard to find, a qualitative approach can provide useful insights. A textual 
analysis of managerial communications can highlight certain managerial traits 
that might have significant bearing on decisions they take. For example, Chen 
and Wang (2012) show that managers of already financially constrained firms 
spend more cash to repurchase their stock than other firms due to their 
overconfidence. Similarly, Malmendier and Tate (2008) show that 
overconfident managers over estimate their ability to generate positive 
abnormal returns. They are more likely to engage in value destroying mergers 
and acquisitions by overpaying for target firms.  
Third, managerial communications can also provide useful insights 
about managerial incentives and their private information set that may allow 
better understanding of their actions and firm behaviour. In other words, 
managerial communications provide outsiders an opportunity to see the world 
from their eyes and hence appropriately evaluate their decisions and 
performance in a given environment. 
Besides, the growing realisation of the inadequacy of quantitative data 
to fully explain stock prices, Li (2010a) argues that the use of qualitative data 
in financial economic research is further facilitated by  the availability and 
accessibility of large amount of unstructured descriptive data in an electronic 
form and significant developments in the area of computational linguistics, 
machine learning and text mining. Jegadeesh and Wu (2013) argue that the 
recent advances in statistical processing of textual information have enabled 
researchers to effectively measure descriptive disclosures tone and analyse its 
impact on market prices. 
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Both of these factors, the electronic availability and the ability to 
process textual data have led to a growing literature in financial economics that 
analyses descriptive disclosures. Accounting researchers were among the early 
adopters of descriptive data analysis tools and techniques. They mainly focused 
on descriptive disclosures in financial statements, president’s letter, chairman’s 
statement, Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) and other forms of 
managerial communications and corporate filings.  
The fundamental question about narrative disclosures relates to whether 
it provides value relevant information or is just another marketing technique? 
This is an empirical question. For example, McConnell et al. (1986) regard 
accounting narratives in annual reports as “carefully crafted public relations 
documents with little substantive content”, if any. However, several papers 
show that this is not the case. For example, Abrahamson and Amir (1996) 
using a computerised content analysis approach find that the number of 
negative words in the president’s letter to shareholders is associated with firm 
fundamentals. Tavcar (1998) expresses his concerns over the usefulness of the 
MD&A section of financial statements for investors.  
However, Pava and Epstein (1993) show that information provided in 
the MD&A section though accurately describes historical events but has 
limited ability to predict future firm performance. Specifically, they find that 
information provided in the MD&A section has a strong bias towards 
predicting positive news, but bad news is either ignored or not fully reported. 
Bryan (1997) however finds that the information contained in the MD&A has a 
strong association with firms’ future financial variables such as changes in 
sales, operating cash flows, earnings per share and especially capital 
expenditures over 3-years into the future. Similarly, Smith and Taffler (2000) 
show that discretionary descriptive disclosure in annual reports encompasses 
information that can estimate firms’ bankruptcy risk. Specifically, they find 
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that the chairman’s statement alone contains value relevant information that is 
highly related to the event of firm failure.  
In order to highlight the importance of descriptive disclosures Sun 
(2010) examines the explanation(s) provided for the increase in inventory 
levels in the MD&A for manufacturing firms. Generally, the rise in inventory 
level is seen as a bad sign and is negatively associated with firms’ current and 
future stock and earnings performance (Lev and Thiagarajan (1993)). 
However, he finds that favourable explanation for inventrory increases is 
associated with firms’ future profitability and sales growth. He argues that 
presence and nature of inventory disclosures in the MD&A helps users to better 
interpret disproportionate changes in inventory and predict firm performance.  
Feldman et al. (2010) explore the effect of changes in tone of the 
MD&A in a large sample of 10Q and 10K filings. They find that short term 
returns around SEC filing date are significantly associated with tone changes in 
the MD&A section even after controlling for other factors such as accruals and 
earnings surprises. Similarly, Li (2010b) using a Naïve Bayesian machine 
learning algorithm, finds that the average tone of forward-looking statements 
(FLS) in MD&A is positively associated with firms’ future earnings. Kothari et 
al. (2009) using the General Inquirer classification show the effect of the 
MD&A disclosure tone on the firm’s cost of capital and risk. They analyse 
more than 100,000 documents and find that an aggregate positive (negative) 
disclosure expressed in the reports is related to a decrease (increase) in firm’s 
cost of capital and risk (return volatility). Further analysis of disclosure by 
source reveals that disclosure in business press stories (both positive and 
negative) is deemed more credible by the market and has an impact on firm 
risk measures whereas only negative disclosure by corporations have an impact 
on its risk. The study highlights the fact that such narrative disclosure not only 
reports on past performance but also contains valuable information about 
firms’ future. 
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Tetlock (2007) is one of the earliest papers that analysed the role of 
business press disclosure on financial markets. My work is similar in its 
approach but different in scope to Tetlock (2007) paper. He analyses the 
popular Wall Street Journal column titled “Abreast of the Market” and finds 
that the sentiment expressed in the column is related to short term market 
returns and volatility. Specifically, he shows that a more pessimistic tone in the 
article puts downward pressure on the market prices as measured by Dow 
Jones stock index. In contrast to the general belief that higher pessimism leads 
to higher returns or lower volatility (risk), he shows that higher pessimism, in 
fact results in higher volatility of stocks. This suggests that pessimism factor as 
estimated by the number of negative words in the article may be distinct from 
risk (Feldman et al. (2010)).  
As a step further to examine the role of media in financial markets, 
Tetlock et al. (2008) study the information content of real time media news 
stories about S&P 500 companies. Using Dow Jones News Service and daily 
stories published in The Wall Street Journal between 1984 and 2004, they 
show that the proportion of negative words in such stories can predict firm’s 
future earnings and returns. Their results are robust to controlling for a host of 
other factors such as historic accounting data, past returns and analyst 
forecasts. 
These studies highlight the impact of narrative disclosures in the 
business press on financial markets and suggest that such qualitative 
information is value relevant and conveys incremental information to that 
captured by traditional quantitative factors. Kothari et al. (2009) also regards 
information from business press as more credible due to lower agency issues as 
compared to information contained in analyst forecasts and disclosures by 
corporation itself. 
Open market repurchase announcements are not regarded as a strong 
signal of equity undervaluation or better future prospects as these are not 
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binding obligations and also a growing number of firms use repurchase 
programmes as a tax efficient way of distributing cash to shareholders (see e.g., 
Comment and Jarrell (1991); Grullon and Michaely (2002); Gaspar et al. 
(2013)). Fried (2005) suggests that open market repurchase programmes in fact 
represent opportunistic management behaviour and are used to deceive 
investors rather than as a disclosure about firm fundamentals.  
In this chapter, I analyse the information content of business press 
releases of share repurchase announcements.
27
 To the best of my knowledge, 
this is the first study that uses a content analysis approach to examine the effect 
of repurchase announcement disclosure tone on the market reaction to share 
buyback signal. Francis et al. (1994) and Rogers et al. (2011) suggest that a 
more positive disclosure tone is positively related to litigation risk.
28
 Litigation 
is costly for the firm and its management both in economic and reputational 
terms. Managers by opting for a more optimistic disclosure tone add some cost 
to their share buyback signal by exposing themselves to a higher litigation risk. 
Thus, in line with Tetlock (2007), Tetlock et al. (2008) and  Kothari et al. 
(2009), I argue that the narrative tone of the repurchase announcement 
discloses valuable information about the company and its prospects. Managers 
with real good news may use a more positive disclosure tone to distinguish 
themselves from mimicking firms and the market reaction to such 
announcements will thus be stronger. So formally, 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): A more positive disclosure tone positively affects 
investor’s reaction to repurchase programme announcement. 
The value of new information will be more important for firms that 
suffer from higher degree of information asymmetry. Bhattacharya and 
Jacobsen (2015) suggest that only repurchase announcement (signal) is 
                                                          
27
 Business press releases are firm-generated press releases for media articles. 
28
 Although particular allegations vary from case to case, a common recurring theme is that 
investors often allege that managements’ disclosures about firm value were overly optimistic 
and that led them to form unduly optimistic expectations about firm value. 
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sufficient to correct mispricing for firms that are more likely to be undervalued 
and suffer from higher information asymmetry. Bonaimé (2012) use firm size 
to approximate degree of information asymmetry. It is reasonable to assume 
that small firms suffer from higher information asymmetry due to lower analyst 
following and lower media coverage. Thus, I expect that the tone affect on 
initial announcement returns will be stronger for firms that have higher 
information asymmetry.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The effect of share repurchase announcement tone 
will be influenced by the degree of information asymmetry between the firm 
and investors.  
Botosan (1997) shows that greater amount of numeric data enhances the 
credibility of the disclosure.  Similarly, Mercer (2004) argues that the greater 
precision of numeric data is associated with higher investor confidence in 
management disclosure. Therefore, I expect that the effect of share repurchase 
announcement tone will be higher for press releases that contain more hard 
information (higher number of numeric terms).  
Hypothesis 3 (H3): The effect of share repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone on repurchase announcement returns will be influenced by the 
number of numeric terms used in the repurchase announcement press release. 
Here, it will also be interesting to explore and analyse the relationship 
between disclosure tone of share repurchase announcement and actual 
repurchases post-announcement. Managers who use more optimistic disclosure 
tone in share repurchase programme announcements to express their 
confidence in firm’s prospects are expected to complete their announced 
repurchase commitments.  So, I expect a positive relationship between the 
repurchase announcement disclosure tone and actual repurchase rates. 
Hypothesis 4 (H4): The disclosure tone of repurchase programme 
announcement is positively related to actual repurchase (completion) rates. 
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Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that the stated motive of the share 
repurchase programme contains value relevant information for investors. They 
show that firms that repurchase for undervaluation reasons outperform others 
both in short-run and long-run stock price performance. As mentioned earlier, 
the data for the study allows for identification of the stated motive(s) of share 
repurchase programme. Thus, I test the value relevance of stated motive of 
repurchase programme to its stock price performance. 
Hypothesis 5 (H5): The stated motive of share repurchase programme 
is related to share buyback announcement and post-announcement stock return 
performance. 
I also examine the relationship between the stated motive and actual 
repurchases in this study. Specifically, I investigate the following question. 
Does the stated motive of the repurchase programme impact its completion 
rate? Formally, I test the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6 (H6): The stated motive of share repurchase programme 
is related to actual completion rate of announced repurchase programme. 
The predictions in above mentioned hypotheses are based on the extant 
literature in the field.
29
 Miller (2006) regards the role of financial press as a 
watchdog of accounting fraud. He argues that media fulfils this role either by 
rebroadcasting or by indulging in independent and original research and 
analysis. His results show that original investigation and analysis conveys new 
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 Managers can also use buyback announcements to deceive the market. For example, Ahern 
and Sosyura (2014) show that corporation have an incentive to manage their media coverage to 
influence stock prices especially during important corporate events. They show that bidders in 
stock mergers attract a lot of media attention and hence originate substantially more news 
stories after the start of merger negotiations but prior to merger announcement. The strategy 
benefits bidder’s shareholders as it results in temporary boost in bidder’s stock price during the 
period when exchange ratio is determined, which substantially lowers the takeover cost. So, by 
managing media coverage managers can influence stock prices and may temporarily 
outsmart/fool the market. Similarly, in the case of buyback announcements as managers are not 
obligated to put their money where their mouth is, they can sound as positive or as optimistic 
as they like. Thus, one can also expect results that may not conform to the hypotheses 
mentioned above. So the research is also exploratory in nature besides being causal. 
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information to the market whereas those who rebroadcast from other 
intermediaries do not provide any additional information. It will be interesting 
to see how accurately media news coverage captures the information content 
and real intent behind manager’s buyback announcements. 
3.3 Data and research design 
The data for the analysis are taken from multiple sources. First of all 
repurchase announcement data (repurchase announcement date and company 
identifier) are downloaded from the ThomsonOne banker. The sample data 
covers the period between 2001 and 2004. I restrict my sample to S&P 1500 
firms. Only those announcements are kept in the dataset for which I can find 
accounting and returns data in the COMPUSTAT and the CRSP databases 
respectively. Actual repurchase announcement press release data are then 
individually downloaded using Factiva search engine. Factiva has major 
business and news journals that cover company press releases. Then actual 
press release for each announcement is saved into a separate file and coded. 
The coding scheme is important and necessary as it allows merging the results 
of disclosure tone of these press releases with other accounting and returns data 
from the COMPUSTAT and the CRSP.  
To further differentiate my research from the existing literature, I read 
each repurchase announcement press release and classify these on the stated 
motivate of repurchase programme; the source of funds for repurchase activity, 
the news source that reports the press release, duration of the repurchase 
programme and the number of news sources that report on a specific 
repurchase announcement. I also look for any other news that is accompanied 
with repurchase announcement and classify these into two general categories 
good and/or bad.
30
  
                                                          
30
 In consultation with (on advice of) my supervisor I work with a sample of 351 repurchase 
announcements given the nature of data collection process and scope of this research. 
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All of these sub-classifications will help to explore the topic in much 
greater detail compared to what has been covered by existing research. For 
example, the general consensus in finance literature is that buyback 
announcements represent managerial signal of firm undervaluation and the 
market reaction to these is positive on average. However, the underlying 
motivation for repurchase announcement may vary. Academic literature has 
cited several motivations for repurchase activity ranging from undervaluation 
to capital restructuring, from distributing excess cash to mitigate the effect of 
dilution and to manage EPS. An interesting research question thus is; are all 
repurchase announcements regarded as the same and have similar signalling 
power irrespective of the stated reason; or the signalling effect varies across 
stated reason(s) and the market reacts accordingly. It is reasonable to assume 
that an efficient market reacts differently to a buyback announcement 
motivated by undervaluation reasons as compared to a repurchase 
announcement made with the intention to offset dilution or gain some 
flexibility in managing firm resources. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) find that the stated reason for the 
repurchase programme in press release contains economically valuable 
information. They classify repurchase announcements in to six categories and 
note that several announcements mention more than one reason to justify the 
repurchase programme. Bonaimé (2012) however note that each repurchase 
programme announcement can correspond to up to 3 reasons; however firms 
rarely mention more than two reasons. In my dataset, I use the first two reasons 
mentioned in an announcement as the motive of repurchase programme. Each 
announcement is read and stated reason(s) are identified, classified and coded 
in to six categories which are as follows.  
1. Undervaluation:  The category includes repurchase announcements 
where managers believe that the market has mispriced the stock and 
the stock is trading below its fair value. Such announcement 
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typically refer to the following terms in press release; 
undervaluation, low current stock price, stock price 
underperformance, best use of funds, regards stock as good 
investment or return on investment etc. Since Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) regard the stated purpose of “best use of funds” in their 
undervaluation category, I group the two into the same 
undervaluation category.  
2. Capital structure adjustments: These announcements typically refer 
to terms such as change in capital structure, adjust capital structure, 
to change debt to equity ratio or to offset dilution. 
3. Corporate use: This is the general purpose that firms mention more 
frequently to justify stock repurchases. I include announcements in 
this category that mention the terms; corporate use, general 
corporate purposes. I also include announcements in to this category 
if firms repurchase stock for Employees Stock Option Programme 
(ESOP). 
4.  Return cash: Repurchase programmes initiated with the motive to 
return excess cash to shareholders. The general terms used in these 
announcements are; to return cash, return excess cash, return capital 
etc.  
5. Earnings per share (EPS) and flexibility: This category includes 
repurchase announcements where managers express that they intend 
to repurchase shares to strengthen their EPS number or to gain some 
financial flexibility.   
6. Legal: If firms repurchase due to legal reasons such as an SEC rule 
change or for legal settlement purposes. 
Similarly, I also look for other information in share repurchase 
announcement news. The buyback announcements are classified based on the 
nature of such additional information that accompanies share repurchase 
announcement. This additional information varies in scope and covers topics 
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related to both internal matters as well as external environment of the firm in 
which it operates. I broadly categorise and condense this additional information 
into two categories; “good news” and “bad news”. Good news category 
contains announcements that pass on another positive news along with the 
buyback announcement and bad news group includes announcements that have 
a bad news in the buyback announcement. Although, it is nearly impossible to 
isolate the impact of two news announcements but the objective here is to see 
how the market reacts to such repurchase announcements given this additional 
information.  
3.3.1 Variables definitions 
The primary variable of interest in this study is the disclosure tone of 
repurchase programme announcement besides the stated motives of the 
repurchase programme. Since the tone measure is based on soft (qualitative) 
data, the first step is to transform the unstructured text document in to a 
structured way of presentation that can be analysed more robustly. Following 
Tetlock et al. (2008) each text document is regarded as a “bag of words 
scheme” which represents all the word in the document as a “document-term-
matrix”. In order to infer meaningful information from this document-term-
matrix, the information is condensed into two main variables using Henry-IV 
psychosocial dictionary of positive and negative words. I use Diction textual 
analysis software to perform content analysis on share repurchase 
announcement press releases. Diction provides average scores of positive and 
negative narrative disclosure tone used in a document. The positivity (tone) 
variable is then defined as the difference between the positive and negative 
tone scores scaled by their sum following Uang et al. (2006) and Henry 
(2008).
31
 
Loughran and McDonald (2011) use different lists of positive and 
negative words that they believe are more appropriate to perform content 
                                                          
31
 For a list of positive and negative words used in the study please refer to Henry (2008). 
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analysis on financial documents. They show that their list of words is better at 
capturing information contained in company 10K filings.  However, in my data 
content analysis is performed on media press releases of share repurchase 
programme announcements which are different from company’s annual 
reports. However, given the nature of my data, I use Henry’s list of positive 
and negative words as it has been applied in a similar context. Henry (2008) 
applies these dictionaries to analyse firm’s earnings press releases. To control 
for the variations in disclosure size and type, I include total number of words 
and the frequency of numeric terms used in the press release as additional 
control variables. 
Abnormal repurchase announcement returns around the event are 
calculated using the standard event study approach. The 3-day (-1, 1) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) is calculated around the event date (day 
0). First, abnormal returns are calculated and then abnormal return is 
accumulated over the event window (-1, 1). Abnormal returns are defined as 
the excess returns due to the announcement over unconditional (without 
announcement) expected returns 
              
where      is the abnormal return on security i at time t.     is the 
conditional return and     is the expected return on the market portfolio. Both 
equal weighted and value weighted market portfolio are used to calculate 
abnormal returns. The CAR approach accumulates daily abnormal return (AR) 
over a time horizon of t1 and t2 (estimation window). 
                 
  
    
 
And the mean CAR is calculated as, 
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Where n is the number of firms in the sample. 
 I following Ikenberry et al. (1995) and calculate longer-term firm 
performance by using Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) approach. 
Taffler et al. (2004)favor it as it accurately captures actual investor experience. 
The BHAR approach is simple and intuitive. It simply compares the multi-
period returns from a buy-and-hold strategy of event firms against that of the 
market portfolio. Thus abnormal return of stock repurchase firms is simply the 
difference between their return and the return on benchmark portfolio.  
                     
       
           
       
 
Returns are calculated for time period T for security i. RB is the return 
on the benchmark portfolio. Just as in short term return calculations, I use both 
equal weighted and value weighted market portfolios as benchmarks 
separately. Average buy and hold abnormal returns for the event firms and the 
market portfolio are calculated using monthly returns data. BHAR is calculated 
over a period of three years post announcement (i-e. from the month of the 
announcement to 36
th
 month after the announcement or up to the end of the 
period for which data is available). Mean buy and hold abnormal return is the 
difference between the average buy and hold return of the event firms and that 
of the benchmark portfolio for the event window. 
The focus of my analysis is on the disclosure tone of repurchase 
announcements and its effect on the market reaction to repurchase 
announcement. In order to fully understand the role of disclosure tone in 
repurchase programme announcements, I control for other factors that are 
likely to affect my dependant variables – (announcement) returns and 
completion rates. Prior literature has identified a number of factors that can 
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influence the market reaction to repurchase announcement. One such factor is 
equity undervaluation and is often mentioned as a motivation for the initiation 
of repurchase programme (see e.g., Brav et al. (2005); Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009); Bonaimé (2012) and Chen and Wang (2012)). To proxy for firm 
undervaluation, I use lagged returns and ratio of book to market value. Lagged 
returns are calculated as buy and hold returns for a 30-day period prior to the 
announcement, starting from -2 days to -32 days.  Book-to-Market (B/M) is 
simply the ratio of book value of firm assets to market value of firm assets and 
is measured at the end of the fiscal year prior to repurchase announcement.  
Ho et al. (1997) find a positive relationship between buyback 
announcement returns and degree of asymmetric information between 
executives and outside investors. Following them and Bonaimé (2012), firm 
size is used as a proxy for  information asymmetry. Firm size is measured as 
natural log of firm’s market value at the end of the fiscal year prior to the 
repurchase announcement. Jensen (1986) suggests that firms with higher levels 
of cash are more likely to suffer from potential agency problems. To control for 
potential agency problems, I use cash as a control variable. Cash is defined as 
book value of cash and short term marketable securities scaled by total assets 
of the firm.  
Firm’s cash flows proxy for its capacity to complete its announced 
repurchase programme. Firms that generate more cash flows are more likely to 
have higher completion rates. Cash flows are defined as the operating cash 
flows of the firm which are scaled by total firm assets at the beginning of the 
year prior to the announcement. Dittmar (2000) and Skinner (2008) show that 
firm’s capital structure also has a bearing on managements’ decision to 
repurchase shares; hence, I use leverage as a control variable. Leverage is 
defined as the ratio of total liabilities to total firm assets using fiscal year end 
values before the repurchase announcement. 
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In addition, Chen and Wang (2012) suggest that financial constraints 
also play a role in explaining the market reaction to repurchase announcements. 
They show that financially constrained firms earn lower return on buyback 
announcement as compared to unconstrained firms. In order to approximate 
financial constraints experience by a firm they use Kaplan and Zingales (1997) 
(KZ) index. A higher value of KZ index represents more financial constraints 
on the firm.
32
 Chan et al. (2010) suggest that firm’s discretionary accruals also 
have an effect on OMSR announcement returns. I measure earnings quality 
using the Sloan (1996) model and decompose it into discretionary and non 
discretionary accruals using the Jones (1991) model. The details of the 
estimation procedure are explained in appendix II.  Stephens and Weisbach 
(1998) show that the market possesses some ability to predict actual 
repurchases at the time of repurchase announcement. They show that initial 
buyback announcement returns are positively related to actual buybacks post-
announcement. Therefore, I control for the effect of actual share repurchases 
post-announcement on repurchase announcement returns.  
Actual repurchase completion rate calculations require an accurate 
measure of actual repurchase activity. Stephens and Weisbach (1998) highlight 
the problems in estimating actual share repurchases as it can neither be 
observed at the time of the announcement nor can be estimated with accuracy 
afterwards. However, an SEC rule change in December 2003 now requires 
firms to report the number of shares repurchased in each quarter.
33
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 The following formula is used to calculate the KZ score. KZ = -1.002 * (CFT/TAT-1) -39.368 
* (DIVT/TAT-1) – 1.135 * (CAT/TAT-1) + 3.139 * (LEV) +0.283 (Q). 
Where CF is the cash flow, DIV is the dividend and CA represents current assets of the 
company for the year. All these variables are scaled by lagged total assets of the firm. LEV is 
the ratio of total debt and book value of assets and Q is the ratio of market-to-book (M/B) 
value of the firm’s assets. 
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 On Dec. 17, 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) began requiring all 
repurchasing firms to report the total number of shares repurchased, the average price paid per 
share, the number of shares that were purchased as part of a publicly announced repurchase 
plan, and the maximum number (or approximate dollar value) of shares remaining under other 
plans. This regulation applies to all quarterly and annual filings for periods ending on or after 
Mar. 15, 2004. 
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(2008) show that although no proxy is without error, however, they find 
Compustat’s purchase of common and preferred stock minus any decrease in 
redeemable preferred stock to be least problematic, especially for firms with 
high levels of equity offerings or option exercises. To calculate the number of 
shares repurchased, I divide this number by the quarterly closing price of the 
firm. This yields the number of shares repurchased that is then scaled by total 
number of shares outstanding to estimate the percentage of shares repurchased. 
These quarterly repurchases are summed over a period of one year (4 quarters) 
following Chan et al. (2010). Finally to determine the percentage of shares 
actually repurchased in relation to the announced repurchase programme size, 
cumulative actual repurchases are divided by the intended size of the 
repurchase programme mentioned at the time of announcement. 
3.3.2 Summary statistics 
Table 3.1 presents descriptive statistics of the sample data. The table reports 
frequency distributions of share repurchase announcements along with their 
relative frequency by year. In addition, the table reports average short-term 
announcement returns, average percentage of intended repurchase programme 
size, average market value as expressed in natural log terms and the average 
Book-to-Market (B/M) value by year. The table shows that repurchase 
announcing firms intend to repurchase around 7.26% of their outstanding 
shares, on average. The average market value and book-to-market ratio of 
share repurchase announcing firms are 2,752 million dollars and 0.49 
respectively. Mean 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the 
buyback announcement is 0.67% which is lower than the number reported in 
earlier studies.
34
  
Table 3.2 provides summary statistics on repurchase announcement 
returns, firm characteristics and disclosure tone of repurchase announcement 
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 This may be due to the time period variations and lower number of observations used in the 
study. 
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press releases for sample firms. The table reports number of observations, 
mean, standard deviations, 10
th
, 50
th
 and 90
th
 percentiles for each variable. 
Repurchase announcement disclosure tone, on average, is positive with a mean 
value of 0.47. Sample firms on average earn an annual buy-and-hold abnormal 
return of around 2.56% over the next three years. So these firms outperform the 
market by more than 7.7% over the next 3-years post-announcement. The 
returns data are windsorized at the 5% and 95% levels to remove impact of 
extreme outliers which lowers the mean return values reported in the paper. 
The sample firms are not highly levered, have an average book-to-market ratio 
of 0.49 and repurchase around 73% of the announced repurchase programme 
size.
35
  
Similar to Brav et al. (2005), I find that the most common motive for 
repurchase programme initiation appears to be  undervaluation. Thirty one 
percent of sample firms mention undervaluation as a motive for announcing a 
repurchase programme, followed by corporate use motive (25%). Nearly half 
(47%) of all repurchase announcements contains other news information as 
well and most of these have positive news and only a handful contain a bad 
news. On average, repurchase announcement press releases have 185 words. 
Around 11% text of these press releases comprises of numeric terms, on 
average. More than one news agency reports repurchase announcement press 
release of a company and nearly half of these come from Dow Jones News 
Service (DJNS) in my dataset. 
3.4 Results 
Table 3.3 presents the relative frequency of the stated motives of repurchase 
announcements. Stock undervaluation is the most referred to motive for share 
repurchases in the repurchase announcement press releases (95). This is 
followed by general corporate use motive (72) and the motive to return cash to 
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 Actual repurchase percentage is not truncated at the maximum level i-e. 100% repurchase of 
announced shares. Some firms repurchase more shares than the announced repurchase 
programme size. 
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shareholders (20). Repurchase announcements mentioning EPS and capital 
structure adjustment as a motive to repurchase shares have the same frequency 
(14) in this sample. Frequency of repurchase announcements mentioning legal 
reasons (13) is low and such announcements are not accompanied by any other 
stated motive for the repurchase programme. 
Distribution of short-term announcement returns by the stated motive 
highlights an interesting fact that not all buyback announcements are received 
as value signalling by the market. The market does seem to pay attention to the 
stated motive of repurchase programme and reacts accordingly. For example, 
the observed announcement returns are highest for firms that repurchase for 
undervaluation reasons (1.11%) significant at the 5% level. Average 
announcement returns for repurchase programmes initiated for reasons other 
than undervaluation are not statistically different from zero.
36
 Long-run returns 
of these firms are also not statistically different from zero. 
Firms that repurchase due to legal reasons experience a negative 
announcement returns which are slightly significant at the 10% level. However 
most of these announcements were made immediately after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks when the market was down and investor confidence was at its lowest. 
This might bias the initial announcement returns downwards and possibly have 
caused the negative returns reported in table 3.3. These firms however earn 
highest longer term abnormal returns though not statistically significant. 
Interestingly, firms that make a repurchase announcement without specifying 
any motive earn significant announcement as well as long-run abnormal 
returns. Thus an interesting research question here is: why firms mention any 
motive at the time of announcement? Other categories that show better longer-
term performance are the ones that repurchase either for corporate use or for 
EPS or flexibility reasons, though the number are not statistically significant.  
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 The absence of statistical significance with announcement returns might be attributed to 
lower number of observations for such motives.  
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These findings are similar to Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) in the sense that the market reaction to the share repurchase 
announcement is highest for firms that initiate repurchase programme due to 
firm undervaluation. Mean CAR reported in the paper is lower as compared to 
earlier studies. This may however be due to differences in sample selection, 
differences in time period and most likely due to fewer number of observations 
used in the study. Bargeron et al. (2014) show that long-run abnormal 
performance of repurchasing firms is attributable to firms that announce 
subsequent repurchase programme authorizations and takeover attempts. I also 
find that firms that repurchase for corporate use reasons earn better long-run 
returns. Shares repurchased under the general purpose category or for corporate 
use purposes include their use in takeovers and mergers and acquisition 
transactions. 
Table 3.4 shows mean return statistics of share repurchasing firms by 
nature of any other news contained in the repurchase announcement press 
release. Mean return results suggest that firms that announce a repurchase 
programme without any other news earn an announcement return of around 
0.69% and an annual buy and hold abnormal return of around 4.02% both 
significant at the 5% level. Repurchase announcements that contain a good 
news as well are discounted by the market and the observed announcement 
return on average is only 0.38% and the annual buy and hold return is around 
1.74%, both numbers are not statistically different from zero.  
Firms that share a bad news along with repurchase announcement are 
also discounted given the presence of a bad news and earn an insignificant 
announcement return of 0.78%. Also there is no observable long-run abnormal 
stock performance for such buyback announcements. Buyback announcements 
that contain a mixed signal by having both a good and a bad news are seen as 
more credible and the initial market reaction is much stronger with 3-day CAR 
around the announcement of around 3.9% which is significant at the 10% level. 
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The long run performance of these firms however is very poor with negative 
annual buy and hold returns of around 7%, though the number is not 
statistically different from zero at the conventional significance levels. 
3.4.1 Firm characteristics, disclosure tone and returns 
Panel A of table 3.5 presents univariate results on the determinants of short 
term announcement returns. Consistent with earlier studies, small firms earn 
significant abnormal returns on share repurchase announcement. The abnormal 
return for large firms is not statistically different from zero. The difference 
between announcement returns of small and large firms is 0.98% and is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The finding is in line with  Ikenberry 
et al. (1995) who show that small firms experience higher abnormal returns on 
repurchase announcement as compared to large firms. The return difference 
between low and high subsamples of data based on other firm and 
announcement characteristics is not statistically significant. However, the 
significance of announcement returns on these characteristics varies between 
subsamples.  
Firms with lower B/M values earn significant abnormal returns on 
buyback announcement compared to high B/M value firms. Firms that 
experience poorer returns prior to buyback announcement earn an 
announcement return of 0.82% significant at the 5% significance level as 
compared to others that earn slightly significant return of 0.52%. Firms with 
lower cash flows earn higher and significant abnormal returns compared to 
firms with lower cash flows. The finding is inconsistent with the traditional 
agency theory that suggests firms with higher cash flows will benefit more 
from repurchase activity by reducing the agency costs of free cash flows. 
However, investors might view a repurchase announcement from a cash 
constrained firm as a stronger signal of management’s belief in better future 
performance. Repurchase announcements are often viewed as a signal that the 
firm will generate higher cash flows in future. Managers by announcing the 
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repurchase programme are pre-committing to distribute these higher expected 
cash flows to shareholders. Chen and Wang (2012) also show that cash 
constrained firms, in fact, repurchase more shares post-announcement.  
Firms that intend to purchase a lower percentage of number of 
outstanding shares earn significant abnormal returns as compared to firms that 
intend to purchase a greater portion of their outstanding shares. Consistent with 
Stephens and Weisbach (1998), announcement returns of firms that actually 
repurchase more shares is higher and significant compared to firms that 
repurchase fewer number of shares. This reflects that the market possesses 
some ability to predict actual repurchases at the time of announcement. The 
effect of any other news in the press release besides the share repurchase 
announcement is quite pronounced and such firms earn an abnormal return of 
1.02% significant at the 1% level as compared to other repurchase 
announcement press releases that have no other news which earn an 
insignificant return of only 0.36%. Similarly, buyback news announcements 
that contain more numeric terms earn higher and significant abnormal 
announcement return of 0.8%. 
Panel B of table 3.5 shows the effect of repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone on repurchase announcement returns.  Each year I rank firms 
into terciles based on their disclosure tone measure. Firms in rank group 1 have 
the least positive disclosure tone in their buyback announcement press releases 
and firms in rank group 3 send the strongest signal by using more positive 
disclosure tone.  Panel B1 (B2) shows mean short term (longer term annual buy 
and hold) abnormal returns for firms in each rank group.   
The distribution of mean short term announcement returns by 
disclosure tone for each rank group provides support to hypothesis H1 that the 
market reaction is more positive for firms that use more positive disclosure 
tone in repurchase announcement press release. Firms that use more optimistic 
language in their open market repurchase press release generate an abnormal 
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return of 1.38% which is highly significant at the 1% level. In contrast, firms 
with least positive disclosure tone earn negative returns of 0.33% though not 
statistically different from zero. Mean difference in announcement returns of 
firms between rank groups 3 and 1 is 1.71% that is highly significant at the 1% 
level. Panel B2 of the table suggests that repurchase announcement disclosure 
tone has no impact on long-run performance of repurchase announcing firms.  
3.4.2 Tone and short term returns 
Table 3.6 reports regression results. I regress short-term repurchase 
announcement returns on the narrative disclosure tone of repurchase 
announcements and other control variables. Specifically, I run the following 
general multiple regression model that includes all the control variables. 
                          
 
   
                            
where Ri,t is the announcement return (3-day cumulative abnormal 
return around the repurchase announcement date). Positivity is a measure of 
repurchase announcement disclosure tone.  Model-I simply regresses initial 
buyback announcement returns on the disclosure tone of repurchase 
announcements without any control variables. The regression coefficient is 
positive and highly significant. This is consistent with my hypothesis H1 that 
there is a positive relationship between the narrative disclosure tone of 
repurchase announcement and the market reaction to it. A more positive 
announcement generates a stronger market reaction. A 1 unit change in 
disclosure tone positivity is associated with a change of 1.44% in short-term 
announcement returns - a result that is economically significant. 
The multivariate regression results in model-II provide further support 
to hypothesis HI by showing that disclosure tone of the news announcement is 
significantly related to buyback announcement returns even after controlling 
for all other variables that may affect short term repurchase announcement 
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returns. Regression results show that a more positive disclosure tone positively 
affects the market perception about the repurchase announcement as value 
signalling and it responds more favourably. The coefficient on positive tone 
variable is highly significant reflecting the fact that it has significant 
explanatory power of short term announcement returns. In addition, as 
expected, the announcement returns are negatively related to firm size. This 
shows that smaller firms earn higher abnormal returns on share repurchase plan 
announcement. The regression coefficients on other control variables are not 
statistically significant.  
The regression results in Model III and IV show the impact of 
disclosure tone on short term repurchase announcement returns for small and 
value firms respectively. Model V shows the impact of disclosure tone on share 
repurchase announcement returns when the buyback announcement contains a 
higher frequency of numeric terms. In model III, an interaction term of small 
firms and positive disclosure tone measure is regressed on CARs in addition to 
other control variables. Small x Positivity variable is generated by multiplying 
positivity tone measure with a size dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for 
sample firms with firm size below the sample median and 0 other wise. The 
coefficient on this variable captures the effect of repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone on initial announcement returns for small firms. Since small 
firms suffer from higher information asymmetry, a more positive disclosure 
tone for small firms thus generates a stronger market reaction to the news. The 
coefficient of this interaction term is 2.03 and is highly significant. The 
positivity (tone measure) in this specification estimates the disclosure tone 
effect for large firms. Its coefficient is not statistically significant. Thus, the 
positive tone effect on repurchase announcement returns are mainly driven by 
small firms. For large firms the impact of disclosure tone on announcement 
returns is insignificant. These findings are consistent with hypothesis H2.  
98 
 
Model IV takes into account the effect of positive disclosure tone on 
short-term announcement returns for value and growth firms. Value x 
Positivity variable is generated by multiplying positivity tone measure with a 
dummy variable. The dummy variable takes the value of 1 for sample firms 
with book to market values above the sample median and 0 other wise. The 
regression coefficient on this interaction is negative and significant which 
shows that the effect of positive disclosure tone on repurchase announcement 
returns is positive for firms with higher growth opportunities. One might 
expect this as higher growth opportunities might justify the optimistic 
disclosure tone and hence the market might see such announcements as more 
credible and value signalling. 
In Model V I analyse the interactive relationship between the disclosure 
tone of repurchase news announcement and the presence of numeric terms in 
the news. Mercer (2004) argues that numbers are viewed as more credible and 
greater numerical precision in management forecasts increases investors’ 
perception about credibility of management disclosure. One would expect that 
the impact of positive tone will be stronger if the announcement has higher 
numeric intensity. The interaction term Numeric x Positivity is calculated by 
multiplying positivity tone measure with a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 for firms with numeric terms above the sample median and 0 other wise. 
The coefficient on this variable is significant which provides support to Mercer 
(2004) argument. The impact of disclosure tone is positive on CARs when the 
repurchase announcement press release has more numeric terms in it. In 
contrast the positive tone has no effect on CARs when the announcement has 
fewer numeric terms in the news.
37
 
  
                                                          
37
 Regression results in all model specifications remain robust and are very similar to ones 
reported in the tables when actual repurchases is excluded as an explanatory variable which 
might induce potential look-ahead bias. 
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3.4.3 Tone and long term returns 
In table 3.7 I regress longer term returns on disclosure tone of share repurchase 
announcement and other control variables. Positive announcement tone seems 
to have no effect on long term firm performance. Longer term returns of 
buyback firms are affected by firm characteristics such as size, B/M, cash and 
cash flows. Size is negatively related to longer term returns of repurchasing 
firms. A 1 unit increase in natural log of market value (size) is associated with 
1.78% decrease in annual buy and hold abnormal returns of repurchasing firms. 
As expected, B/M is significantly positively related to longer term returns of 
firms that announced a repurchase programme. The regression coefficient on 
B/M variable is relatively high. A one standard deviation change in book-to-
market ration is associated with 2.92% change in annual BHAR. The finding is 
consistent with earlier evidence such as Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) who show that value firms earn significant longer term 
returns post-announcement. The regression coefficient on cash held by firms is 
negatively related to long run returns of repurchase announcing firms whereas 
firms that have higher operating cash flows do better in post announcement 
period. Interestingly, the coefficient on actual repurchases is negative showing 
evidence on managerial ability to time the market. Firms that repurchase more 
shares earn lower abnormal returns in the 3-year period post announcement. 
None of the other variables have any statistical significance. 
Bonaimé (2012) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) show that firms that 
repurchase for undervaluation reasons earn significant longer term returns in 
the post announcement period. I test that in Model II of table 3.7. I do not find 
any relationship between the stated motive and long-run returns of 
repurchasing firms. The only motive that shows slight significance is legal 
reasons for the repurchase plan. However in my sample there are only 13 
observations with the stated motive and most of these announcements were 
made when the market was down due to 9/11 terrorist attacks. Unlike Peyer 
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and Vermaelen (2009), the relationship between stated motive and long-run 
performance of repurchasing firms is not clear in this dataset. 
3.4.4 Tone and actual repurchases 
Table 3.8 presents tobit regression results of regressing actual share 
repurchases on the repurchase announcement tone and other determinants of 
actual repurchases. Model I presents the untruncated estimates whereas model 
II and III present the tobit estimates with truncation of dependant variable. 
Model II and III account for the censored nature of actual completion rates, 
which is naturally truncated at the lower bound at 0 and manually truncated at 
the 100% level on the upper bound. The coefficient on positive tone variable is 
not statistically different from zero. So the repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone has no explanatory power of actual repurchases post-
announcement. 
Actual repurchases are however positively related to cash flows and 
negatively related to the announced repurchase plan size. This shows that 
firm’s ability to repurchase effects firm’s decision to repurchase shares. A 1-
standard deviation increase in cash flow is associated with 39.4% increase in 
firm’s actual repurchases. The findings are similar to ones reported in Stephens 
and Weisbach (1998) who show that the combined effect of firm’s expected 
and unexpected cash flows on actual share repurchases is around 38.37%, an 
effect that is economically meaningful and significant. Similar to Bonaimé 
(2012), I find a negative and significant relationship between actual 
repurchases and the size of announced repurchase programme. This is 
consistent with the idea that larger repurchase programmes are more difficult to 
complete. The marginal effect of announced repurchase plan size on actual 
share repurchases is -1.22%. consistent with Chan et al. (2004) and Bonaimé 
(2012) actual repurchase rates are negatively related to post-announcement 
returns, though the relationship is slightly significant at the 10% level.  
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Model III incorporates stated motives as additional explanatory 
variables of actual share repurchases. Unlike Bonaimé (2012), who find no 
relationship between the stated motive and actual completion rate, I find that 
firms that announced a repurchase plan for EPS/flexibility reasons or 
mentioned legal reasons for repurchasing shares actually repurchase fewer 
shares. The marginal effects of the two motives are also economically 
significant, i.e., 18.3% and 29.3% respectively. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Firms communicate with investors in a number of ways to convey 
economically meaningful information. Open market share repurchase 
announcements are often seen as a managerial signal of firm undervaluation 
and the market reaction to these is positive, on average. However, the most 
common form of repurchases – open market share repurchases are not binding 
commitments and often criticised to be regarded as a strong signal of equity 
undervaluation. The study investigates if the soft information passed on to 
investors at the time of repurchase announcement has some value relevance in 
explaining the initial market reaction to these announcements as well as longer-
term returns post-announcement. I also test if the narrative disclosure tone of 
repurchase announcement can help predict actual repurchase completion rates 
of repurchase announcing firms. Specifically, I look at the narrative disclosure 
tone of repurchase announcement press releases and the role of the stated 
motive of repurchase programme on the above mentioned variables.  
The analysis in this chapter suggests that not all share repurchase 
programmes create equal value for shareholders. The market tends to 
differentiate between share repurchase programmes initiated for different 
reasons. Consistent with Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), initial announcement 
return is highest for firms that mention undervaluation as a motive for stock 
repurchases. However, these firms show no long-run abnormal performance in 
my sample data. Firms that do not mention any reason in their repurchase 
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announcement earn both short term and long-run abnormal returns. Similarly, 
firms with no other news do better than firms with positive news. An 
interesting research question for future research is: why do some firms mention 
a reason/positive news if the market reaction is lower compared to firms that 
do not mention any reason/news in their repurchase announcement? Further 
empirical research is required to address the question to help us understand the 
discretionary disclosure options available to managers and why, when and how 
do they use these. 
My results show that the initial announcement returns are significantly 
positively related to the disclosure tone of repurchase news announcement. The 
effect of disclosure tone is stronger for small firms – given higher degree of 
information asymmetry experienced by such firms, and firms with higher 
growth potential such as firms with lower book-to-market ratios. The positive 
tone impact is negative on short term announcement returns with higher B/M 
ratio (value) firms and positive for low B/M (growth) firms. Finally, I also find 
that positive disclosure tone effect is higher for firms that use more numeric 
terms in the news.  
These results suggest that the repurchase announcement disclosure tone 
is value relevant information for investors. However the mechanism through 
which it affects announcement returns needs further exploration and is a 
limitation of this study. In this chapter I argue that a positive disclosure tone 
adds to the credibility of the undervaluation signal conveyed through 
repurchase announcements – which are inherently flexible and are not binding 
obligations. Thus the conditional variable disclosure tone in this case reinforces 
the undervaluation signal conveyed by repurchase announcement. However, 
there is also a possibility that disclosure tone may contain price sensitive 
information above and beyond the repurchase signal that results in a stronger 
market reaction. I find no relationship between repurchase announcement 
disclosure tone and longer term returns of repurchase announcing firms. Higher 
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announcement returns might be due to the positive tone effect. Repurchase 
announcement disclosure tone also appears to have no relationship with actual 
repurchase rates of firms that announced a repurchase programme.  
Consistent with prior literature, I find evidence that small and value 
firm earn higher abnormal returns post-repurchase announcement. Stated 
motive of repurchase programme also has no explanatory power for longer 
term abnormal returns of share repurchase announcing firms. Actual share 
repurchases are strongly influenced by firm’s ability to spend cash for share 
repurchase activity. Firms with higher cash flows repurchase a lot more 
compared to other firms. Firm’s ability to complete a share repurchase 
programme is negatively related to announced repurchase programme size and 
also to post-announcement returns experienced by such firms. The stated 
motive(s) of repurchase programmes also have limited explanatory power for 
actual repurchase rates, if any. 
In conclusion, the paper provides support to a number of findings 
reported in earlier studies and at the same time explores the effect of narrative 
disclosure tone of repurchase announcements on investors’ reaction to 
repurchase announcement, longer term returns and actual repurchase decisions 
of repurchase announcing firms.  The paper also contributes to the growing 
literature in finance that shows qualitative data contains value relevant 
information that was traditional ignored in the financial economics research. 
The analysis in this chapter also suggests that verbal content (soft information) 
of buyback announcements contain value relevant information for market 
participants and can explain initial market reaction to share repurchase 
announcement. 
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Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics of share buyback announcements 
The table reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by year. Year 
represents the year of the announcement. Freq shows the number of 
announcements made in the year for our sample. % Freq is the percentage to 
total announcements in the given year. CAR is the 3 day cumulative abnormal 
return around the buyback announcement. % sought ratio is the percentage of 
outstanding shares that management states it intends to buyback at the time of 
announcement. Size is measured taking the natural log of the market value of 
the firm prior to the announcement. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm 
assets to its market value at the beginning of the year. 
 
Year Freq % Freq CAR % sought MV B/M 
2001 74 21.08 0.16 6.43 8.36 0.47 
2002 94 26.78 0.88 6.06 7.78 0.50 
2003 86 24.50 0.63 9.24 7.65 0.51 
2004 97 27.64 0.89 7.29 7.97 0.49 
All 351 100.00 0.67 7.26 7.92 0.49 
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Table 3.2: Summary statistics 
The table reports the summary statistics of data. Positivity measures the tone of the 
repurchase news announcement. It is calculated as the difference between positive and 
negative tone estimates of diction using Henry IV psychosocial dictionary scaled by 
their sum. 3 day CAR is the 3 day (-1,1) cumulative abnormal return around the event 
date (day 0) using value weighted market return as benchmark return. Annual BHAR 
is the average annual buy-and-hold return of repurchasing firms. The buy-and-hold 
return is calculated over a period of three years post announcement against the value 
weighted market return as the benchmark and the three year BHAR is then divided by 
3 to get annual BHAR. Size is measured the natural log of firm market value prior to 
the announcement. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm assets to its market value at 
the beginning of the year. Leverage is the ratio of total firm liabilities to total assets. 
Cash is the sum of cash and short term marketable securities scaled by total assets. 
Cash flow represents the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. Prior BHR 
is the cumulative buy and hold return of the firm from 30 days prior to the 
announcement to 2 days before the announcement (-30 to -2). Financial constraints are 
measured by KZ index. Discretionary accruals are the discretionary firm accruals as 
measured by Jone’s (1991) model. Actual Repurchases show the percentage of shares 
actually repurchased during the first four quarters of the announcement scaled by 
intended repurchase percentage. Undervalue, capital structure, corporate use, return 
cash, EPS/flexibility and Legal represent the stated motives of the repurchase plan. 
Secondary is an indicator variable 1 for secondary announcements and 0 otherwise.. 
Mentions represent the number of news agencies that reported the repurchase plan. 
Other news is a dummy variables equal to 1 if the there is any other news in the 
repurchase announcement and 0 otherwise. Total word and numeric terms represent 
the frequency of total words and numeric terms in buyback news announcement. Dow 
Jones news is a dummy variable equal to 1 if Dow Jones reported the repurchase plan 
and 0 otherwise. 
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        Percentiles 
Label N Mean Std Dev 10th 50th 90th 
Positivity 351 0.47 0.48 0 0.5 1 
3 Day CAR 351 0.66 4.73 -5.38 0.62 7.23 
BHAR 351 2.56 19.74 -22.32 -0.68 32.48 
Size 351 7.92 1.66 6.04 7.78 10.19 
Book to Market 351 0.49 0.23 0.2 0.5 0.77 
Leverage 351 0.37 0.56 0.11 0.33 0.73 
Cash 351 0.15 0.28 0.01 0.08 0.35 
Cash flow 351 0.16 0.12 0.03 0.15 0.3 
Prior return 351 -0.04 0.17 -0.26 -0.02 0.14 
Financial Constraint 351 1.95 2.43 0.5 1.87 3.24 
Discretionary Accruals 321 0.04 0.37 -0.19 0 0.34 
Actual Repurchase 341 0.73 0.79 0.01 0.5 1.57 
Undervalue 351 0.31 0.55 0 0 1 
Capital Structure 351 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 
Corp Use 351 0.25 0.52 0 0 1 
Return Cash 351 0.06 0.23 0 0 0 
EPS or Flexibility 351 0.04 0.2 0 0 0 
Legal 351 0.04 0.19 0 0 0 
Secondary 351 0.57 0.5 0 1 1 
Media Mentions 351 1.72 0.79 1 2 3 
Other News 351 0.46 0.5 0 0 1 
Total Words 351 184.5 125.44 83 157 332 
Numerical Terms 351 21.32 19.63 6 16 42 
Dow Jones News 351 0.52 0.5 0 1 1 
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Table 3.3: Stated Motives, their relative frequency and returns 
The table reports the frequency distribution of share buyback announcements 
by their stated motive. The numbers at the diagonals represent the frequency of 
the stated motive and the other numbers represent the joint frequency of 
motives where there was more than one stated motive. 3 day CAR is the 3 day (-
1,1) cumulative abnormal return around the event date (day 0) using value weighted 
market return as benchmark return. Annual BHAR is the average annual buy-and-hold 
return of repurchasing firms. The buy-and-hold return is calculated over a period of 
three years post announcement against the value weighted market return as the 
benchmark and the three year BHAR is then divided by 3 to get annual BHAR. 
  Undervalue 
Capital 
structure 
Corporate 
use 
Return 
cash 
EPS/flexibility Legal None 
1 95 
     
162 
2 2 14 
    
 3 14 8 72 
   
 4 4 1 1 20 
  
 5 3 2 3 1 14 
 
 6 0 0 0 0 0 13 
         3 day CAR 1.11** 0.65 -0.44 1.04 0.33 -2.61* 0.98*** 
Mean BHAR 0.49 -0.83 2.09 -0.97 2.01 7.07 3.61** 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Table 3.4: Announcement and long-run returns by other news type 
The table reports the summary statistics announcement and post announcement long term 
returns by news type. News type is defined as a dummy variable equal to 1 it the news 
announcement contains any other information/news besides share repurchase programme 
announcement and 0 otherwise. Announcement returns are represented by CAR which is 
the 3 day (-1,1) cumulative abnormal return around the event date (day 0) using value 
weighted market return as benchmark return. Long term returns are represented by 
BHAR. Annual BHAR is the average annual buy-and-hold return of repurchasing 
firms. The buy-and-hold return is calculated over a period of three years post 
announcement against the value weighted market return as the benchmark and the 
three year BHAR is then divided by 3 to get annual BHAR.  
News Type N Obs Variable Mean Std Dev Min Max 
No News 177 
CAR 0.69** 4.63 -9.59 9.25 
BHAR 4.02** 20.73 -26.39 47.56 
Good News 133 
CAR 0.38 4.38 -9.59 9.25 
BHAR 1.74 18.54 -26.39 47.56 
Bad News 32 
CAR 0.78 6.01 -9.59 9.25 
BHAR 0.54 19.50 -26.39 47.56 
Both 9 
CAR 3.9* 6.22 -9.59 9.25 
BHAR -6.97 16.63 -26.39 18.57 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
 
 
  
109 
 
Table 3.5: Determinants of buyback announcement returns 
The Panel A of the table reports the mean three day cummulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) of share repurchasing firms for subsets of data, subsets are formed by 
segmentng the dataset in to low and high groups of firms for each determinant. Low 
(High) means that the subsample contains firms with below (above) the median value 
of the determinant. For a definition of determinants please refer to description of table 
2. In Panel B, panel B1 and B2 report the mean 3 day (-1,1) CAR and the mean annual 
BHAR of firms that are ranked by the tone of repurchase announcemnet news 
respectively. The last row panel of panel B1 and B2 report the difference between the 
mean returns of firms in rank group 3 and the firms in rank group 1 along with the 
significant test of difference of means between the two groups. Firms are sorted in 3 
groups based on the tone score of firm in each year. Tone measures the positivity of 
the repurchase news announcemnet and is calcuted as the difference between the 
positive and negative tone score of each news announcement scaled by their sum. 
Diction is used to calculate positive and negative tone measures using Henry IV 
psychosocial dictionary.  
Panel: A 
Determinant 
    Low - High 
Low  High Difference t-stat 
Size 1.15*** 0.17 0.98* 1.96 
Book to Market 0.83** 0.50 0.33 0.65 
Prior return 0.82** 0.50* 0.32 0.62 
Cash flow 0.95*** 0.35 0.60 1.18 
Percent sought 0.80** 0.52 0.28 0.55 
Actual Repurchase 0.36 0.97*** -0.62 1.22 
Other News 0.36 1.02*** -0.65 1.30 
Total Words 0.60* 0.72* -0.12 0.23 
Numerical Terms 0.53 0.80** -0.26 0.52 
Panel: B 
Positivity Rank 
B1: CAR 
N Mean t Value Pr > |t| 
1 117 -0.33 -0.73 0.464 
2 110 0.91* 1.9 0.060 
3 124 1.38*** 3.58 0.001 
Difference (3 - 1) 
 
1.71*** 2.91 0.004 
  B2: BHAR 
1 117 3.34 1.61 0.109 
2 110 2.00 1.12 0.267 
3 124 2.31 1.43 0.154 
Difference (3 - 1)   -1.03 0.39 0.693 
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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Table 3.6: Effect of disclosure tone on short-term returns 
The table reports the regression results. The dependent variable is the 3-day (-1, +1) cumulative abnormal return (CAR) around the event date 
(day 0) using value weighted market return as benchmark. The main independent variable is Positivity. Positivity measures the tone of the 
repurchase news announcement. It is calculated as the difference between positive and negative tone estimates of diction using Henry IV 
psychosocial dictionary scaled by their sum. Please refer to description in table 2 for a definition of control variables. Small x Positivity, Value 
x Positivity and Numeric x Positivity is the interaction of dummy variables with positivity where small, value and numeric are dummy 
variables equal to 1 for small firms, value firms and announcement with high frequency of numeric terms and 0 otherwise respectively. White 
(1980) heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are used to compute t-statistics. 
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Label 
Model I   Model II   Model III   Model IV   Model V 
Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept -0.02 -0.06 
 
2.43 1.42 
 
-0.45 -0.43 
 
2.01 1.25 
 
3.33** 1.97 
positivity 1.44*** 2.86 
 
1.59*** 2.83 
 
0.54 0.84 
 
2.23*** 3.13 
 
0.94 1.58 
Size 
   
-0.38** -2.1 
    
-0.36** -1.98 
 
-0.44** -2.47 
Book to Market 
   
-0.52 -0.42 
 
-0.62 -0.49 
    
-0.76 -0.63 
Leverage 
   
-0.35 -0.94 
 
-0.40 -0.91 
 
-0.27 -0.79 
 
-0.41 -1.25 
Cash 
   
0.47 0.32 
 
0.59 0.39 
 
0.42 0.29 
 
0.29 0.20 
Cash flow 
   
-1.83 -0.73 
 
-1.84 -0.73 
 
-2.20 -0.86 
 
-1.60 -0.64 
Prior return 
   
0.81 0.46 
 
1.12 0.62 
 
0.85 0.48 
 
0.21 0.12 
Financial constraint 
   
0.04 0.41 
 
0.04 0.41 
 
0.06 0.64 
 
0.02 0.21 
Repurchase Plan Size 
   
0.00 0.05 
 
0.02 0.34 
 
0.01 0.13 
 
0.00 0.02 
Discretionary Accruals 
   
-0.84 -1.1 
 
-0.75 -0.99 
 
-0.75 -0.98 
 
-0.79 -1.04 
Actual Repurchase 
   
0.55 1.55 
 
0.50 1.44 
 
0.48 1.34 
 
0.53 1.46 
Other news 
   
0.84 1.36 
 
0.62 1.02 
 
0.81 1.32 
 
0.51 0.85 
Total Words 
   
0.00 1.01 
 
0.00 0.92 
 
0.00 1.09 
 
0.00 0.27 
Numeric terms 
   
-0.02 -0.54 
 
-0.01 -0.41 
 
-0.02 -0.54 
   
Small x Positivity 
      
2.03** 2.56 
      
Value x Positivity 
         
-1.36* -1.71 
   
Numeric terms x Positivity 
            
1.89** 2.36 
               
Adjusted R-Sq. 0.018     0.022     0.026     0.030     0.034   
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Table 3.7: Determinants of long-term returns 
The table reports the regression results. The dependent variable is annual BHAR. Annual 
BHAR is the average annual buy-and-hold return of repurchasing firms. The buy-and-hold 
return is calculated over a period of three years post announcement against the value weighted 
market return as the benchmark and the three year BHAR is then divided by 3 to get annual 
BHAR. Positivity measures the tone of the repurchase news announcement. It is calculated as 
the difference between positive and negative tone estimates of diction using Henry IV 
psychosocial dictionary scaled by their sum. . Size is measured the natural log of firm market 
value prior to the announcement. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm assets to its market 
value at the beginning of the year. Leverage is the ratio of total firm liabilities to total assets. 
Cash is the sum of cash and short term marketable securities scaled by total assets. Cash flow 
represents the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. Prior BHR is the cumulative 
buy and hold return of the firm from 30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before the 
announcement (-30 to -2). Financial constraints are measured by KZ index. Actual 
Repurchases show the percentage of shares actually repurchased during the first four quarters 
of the announcement scaled by intended repurchase percentage. Discretionary accruals are the 
discretionary firm accruals as measured by Jone’s (1991) model. Undervalue, capital structure, 
corporate use, return cash, EPS/flexibility and Legal represent the stated motives of the 
repurchase plan. 
Label 
Model I   Model II 
Coeff. t-stat   Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 11.16 1.67 
 
10.6* 1.61 
positivity 0.78 0.33 
 
1.35 0.58 
Size -1.71** -2.59 
 
-1.78** -2.61 
Book to Market 12.7** 2.51 
 
12.7** 2.53 
Leverage 0.14 0.08 
 
0.21 0.13 
Cash -8.6*** -2.96 
 
-10.1*** -2.75 
Cash flow 19.4** 2.08 
 
19.3* 1.96 
Prior return -0.27 -0.03 
 
1.49 0.19 
Financial constraint 0.25 0.84 
 
0.27 0.92 
Repurchase Plan Size 0.17 0.78 
 
0.22 1.04 
Discretionary Accruals -3.12 -1.13 
 
-3.42 -1.28 
Actual Repurchase -2.55** -2.26 
 
-2.04* -1.75 
Other news -1.11 -0.46 
 
-0.54 -0.22 
Total Words -0.02 -1.54 
 
-0.02 -1.41 
Numeric terms 0.03 0.42 
 
0.03 0.46 
Undervalue 
   
-0.23 -0.10 
Capital Structure 
   
-0.50 -0.10 
Corp Use 
   
-0.94 -0.51 
Return Cash 
   
-5.53 -1.51 
EPS or Flexibility 
   
-1.14 -0.24 
Legal 
   
13.8* 1.74 
      Adjusted R-Sq. 0.055     0.057   
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Table 3.8: Actual repurchases tobit regressions 
Table 8 presents coefficient estimates from tobit regressions on actual repurchase rates. Model 
I is untruncated and Model II and III are truncated at 100% of actual repurchases. Positivity 
measures the tone of the repurchase news announcement. It is calculated as the difference 
between positive and negative tone estimates of diction using Henry IV psychosocial 
dictionary scaled by their sum. . Size is measured the natural log of firm market value prior to 
the announcement. B/M is the ratio of book value of firm assets to its market value at the 
beginning of the year. Leverage is the ratio of total firm liabilities to total assets. Cash is the 
sum of cash and short term marketable securities scaled by total assets. Cash flow represents 
the cash flow from operations scaled by total assets. Prior BHR is the cumulative buy and hold 
return of the firm from 30 days prior to the announcement to 2 days before the announcement 
(-30 to -2). Financial constraints are measured by KZ index. . Actual Repurchases show the 
percentage of shares actually repurchased during the first four quarters of the announcement 
scaled by intended repurchase percentage. Discretionary accruals are the discretionary firm 
accruals as measured by Jone’s (1991) model. Undervalue, capital structure, corporate use, 
return cash, EPS/flexibility and Legal represent the stated motives of the repurchase plan. 
Label 
Model I   Model II   Model III 
Coeff. t-stat 
 
Coeff. t-stat 
 
Coeff. t-stat 
Intercept 1.04*** 3.84 
 
0.70*** 4.28 
 
0.66*** 4.06 
positivity -0.02 -0.23 
 
-0.03 -0.48 
 
-0.06 -1.02 
Size -0.03 -0.97 
 
0.00 -0.04 
 
0.01 0.57 
Book to Market -0.13 -0.57 
 
-0.02 -0.16 
 
-0.03 -0.26 
Leverage 0.02 0.24 
 
0.00 -0.04 
 
0.00 -0.08 
Cash -0.21 -1.28 
 
-0.18 -1.85 
 
-0.13 -1.35 
Cash flow 1.23*** 2.96 
 
0.57** 2.23 
 
0.49* 1.95 
Prior return 0.08 0.28 
 
0.20 1.17 
 
0.20 1.15 
Annual BHAR -0.004* -1.90 
 
-0.002* -1.66 
 
0.00 -1.25 
Financial constraint 0.00 -0.04 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
0.00 0.06 
Repurchase Plan Size -0.026*** -3.12 
 
-0.015*** -2.98 
 
-0.015*** -3.06 
Discretionary Accruals -0.12 -1.02 
 
-0.05 -0.74 
 
-0.05 -0.73 
Other news -0.03 -0.34 
 
-0.05 -0.78 
 
-0.09 -1.44 
Total Words 0.00 0.58 
 
0.00 0.61 
 
0.00 0.27 
Numeric terms 0.00 -0.21 
 
0.00 -0.31 
 
0.00 -0.19 
Undervalue 
      
0.08 1.6 
Capital Structure 
      
0.08 0.59 
Corp Use 
      
-0.02 -0.38 
Return Cash 
      
0.16 1.33 
EPS or Flexibility 
      
-0.23* -1.77 
Legal 
      
-0.37** -2.37 
         No. Of Obs. 311 
  
311 
  
311 
 
Log Likelihood -359.48     -222.12     -215.05   
***,**,* represent significance at 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively 
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Chapter 4   
 
Insider Trading and Open Market Share Repurchases 
4.1 Introduction 
The corporate finance literature regards open market share repurchase 
announcements as a managerial signal of equity undervaluation. A survey of 
US corporate executives on firm payout policy suggests that undervaluation is 
the primary rationale behind managements’ decision to repurchase a firm’s 
stock (Brav et al. (2005)). However, the market may not view such an 
announcement as a strong signal of undervaluation. This is partly due to the 
fact that firms are increasing relying on share repurchases to distribute cash to 
shareholders as an  alternative to dividends (see e.g., Fama and French (2001); 
Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008)); and partly because open 
market repurchase announcements only represent managements’ commitment 
to repurchase shares but are not binding obligations on the part of firm 
management to complete (Stephens and Weisbach (1998) and Chan et al. 
(2010)). 
In addition to the above factors investors may also discount the open 
market repurchase “signal” due the possibility that such an announcement may 
be driven by managerial incentives rather than signalling stock undervaluation 
to investors. As the market generally views the repurchase announcement as 
good news, managers may announce the repurchase programme to sell their 
shares at higher post-announcement prices. Edmans et al. (2014) demonstrate 
that managers’ strategically time the disclosure of positive news (in months in 
which their equity vests), so that they can cash out at a higher stock price. Fried 
(2001) and (2005) also suggests that open market repurchase announcements 
reflect opportunistic managerial behaviour and claims that the empirical 
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evidence on share repurchases is more consistent with his “managerial 
opportunism” theory as compared to signalling theory.  
The intuition in this paper is that the market should respond more 
favourably to a repurchase announcement when insiders’ private information, 
as reflected in their personal trades, supports the repurchase signalling theory. 
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, I argue that a repurchase 
announcement will be a more credible signal of equity undervaluation when it 
is supported by insider actions. Specifically, insiders who buy more (or sell 
less) stocks of their firm before an open market repurchase announcement 
signify that they believe their stock to be under-priced. Holding additional 
firm’s equity is costly and exposes already undiversified insiders to 
considerable risk. This is particularly true if the stock is overpriced. So, 
investors should take into account how insiders have traded in their personal 
account before the repurchase announcement in their reaction to stock buyback 
signal. Second, there is also a possibility that insiders may announce a 
repurchase programme to cash out at a higher post-announcement price (Fried 
(2005)).
38
  If this is the case then such insiders are more likely to sell after the 
repurchase announcement. These post-announcement insider sales will be 
particularly beneficial for insiders when announcement returns are high. So, 
post-announcement insider sales will be higher when repurchase announcement 
returns are high. 
Seyhun (1998) and Lakonishok and Lee (2001) argue that small firms 
present the greatest potential of gains from insider trading. Smaller firms are 
more likely to be mispriced compared to large firms as the latter are under 
more scrutiny from analysts and media, and thus are generally priced more 
efficiently. They claim that insiders can predict long-run price performance of 
small firms (for up to two year) and hence can trade profitably in such firms. 
                                                          
38
 Fried (2001) suggests that repurchase announcements can be used as a false signalling device 
as these are not binding obligations on part of the management. Massa et al. (2007) and Chan 
et al. (2010) provide evidence that managers use repurchase programmes to fool the market. 
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Therefore, I expect higher insider sales post-announcement for small firms. 
Similarly, I expect higher post-announcement insider sales for growth firms 
where the repurchase announcement is less likely to be a signal of stock 
undervaluation.  
Finally, I explore the signaling effect of post-announcement insider 
trades on a firm’s longer-term stock price performance. Insiders will sell more 
stock of their firm when they believe it to be either over-priced or at least not 
significantly under-priced. Thus post-announcement insider trades signal 
insiders’ private information about a firm’s true value. Thus, firms where 
insiders sell more shares post-announcement should not outperform or 
underperform in the long-run as compared to other repurchase announcing 
firms where insiders retain more equity in their firm. Therefore, I expect post-
announcement net insider sales to be either unrelated or negatively related to 
longer-term returns of repurchase announcing firms.   
I test these predictions by employing a sample of 8,945 open market 
repurchase programmes announced between 1990 and 2012. My analysis 
suggests that the repurchase announcement returns are higher for firms where 
insiders retain more equity (purchase more or sell fewer stocks) in their firm 
prior to the event (repurchase announcement). Firms with lower net insider 
sales earn buy-and-hold abnormal return of 2.4 percent in the 3-day (-1, 1) 
window around the event, that is 0.80 percent greater than firms with higher 
net insider sales before the event. The difference is highly significant at 
conventional levels.
39
  However, pre-announcement trades affect only short-
term announcement returns and I find no significant difference in longer-term 
returns of the two groups.  
                                                          
39
 The results hold when event firms are sorted on 6-month trading window before the 
announcement. Although, the magnitude of return difference between low and high net insider 
sales groups is smaller in this case but the difference is still statistically significant. 5-day (-2, 
2) return difference between the two groups is similar to the number reporter above. 
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My regression results indicate that short-term repurchase announcement 
returns are significantly related to pre-announcement insider trades. Insider 
trading literature suggests that purchases are more informative than insider 
sales as insiders may sell for reasons unrelated to signalling.
40
 For example, 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that only insider purchases provide value 
relevant information while insider sales have no predictive ability. Though pre-
announcement insider purchases are strongly positively related to the 3-day 
announcement returns but I find that insider sales are also negatively related to 
returns. The market reaction to repurchase announcement is stronger for 
undervalued (value) firms and for firms that suffer from higher information 
asymmetry (small firms). My results also indicate that pre-announcement 
insider trades closer to the event are more value relevant as the 3-month insider 
trading has a stronger effect on the 3-day returns as compared to insider trades 
during the 6-month period.
41
 
Next I investigate the relationship between post-announcement insider 
trades and repurchase announcement returns. Consistent with Fried’s (2005) 
theoretical argument that manager may announce repurchase programmes to 
sell their shares at a higher price, I find empirical evidence that insiders sell 
more shares in the 3-month window post-announcement as compared to pre-
announcement 3-month window. There however is no significant difference in 
insider purchases between the two periods. In order to minimize the litigation 
risk, insiders trade more cautiously in the 6-month (-3, 3) window centred on 
the repurchase announcement date as compared to the 12-month (-6, 6) 
window.  
Analysis of insider trades based on firm characteristics indicates that 
insiders sell (purchase) more (less) shares when their firm is less likely to be 
                                                          
40
 Ofek and Yermack (2000) and Jin (2002) show that insider sales may be driven by reasons 
other than signalling such as liquidity needs and option exercises or stock-based grants. 
41
 Regression coefficients on 3-month insider trade variables (purchases, sales, net sales) are 
higher than those of 6-month insider trades. 
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undervalued. Insiders also sell significantly more shares when repurchase 
announcement returns are high allowing them to cash out at higher stock 
prices. I further show that controlling for repurchase announcement returns, 
insiders sell more shares when a firm is less likely to be under-priced (low 
book-to-market ratio) and offers potential gains to exploiting insider trades 
(small firms). Regression results show that insider sales (purchases) are 
significantly positively (negatively) related to short-term announcement returns 
suggesting that insiders sell greater number of shares when repurchase 
announcement returns are high. These findings provide empirical evidence that 
insiders may use repurchase programmes in their self-interest rather than 
signalling undervaluation. This is the first research study (to the best of my 
knowledge) that provides empirically evidence on Fried’s (2001; 2005) 
managerial opportunism theory of repurchases.  
Finally, I explore the relationship between post-announcement insider 
trades on the longer-term returns of firms that announce a repurchase program. 
I find mixed results for the signalling effect of post-announcement insider sales 
on the longer-term returns of share repurchasing firms. Higher post-
announcement insider sales signal that insiders believe their stock to be either 
overvalued or fairly valued but not significantly undervalued. Consistent with 
this, I find that post-event 1-month net insider sales is not related to first year 
buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) and weakly negatively related to 
second year BHAR. However, regressions of 3-month net insider sales post-
announcement show that it is positively related to first year BHAR but 
negatively related to second year BHAR of share repurchasing firms.
42
   
This paper contributes to the growing literature addressing the 
credibility of share repurchase programme announcements as a signal of equity 
undervaluation and also to the corporate payout policy literature, more 
                                                          
42
 The unexpected positive relationship of 3-month net insider sales with first year BHAR 
might be due to higher demand for the firm’s shares due to its repurchase activity resulting in 
higher returns for the year. 
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generally. Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991) evaluate the 
relative market reaction to repurchase tender offers, Dutch auctions and open 
market share repurchases and find that the latter is considered to be a least 
effective signalling tool with the lowest announcement returns as compared to 
other repurchase methods. Ikenberry et al. (1995; 2000) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009) document significant positive drift in the longer-term returns 
of share repurchasing firms and attribute it to the market’s underreaction to 
repurchase signal. Fried (2001; 2005) and Chan et al. (2010) show that 
repurchase announcements are used by managers in their self-interests rather 
than conveying value relevant information to investors. Fenn and Liang (2001) 
show that managers with a higher number of stock options use repurchase 
announcements to artificially increase stock prices. I add to the literature by 
empirically documenting that insiders, in fact, take advantage of higher post-
announcement stock prices and sell more heavily.  
The paper also adds to the literature on insider trading. Seyhun (1998), 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that insider 
trading contains value relevant information for market participants. This 
research study also sheds light on the trading behaviour of insiders around 
buyback announcements and their investment horizon. I contribute to the 
literature on insider trading by demonstrating that insider trades both before 
and after the repurchase announcement provide value relevant information to 
investors in evaluating the credibility of repurchase announcement as a signal 
of undervaluation as well as insiders views about firm value. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 
provides some background to research questions explored in the study. In 
section 4.3 I describe data sources, sample selection criteria and report 
summary statistics of the sample data. In section 4.4, I present and discuss my 
empirical results. Finally, I conclude in section 4.5.  
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4.2 Background 
Academic literature has mainly focused on the value signalling aspect of share 
repurchase announcements. Especially in the corporate finance literature, 
positive repurchase announcement returns are explained by signalling theory 
which regards such announcements as a signal of equity undervaluation (see 
e.g., Vermaelen (1981) and Comment and Jarrell (1991)). With Ikenberry et al. 
(1995) began another phase of research on share repurchases where they 
document significant positive drift in returns of repurchase announcing firms 
over the next four years. They attribute this abnormal long-run performance of 
repurchasing firms to market’s underreaction to repurchase signal. Later, Peyer 
and Vermaelen (2009) show that unlike many other stock market anomalies 
which disappeared over time, repurchase announcing firms continue to 
outperform in the long-run. They argue that longer-term abnormal returns of 
repurchasing firms results as the market corrects itself from an overreaction to 
bad news before the repurchase announcement.  
Business press however raised early concerns about the dubious nature 
of repurchase signal.
43
  Fried (2001) was amongst the first academics to 
formerly question the idea that repurchase announcements be uniformly 
viewed as a managerial signal of equity undervaluation. He proposes an 
alternative “managerial opportunism” hypothesis and suggests that managers 
opportunistically use share repurchase programmes to maximise their personal 
wealth. He suggests that managers of undervalued firms may announce and 
carry out share repurchases to transfer wealth from selling shareholders to 
themselves and remaining shareholders. In cases where managers want to sell 
equity they may announce a repurchase programme to sell their shares at 
higher post-announcement stock prices. Fried (2005) highlights that insiders 
                                                          
43 “When it comes to stock-buyback, public traded companies show a lot of bark than bite. It’s 
oh-so-easy for a company to announce a buyback program. And it’s gratifying, no doubt, for a 
company to watch its shares jump as a result of announcements. But the open secret on Wall 
Street is that few companies actually buy anywhere near the amount of stock that they indicate 
they might.” – The Wall Street Journal (Mar. 27, 1995) 
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are not barred from trading after the repurchase announcement and hence can 
time the market around the repurchase announcement event.
44
 He raises serious 
concerns about the credibility of repurchase announcements as a reliable signal 
of stock under-pricing and claims that the empirical evidence on repurchases is 
inconsistent with the signalling theory and terms buyback announcements as a 
“false signalling device”. 
However, observing insider trades around repurchase announcements 
affords us with the possibility to infer insiders’ private information about firm 
value and repurchase programme objective(s). For example, Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001), Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) show that 
insider trading provides value relevant information to market participants about 
insiders’ beliefs regarding firm value and its future prospects. Repurchase 
announcement signal will be more credible when insiders trade in the direction 
of their signal. In other words buyback signal will be a more credible signal of 
undervaluation if it is supported by insiders’ actions. Specifically, insiders who 
believe their firm’s stock to be undervalued should sell less and/or buy more 
equity of their firm prior to the repurchase announcement.
45
  
This is consistent with the signalling explanation of repurchase 
announcement as undiversified insiders will only purchase or hold more equity 
if they believe their firm’s stock to be undervalued. Buying addition equity of 
own firm’s stock is especially costly when the firm’s stock is overvalued and 
exposes already undiversified insiders to considerable risk. Investors should 
incorporate this (insider trading) information in their reaction to share 
repurchase announcement. Thus the market reaction to a firm’s repurchase 
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 Section 16 (b) of Securities and Exchange Act contains “short-swing” profit rule and 
prohibits insiders from buying and selling their firm’s shares in a short period of time. Insiders 
are required to hold purchased shares for at least 6-months. However, insiders already owning 
significant stock of their firm can still profit from selling at post-announcement prices. 
45
 Babenko et al. (2012) present a simple model of managerial behaviour based on signalling 
literature and find that investor reaction to repurchase announcement is stronger for firms 
where insiders purchase more shares in the six month period before repurchase announcement. 
122 
 
announcement should be more positive for firms where insiders acquire/retain 
more equity of their firm prior to the announcement.  
Fidrmuc et al. (2006) and Agrawal and Nasser (2012) also argue that 
insider purchases serve as a more informative signal as these are more costly. 
Insiders put greater personal wealth at stake by purchasing more equity and 
bear the cost of holding less than an optimally diversified portfolio as a result. 
Compared to purchases, insider sales may be a less informative (negative) 
signal to the market as insider sales may be driven by their liquidity needs 
rather than changes in their expectation about the firm’s future cash flows. 
Seyhun (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) show that the market reacts more 
strongly to insider purchase decisions as compared to sales. Thus, I also 
analyse the market reaction to both buy and sale trades around repurchase 
announcements. 
There however also exists a significant body of literature that shows 
managers engage in opportunistic behaviour and informed trading. For 
example, Kim and Varaiya (2003) find that managers engage in opportunistic 
trading and sell more heavily in quarters when their firm is repurchasing 
shares. Gosnell et al. (1992) find evidence that corporate insiders get rid of 
most of their equity stake in the company in the five months preceding a 
bankruptcy announcement. Yermack (2009) shows that CEOs gift stocks 
before significant declines in their stock prices thereby allowing themselves to 
benefit from increased personal income tax savings.  
The flexibility of open market share repurchases affords managers with 
the possibility to ustilise these opportunistically in their self-interest rather than 
as a market signal. Fenn and Liang (2001) and Chan et al. (2010) show that  
managers may intentionally mislead the market by announcing repurchase 
programmes for their personal gain. Kothari et al. (2009) find that a range of 
personal incentives and career concerns motivates managers to time news 
disclosures. They show that managers delay the release of bad news up to a 
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certain threshold but immediately release good news. In a recent paper, 
Edmans et al. (2014) show that managers strategically time the disclosure of 
discretionary news to coincide with months in which their equity vests. They 
show that managers disclose significantly more positive news in months in 
which their equity vests, thus allowing them to sell their stocks and/or exercise 
options at a higher price. A closer look at the distribution of share repurchase 
related corporate news in their data shows that more than half of all buyback 
announcements and updates are made in months in which managers equity 
vests. This suggests that managers may time the disclosure of share repurchase 
announcements to sell at higher stock prices.  
The paper also tests how managers trade after the repurchase 
announcements. If insiders use buyback announcements to time the market 
then they will sell more when stock prices soar after the repurchase 
announcement. Insider sales will be especially higher when the market reaction 
to repurchase announcement is stronger. Thus, I expect a positive relationship 
between net sales and short-term announcement returns. Higher insider stock 
sales or lower purchases post-announcement also signal that insiders believe 
their stock to be either overvalued or at least not significantly undervalued.  
Thus insider sales post-announcement should be either unrelated or negatively 
related to longer term returns of repurchase announcing firms. 
4.3 Data and summary statistics 
Share repurchase announcement data is extracted from the Thomson Financial 
Security Data Company (SDC) Mergers and Acquisition database between 
January 1, 1990 and December 31, 2012. I restrict my repurchase 
announcements data to open market share repurchases only. I delete multiple 
repurchase announcements by a firm that are made within a period of two 
years. In such cases I only keep the first announcement. This also eliminates 
the problem of duplicate announcements. Banyi et al. (2008) document that an 
announcement may appear more than once in the SDC data as it may report the 
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same announcement more than once if it appears in different news sources on 
different dates. 
Insider trading data come from the Thomson Financial insider trading 
database. Insider trades are obtained from the Form 4 that is filed with Security 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) whenever insiders make a stock sales or 
purchase transaction. I following Babenko et al. (2012) and only consider open 
market stock purchases and sales and exclude stocks accumulated via option 
exercises and grants. In order to focus on economically significant trades, I 
delete all trades that involve exchange of fewer than 100 shares. Prior literature 
suggests that insider purchases may be more informative as insiders often sell 
for reasons unrelated to signalling, such as diversification and liquidity needs 
(see e.g., Kahl et al. (2003) and Ofek and Yermack (2000)). Babenko et al. 
(2012) also highlight that anecdotal evidence suggests managers are more 
likely to be sued for their sales based on private information. However, I focus 
on both purchase and sale transactions as insiders can exploit both active and 
passive trading strategies around the repurchase announcement to achieve the 
desired outcomes. For example, an insider may be able to generate similar 
economic effect by selling less prior to the repurchase announcement rather 
than actively purchasing more stocks.  
I follow Babenko et al. (2012) to calculate number of shares sold 
(purchased) by insiders as the sum of shares sold (purchased) by all insiders 
over a given time window scaled by total number of outstanding shares of the 
firm.
46
 If no sales or purchase data are available for a firm due to non-trading 
activity, I set insider trades (sale and purchase) equal to 0. The net sales are 
defined as the difference between insider sales and purchases over a given time 
window. 
In addition to aggregate insider sales, purchases and net sales, I also use 
abnormal sales, abnormal purchases and abnormal net sales measures. I use 
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 Insiders are as defined by Thomson Financial Insider trading database. 
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two measures to calculate abnormal trades (abnormal sales, abnormal 
purchases and abnormal net sales). First, I calculate normal trades using 
methodology similar to Kahle (2000), as the average monthly trades in the 
previous three year period starting six month before the buyback 
announcement.  Next abnormal trades are defined as the difference between the 
actual insider trades and the average insider trades over the last three year 
period for the same time window. It is possible that insiders might have equity 
vesting plans or more need for cash over certain time periods during a year so 
they might have concentrated trading activity in those periods. Agrawal and 
Nasser (2012) suggest that a time series control i-e, insider trades over the 
same period a year before the event serves as a good control for such firm 
characteristics. So, my second measure of abnormal trades defines normal 
trades as the last year trades over the same time window. 
 The market reaction to repurchase announcement is calculated using 
stock return data from the CRSP database. I define abnormal repurchase 
announcement return as the difference between the 3-day (-1, 1) buy-and-hold 
return of the event firm centered on the announcement date (day 0) and the 
buy-and-hold return of the market over the same window. The market return is 
the daily value weighted return of CRSP index. As an alternative, I use 3-day 
cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) around the event date (-1, 1), defined as 
the sum of the difference between the event firm return on the day and the 
return on the market.
47
 To calculate longer-term abnormal returns, I use buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) approach. Taffler et al. (2004) favour 
BHAR methodology as it accurately captures investor’s experience. Buy-and-
hold abnormal return of the event firm is the difference between the buy-and-
hold return of the firm and the market over the one year and two year periods 
post-announcement, where a year is defined as 252 trading days starting from 
the event date (day 0). 
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 Results are qualitatively similar when I use cumulative abnormal returns instead of buy-and-
hold abnormal returns. 
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Intended size of the repurchase programme is measured as the 
percentage of intended dollar value to be spent on repurchase activity over the 
total market value of the firm at the beginning of year. Stock price run-up is 
calculated as 40-days buy-and-hold return of a firm starting 4 days prior to the 
repurchase announcement day. For other accounting data, I rely on the 
COMPUSTAT database. All the variables in the final dataset are winsorized at 
the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles to mitigate the effect of extreme observations. 
Table 4.1 presents the frequency, average market value, average book-
to-market ratio and average percentage of intended size of announced 
repurchase programmes by year. My final dataset contains 8,945 unique share 
repurchase programmes announced between 1990 and 2012. The highest 
number of share repurchase announcements were made in years 1998 and 
1999. Average size of the repurchase programme over the entire sample period 
is slightly higher than the number reported in earlier studies; this is mainly due 
to larger size of intended repurchase programmes announced after the financial 
crisis of 2007-2008. Mean book-to-market ratio of repurchase announcing 
firms is 0.64 which is similar to other studies. The average nominal market 
value of repurchase announcing firms for the entire sample period is around 
$3,845 million.  
Panel B of table 4.1 shows the number of share repurchase 
announcements by industry classification. Manufacturing industry accounts for 
nearly 39 percent of the total repurchase announcements in the dataset. 
Repurchase announcements made by finance and insurance companies 
represent nearly one fourth of all repurchase announcements made during the 
sample period. Given their frequency and following earlier studies such as 
Chan et al. (2004) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009), I include these in my 
analysis.   
 Table 4.2 presents summary statistic of announcement and post-
announcement returns, insider trading and other firm characteristics of sample 
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firms. Panel A of the table presents short-term and longer term returns of firms 
that announce a share repurchase programme. Mean 3-day buy-and-hold 
abnormal return (BHAR) around the buyback announcement date (-1, 1) is 2.3 
percent which is similar to the 3-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) 
centered on the announcement day of 2.4 percent. These buyback 
announcement returns are also similar to announcement returns reported in 
earlier studies such as Ikenberry et al. (1995) and Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) 
but slightly higher than the ones reported in later studies such as Babenko et al. 
(2012) and Bonaimé (2012). According to Kothari et al. (2007) short-term 
returns are not much affected by risk adjustment(s). They show that the 
potential error in estimation of daily expected return is only 0.05% which is 
much smaller than the reported short-term announcement returns. 
The mean one year buy-and-hold abnormal return is 4.5 percent which 
supports the finding of positive drift in returns after repurchase announcement 
as documented by earlier studies e.g.,  Peyer and Vermaelen (2009). The mean  
stock price run-up in the 40 trading days prior to repurchase announcement 
starting 4 days before the announcement is -6.7 percent. This suggests that 
managers are more likely to announce a share repurchase programme after 
significant declines in stock price.  
Panel B of the table shows summary statistics for insider trades over 
different time windows around share repurchase announcement. As expected 
insider sales are generally larger than purchases. In the one month (0, 30) post-
announcement period, insiders sell on average 0.064% of outstanding equity 
while they purchase only 0.021%. The net sales for the window are thus 
0.043%. In the 3-month (0, 90) post-announcement window the difference 
between insider sales and purchases increases to 0.13% of total shares 
outstanding. However using either measure of benchmark trades (described 
above), abnormal net sales are negative in both 1 and 3 month post-
announcement windows. Firm characteristics are reported in panel C of table 
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4.2. Firm size is measured as log of total assets and both mean and median 
values are similar. Leverage is ratio of total debt to total assets. Cash, cash 
flow, capital expenditure and research and development expenses are defined 
as percentages of cash, operating cash flows, capital expenditure and research 
and development expenses over total firm assets respectively. Tobin’s Q is 
ratio of market-to-book value and return volatility is the standard deviation of 
daily stock returns in the one year period before the repurchase announcement. 
All accounting variables represent fiscal year values prior to the buyback 
announcement. The averages reported for these variables are comparable to 
ones reported in Babenko et al. (2012). 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Pre-announcement trades and short-term returns 
Table 4.3 shows mean short-term and longer-term returns for firms that 
announce a share repurchase programme by high and low net insider sales in 
the pre-announcement period. The left (right) hand side panel is categorised on 
3-month (6-month) insider trades before therepurchase announcement. Low 
(High) net insider sales represent higher (lower) purchases and/or lower 
(higher) sales during the period.  Consistent with the undervaluation argument, 
the market reacts more positively to share repurchase announcements where 
insiders retain more equity prior to repurchase announcement. Average 3-day 
BHAR around the repurchase announcement for firms with high net insider 
sales in the three-month window before the repurchase announcement date is 
only 1.6 percent as compared to average return of 2.4 percent for firms with 
lower net insider sales. Thus, mean 3-day BHAR around the repurchase 
announcement is 0.8 percent higher for firms with lower net insider sales and is 
significant at the 1 percent level.  
Mean 3-day CAR and 5-day BHAR around the repurchase 
announcement between low and high net insider sales firms are 0.9 percent and 
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1.1 percent respectively and are significant at the 1 percent level. These 
findings suggest that the market considers insider trading in evaluating the 
credibility of repurchase signal and responds more favourably to those where 
insider retain greater ownership interest in the firm. However, the difference 
between low and high net insider sales groups for longer-term returns is not 
significant. Specifically, difference of 1
st
 year and 2
nd
 year BHAR between the 
two groups of firms is not statistically significant. 
Table 4.4 presents results from regressing short-term announcement 
returns on insider trading measures calculated for different time windows 
before the repurchase announcement. Specifically, I regress 3-day BHAR 
around the repurchase announcement event on insider trading variables in 
different model specifications. I control for other factors identified in earlier 
studies that may affect short-term repurchase announcement returns. I follow 
Kahle (2002) and include stock price run-up as a control variable in my 
regression specifications. Stock price run-up controls for the possibility of 
pseudo-market timing and also serves as a control for tax effects (Babenko et 
al. (2012)). Schultz (2003) suggests that abnormal market returns calculated 
around an event might be biased if managers’ decisions are influenced by 
firms' recent stock price performance. This suggests that abnormal returns 
around repurchase announcements might be biased upwards when they are 
preceded by significant decline in stock price. If however, share repurchase 
announcement are preceded by significant increases in stock price, the relative 
tax advantage of share repurchases over dividends is significantly reduced (Lie 
and Lie (1999)).  
To control for differences in firm size, I use log of total firm assets. 
Ikenberry et al. (1995); Fama and French (1992) and Peyer and Vermaelen 
(2009) suggest that smaller firms tend to have higher returns. They also 
document that value firms earn higher returns in the long-run as compared to 
growth firms. I use book value to market value ratio as a proxy for firm 
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undervaluation as used in earlier studies. I control for repurchase programme 
size as literature (e.g., Chan et al. (2010) and Bonaimé (2012)) suggests that 
repurchase programme size might affect investors’ reaction to repurchase 
announcement.
48
 Dittmar (2000) suggests that repurchase programmes are also 
used by managers to make capital structure adjustments. Therefore I control for 
firm leverage in my regression models. Firms’ growth and investment 
opportunities can also affect both insider trading as well as repurchase 
announcement returns. Managers may hold greater ownership interest in a firm 
with higher growth potential and attractive investment opportunities and thus is 
more likely to earn higher returns. I use tobin’s Q to proxy for firms’ growth 
and investment opportunities. Using Petersen (2009) methodology, I report t-
statistics based on robust standard errors after adjusting for clustering at the 
firm level. The regression results in all model specifications are also robust to 
industry fixed effects.  
The dependant variable in all model specifications is 3-day BHAR in 
table 4.4. Model 1 regresses short-term announcement returns on insider 
purchases during the 6-month window before the repurchase announcement 
and other control variables. The coefficient on the pre-announcement 6-month 
insider purchases is positive and significant at conventional significance levels. 
This suggests that the market reaction is stronger for firms where insiders 
purchase more shares before the buyback announcement event. Model 2 shows 
that the market reaction is even stronger and highly significant at the 1 percent 
level for insider purchases made in the more recent period closer to the 
announcement date (purchases in the 3-month window before the repurchase 
announcement). 
In models 3 and 4 I introduce net insider sales variable for the 6-month 
and 3-month pre-announcement periods respectively. Net insider sales account 
for both the active and passive trading strategies of insiders. Regression results 
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 Although the empirical evidence on this is mixed.  
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in  models 3 and 4 suggest that higher net insider sales is significantly 
negatively related to announcement returns at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels 
respectively. The results indicate that investors take into account pre-
announcement insider trading information in their reaction to the buyback 
signal. Insiders purchasing more or selling less equity before a repurchase 
announcement appear to be signalling their confidence in their firm’s stock 
being worth more than its current market value. 
Cheng and Lo (2006), Huddart et al. (2007) and Agrawal and Nasser 
(2012) suggest that insiders prefer a passive trading strategy to reduce litigation 
risk. It is also argued that insider sales are less informative than insider buys as 
insider might sell for a number of other reasons unrelated to signalling private 
information. To test this, in models 5 and 6 announcement returns are regressed 
on insider sales in the pre-announcement 3-month and 6-month event windows 
respectively. Coefficients on insider sales variables are significant at 
conventional significance levels in both models and suggest that pre-
announcement insider sales too have some explanatory power for short-term 
repurchase announcement returns. 
4.4.2 Post-announcement insider trades 
In this section, I test whether insiders announce repurchase programmes to be 
able to sell their holdings at higher post-announcement prices. The first 
(second) panel in table 4.5 presents mean differences in insider trades between 
pre- and post-announcement periods over 3-month (6-month) windows. The 
mean difference between 3-months pre- and post-announcement insider sales is 
-3.4 and is highly significant at the 1 percent level. However the difference 
between pre- and post-announcement purchases is not statistically significant. 
The net sales difference between the two periods, which is mainly due to 
differences in insider sales, is -2.93 and is again highly significant at the 1 
percent level. It is also interesting to note that both abnormal net sales 
measures are negative in the pre- and post-announcement periods, although the 
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difference in abnormal net sales 2 measure is statistically significant. This is 
consistent with insiders potentially reducing their trading around share 
repurchase announcements to avoid being sued. It also suggests that insiders 
actually sell fewer shares in the 3-month period before the repurchase 
announcement rather than buying more shares. This passive trading strategy 
could suggest that insiders want to minimise litigation risk associated with 
active trading around the repurchase announcement. However, the difference 
between 3-month pre- and post-announcement abnormal net sales as measured 
against three year average trades prior to the repurchase announcement is still 
negative and significant at the 1 percent level. 
The pattern however seems to be opposite for pre- and post-
announcement 6-month average insider trades. Insiders sell more in the 6-
month period before the repurchase announcement as compared to average 
sales in the post-announcement 6-month period. The difference between 
average insider sales in the two periods is 13.9 and highly significant. Insiders 
also seem to purchase slightly more on average in the post-announcement 6-
month period. The differences between pre- and post-announcement periods 
insider trading activity for both abnormal net sales measures over the 6-month 
period are also positive and significant.
49
 This suggests that managers are more 
cautious about their trading in the 6-month (-3, 3) window centered on the 
announcement date rather than a much longer 12-month (-6, 6) window around 
the repurchase announcement. 
Insiders are likely to sell more post-announcement when they believe 
their firm’s stock to be either overvalued or at least not significantly 
undervalued. This suggests that post-announcement insider sales will be 
especially high for firms that are less likely to be undervalued. Fried (2005) 
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One possible reason for this reverse trend might be that insiders believe that the market has 
under reacted to the repurchase signal and believe their stock remains significantly 
undervalued. Another explanation could be that insiders might want/have to retain a certain 
proportion of firm equity due to contractual or control reasons. 
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also suggests that managers use repurchase announcements to artificially boost 
share price so that they can sell their equity holdings at a higher price. Thus 
insiders announcing repurchase programmes to sell their stock will sell more 
shares when the stock is less likely to be undervalued and when repurchase 
announcement returns are high.  
Table 4.6 reports mean insider trades for different proxies of firm 
undervaluation and announcement returns. Panel A of table 4.6 shows mean 
insider trades for subsamples by high and low book-to-market value firms. 
Peyer and Vermaelen (2009) rely on book-to-market ratio as a measure of firm 
undervaluation. Firms with book-to-market ratio above (below) the sample 
mean are classified as value (growth) firms. Difference in mean trades of value 
and growth firms show that insiders in growth firms, in fact, sell more and buy 
fewer shares in the 1-month and 3-month periods post-announcement. The 
difference between net sales of the two groups is also highly significant. A 
similar trend is observed in the 3-month trades post-announcement.  
Panel B of table 4.6 shows mean 1-month and 3-month insider trades 
for subsamples of firms by high and low stock price run-up.  Firms that 
experience significant declines in share price prior to the repurchase 
announcement are more likely to be undervalued. Insiders in firms that have 
higher (lower) run-up return, i.e., above (below) the sample mean, sell more 
(less) and purchase fewer (more) shares. The difference between insider trades 
(sales and purchases) of the two groups is also highly significant. Panel C 
partitions the sample data on pre-announcement 6-month net sales. Babenko et 
al. (2012) suggest that pre-announcement insider trades can signal their belief 
about firm valuation. They argue that higher pre-announcement insider 
purchases add credibility to a firm’s repurchase undervaluation signal as 
buying additional equity exposes undiversified insiders to considerable risk and 
they will only hold more equity if they believe their firm to be undervalued. 
My results show that the differences between post-announcement 1-month and 
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3-month mean insider sales (purchases) for high and low net sales firms are 
positive (negative) and highly significant. These findings are consistent with 
the argument that insiders sell more equity after the repurchase announcement 
when the firm is either overvalued or fairly valued but not undervalued.  
Panel D of table 4.6 partitions the sample data on 3-day buy-and-hold 
returns around the repurchase announcement. Higher (lower) return firms are 
defined as firms with 3-day buy-and-hold return above (below) the sample 
mean. Consistent with Fried’s (2005) argument, I find that insiders sell more 
shares post-announcement when repurchase announcement returns are higher. 
However, there is no significant difference in purchases of the two subsamples. 
The net sales difference between the two groups of firms is also highly 
significant. Overall table 4.6 suggests that insiders sell more shares post-
announcement especially when their stock is less likely to be undervalued and 
when the market reacts more positively to the repurchase announcement. 
As a further test, in table 4.7, I report average net insider sales post-
announcement of two-way sorted portfolios of firms. First, each year I rank 
firms into high and low short term announcement return groups. I then sort 
firms in each rank group into two subgroups based on firms’ book-to-market 
ratio, size and return volatility in panels A, B and C respectively.
50
 Panel A of 
table 4.7, reports mean net insider sales in each announcement rank group for 
subsamples by low and high book-to-market value firms. Insiders sell 
significantly more shares in growth firms as compared to value firms in the 
post-announcement period even after controlling for repurchase announcement 
returns. 
In panel B, firms with high and low repurchase announcement returns 
are sorted into subgroups by market capitalization. Corwin (2003) and Zhang 
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 Sorting on these firm characteristics is based on mean values for the sample data. For 
example, large (small) firms are defined as firms with size above (below) the average firm size 
in the sample data. 
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(2006) proxy for degree of information asymmetry between insiders and 
investors by firm size. Small firms suffer from a higher degree of information 
asymmetry as they receive little media coverage unlike large firms, and are 
followed by fewer analysts. Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also find that the 
highest potential gains from insider trading are possible in small firms as these 
are less efficiently priced due to higher information asymmetry. Such results 
suggest that insiders in small firms sell down more of their stock holdings after 
the repurchase announcement as compared to insiders in large firms. This is 
especially true for firms with high announcement returns. For such firms the 
mean difference in the 1-month (3-month) net insider sales between small and 
large firms is 1.95 (4.94), significant at the 5 percent level.  
Panel C sorts firms with high and low repurchase announcement returns 
into subgroups by their daily return volatility over the previous year before the 
repurchase announcement. Babenko et al. (2012) argue that it is more risky for 
undiversified insiders to hold more equity of their firm when the stock 
volatility is high. However, I do not find any significant difference in post-
announcement net insider sales between high and low volatility firms. This 
suggests that stock volatility may not be the most important factor for insiders 
in their decision to sell stocks post-announcement.  
Similar to Babenko et al. (2012) where they argue that pre-
announcement insider purchases can add credibility to their repurchase 
undervaluation signal, my empirical analysis suggests that post-announcement 
insider trades can also signal insiders’ private information regarding firm 
value. Post-announcement insider sales will be positively related to short-term 
announcement returns when insiders announce a repurchase to cash out at 
higher stock prices as suggested by Fried (2001; 2005). Higher post-
announcement insider sales also signal that they do not believe their stock to be 
significantly undervalued. 
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However, the literature also suggests that the market under reacts to 
share repurchase signal (see e.g., Ikenberry et al. (1995; 2000) and Peyer and 
Vermaelen (2009)) and repurchasing firms earn higher longer-term returns. 
Post-announcement insider trades thus can signal insiders’ expectations about 
future firm performance. Insiders will retain more equity when they believe 
that the market has underreacted to their repurchase signal and the stock is still 
under-priced. Higher post-announcement insider sales signal managerial 
pessimism about future firm performance. On this basis, I expect post-
announcement insider sales to be negatively related to longer-term returns of 
such firms.  
Finally, in table 4.8 I regresses post-announcement insider trades on 
short-term repurchase announcement returns, longer-term returns of share 
repurchasing firms and other control variables in different model 
specifications. Short-term announcement return is 3-day buy-and-hold 
abnormal return around the repurchase announcement. I restrict long-run post-
announcement performance to two years as Seyhun (1998) suggests that 
insiders can predict stock price performance for up to two years in to the 
future. I use 1
st
 year BHAR and 2
nd
 year BHAR in different model 
specifications. Other control variables are as defined earlier in section 4.3, data 
and descriptive statistics. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis and are 
reported after adjusting for heteroskedasticity in standard errors as suggested 
by White (1980). Regression results in all model specifications are also robust 
to industry fixed effects. 
The dependent variable in models 1 to 3 is the 1-month net sales post-
announcement. Regression results in model 1 suggest that insider sales in the 
1-month post-announcement period are significantly positively related to 
(short-term) repurchase announcement returns. This indicates that insiders take 
advantage of increase in stock price after the repurchase announcement and sell 
more heavily. Model 2 in table 4.8 shows that net insider sales are significantly 
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positively related to short-term returns but unrelated to post-announcement first 
year buy-and-hold abnormal returns. Net insider sales in model 3 are 
significantly negatively related to longer-term post-announcement (second year 
buy-and-hold abnormal) returns. This is consistent with the argument that a 
higher post-announcement insider sale represents insiders’ pessimism about 
firms’ longer-term stock price performance. Insiders sell more shares when 
they believe that the stock will not outperform in the long-run. 
Lakonishok et al. (1994) show that value firms earn higher returns in 
the long-run as compared to growth firms after the repurchase announcement. 
As value firms are more like to be undervalued, I find that insiders in such 
firms sell fewer shares after the repurchase announcement. Table 8 shows that 
the book-to-market ratio is significantly negatively related to post-
announcement net insider sales. I also find that the stock price run-up is 
significantly positively (negatively) related to insider sales and net insider sales 
(purchases) in all regression models. This indicates that insiders might be 
employing a contrarian trading strategy around the repurchase announcement. 
As firms with higher pre-announcement returns are less likely to be 
undervalued or at least not significantly undervalued, thus insiders in such 
firms sell more post-announcement to cash out at higher stock prices. 
My analysis also suggests that firm size is unrelated to post-
announcement net insider sales. Firm size is insignificant in all three (1-3) 
models where the 1-month net insider sales is used as a dependent variable. 
However, intended repurchase programme size is slightly positively related to 
net insider sales. Since repurchase programme size is often linked to the 
credibility of repurchase signal (Chan et al. (2010)), this finding suggests that 
insiders sell more post-announcement when they announce to repurchase a 
greater number of outstanding shares. I find that firm leverage is significantly 
negatively related to net insider sales and positively related to insider purchases 
(column 5 in table 4.8) in the post-announcement period. Higher leverage is 
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associated with higher risk of bankruptcy. Insider sales in such firms could 
then send a very negative signal about firm prospects. Thus insiders may sell 
more cautiously when leverage is high. Insider net sales and sales post-
announcement are significantly positively related to Tobin’s q. Higher Tobin’s 
q represents higher market valuation and the observed positive relationship is 
consistent with the argument that insiders sell more when their firm’s stock is 
less (more) likely to be undervalued (overvalued). 
As a robustness test, in models 4 and 5 respectively I separately regress 
1-month sales and 1-month purchases post-announcement on short-term 
repurchase announcement returns and other explanatory variables. Regression 
results in model 4 show that insider sales are positively related to repurchase 
announcement returns and the coefficient is highly significant at the 1 percent 
level. The signs on other variables are as expected. Unlike the regression 
models with net insider sales as regressand, firm size is significantly negatively 
related to 1-month insider sales post-announcement. This is in line with 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) who highlight that insiders of small firms are better 
able to predict future returns and time their trades accordingly. Insiders in 
small firms sell more after the repurchase announcement.  
Model 5 shows that 1-month insider purchases are significantly 
negatively related to short-term announcement returns. When announcement 
returns are high, undervaluation will be eliminated or significantly reduced and 
thus it will be more costly for insiders to purchase more shares. Also the 
incentive to purchase an undervalued stock will be eliminated when stock price 
increases after the repurchase announcement. Thus insiders will purchase fewer 
shares when investors react more positively to the repurchase announcement 
signal. However, as expected, book-to-market is significantly positively related 
to post-announcement insider purchases. This suggests that insiders purchase 
more equity when the firm is undervalued.  
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Finally, as a further robustness test in regression models 6 to 8 I regress 
3-month net insider sales post-announcement on the same independent 
variables. Results are very similar to regression results of models 1 to 3. One 
distinction however is that 3-month insider sales are positively related to one 
year BHAR which was insignificant in the case of 1-month net sales. The 
relationship however with second year BHAR is still negative and significant 
only at the 10 percent level. The signs on other control variables are expected. 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter analyses insider trades around open market repurchase 
announcements to infer insiders’ private information about firm value, and its 
relevance to investors in assessing the credibility of an open market repurchase 
announcement as a signal of firm undervaluation. Lower pre-announcement net 
insider sales signal to the market that insiders believe the stock to be under-
priced. However, higher post-announcement sales also signal to the market that 
the stock is either over-priced or fairly priced.  
The empirical evidence in the paper suggests that investors react more 
positively to repurchase announcements where insiders retain more equity 
before the repurchase announcement. However, my analysis also suggests that 
insiders sell more shares post-announcement when repurchase announcement 
returns are higher. This is particularly true for firms that are less likely to be 
undervalued (growth firms) and present the highest potential gains from 
exploiting insider trading such as small firms. I find empirical evidence that 
post-announcement insider sales are significantly positively related to 
repurchase announcement returns and negatively related to firm size. I also 
document a negative relationship between post-announcement insider sales and 
longer-term returns (second year buy-and-hold abnormal return) This is 
consistent with the expectation that insiders sell more shares post-
announcement and such firms are less likely to outperform in the long-run. 
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The findings of this chapter suggest that investors pay attention to pre-
announcement insider trades in determining the credibility of repurchase 
announcement undervaluation signal and respond accordingly. My results 
indicate that investors view insider trades as a signal of insiders’ private 
information and regard insiders to be rational and trading to take advantage of 
any mispricing, rather than as a tool to deceive the market. However, higher 
insider sales post-announcement suggest that insiders may also announce 
repurchase programmes to sell their equity at higher post-announcement stock 
prices. Thus, there is also a possibility that managers may engage in “pump and 
dump” behaviour to mislead investors and pursue self-serving interests. 
Government regulatory bodies have put in place some regulatory safeguards to 
prevent managers from engaging in such opportunistic behaviour (please refer 
to footnote 44). Also managers have higher discount rates as they hold under 
diversified portfolios that makes such “pump and dump” strategy more costly 
for them. However, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out and requires 
further investigation. The negative relationship between post-announcement 
sales and longer-term returns suggests that the market realises that firms where 
insiders sell more shares after the buyback announcement are less likely to be 
undervalued and hence do not out perform in the long-run.  
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Table 4.1: Distribution of repurchase announcements by year and 
industry 
The table reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by year and industry. 
Panel A reports the distribution by year. Year is the fiscal year in which repurchase 
announcement was made. Frequency counts the number of open market repurchase 
programmes announced in a given year. Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of 
assets to market value at the beginning of the fiscal year. Market value is the average 
market value of firms in millions of dollars. Intended percentage is the percentage of 
outstanding shares that management states it intends to repurchase at the time of 
announcement.  
Panel B reports the distribution of repurchase announcements by industry. Industries 
are classified based on two digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code in 
COMPUSTAT. 
Panel A: Distribution by year. 
Year Frequency 
Book-to-
market 
Market 
value ($M) 
Intended percentage 
1990 433 0.84 898.85 7.32 
1991 114 0.86 1223.93 8.59 
1992 215 0.61 1498.94 7.35 
1993 240 0.59 1651.03 5.85 
1994 446 0.65 1378.79 6.14 
1995 421 0.68 1384.05 6.99 
1996 559 0.58 2264.09 6.46 
1997 488 0.54 1787.50 7.23 
1998 866 0.65 1803.72 8.34 
1999 635 0.73 1819.54 8.02 
2000 372 0.78 3837.12 9.03 
2001 361 0.67 6959.89 8.37 
2002 250 0.74 3917.20 8.77 
2003 253 0.60 4313.64 7.94 
2004 311 0.48 6314.72 8.51 
2005 360 0.47 6983.02 8.02 
2006 354 0.47 9137.10 8.48 
2007 522 0.57 7084.00 9.21 
2008 556 0.74 3543.54 9.90 
2009 182 0.77 5204.74 9.73 
2010 300 0.62 6745.56 10.00 
2011 426 0.62 5842.62 10.08 
2012 281 0.69 8051.59 11.18 
All 8945 0.64 3854.37 8.26 
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Panel B: Distribution of repurchase announcements by industry 
Industry Frequency Percent 
Cumulative 
frequency 
Cumulative 
percentage 
Agriculture, forestry, and Fishing 21 0.23 21 0.23 
Construction 100 1.12 121 1.35 
Finance and Insurance 2205 24.65 2326 26.00 
Manufacturing 3486 38.97 5812 64.97 
Mining 200 2.24 6012 67.21 
Public administration 28 0.31 6040 67.52 
Retail trade 644 7.2 6684 74.72 
Services 1419 15.86 8103 90.59 
Transportation and communication 537 6 8640 96.59 
Wholesale trade 305 3.41 8945 100.00 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics of key variables 
The table reports summary statistics for the main variables for firms that announced 
open market share repurchase programmes. The table reports number of observations 
(N), mean, standard deviation (SD) and the 1
st
, 50
th
 and 99
th
 percentiles of sample 
data. Panel A reports on announcement and longer-term return statistics (in percentage 
terms) of share repurchase announcing firms. 3-day CAR (BHAR) is the 3 day (-1, 1) 
cumulative (buy-and-hold) abnormal return around the announcement date (day 0) 
using CRSP index value weighted market return as benchmark. 1
st
 year BHAR is the 1 
year (0, 252 days) buy-and-hold abnormal return against the value weighted return on 
the market starting from the event date (day 0). 2
nd
 year BHAR is the second year 
(253, 504 days) buy-and-hold abnormal return starting from the first anniversary of 
event date. Stock price runup is the 40 days buy-and-hold return of event firms 
starting 4 days prior to the repurchase announcement.  
Panel B reports summary statistics on insider trading around repurchase 
announcements. 1 (3)-month sales (purchases) is the number of shares sold (bought) 
by insider in the one (three) month period after repurchase announcement normalized 
by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. 1-month (3-month) net 
sales is the difference between number of shares sold and bought by insiders in the 
one (three) month period post-announcement normalized by the number of 
outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. 1-month (3-month) Abnormal net sales 
is the one (three) month difference between net insider sales and net insider sales in 
the time period last year. 1-month (3-month) Abnormal net sales 2 is the one (three) 
month difference between net insider sales and normal net insider sales for the same 
period (number of month) where normal net insider sales are measured as the average 
monthly difference number of share sold and bought by insiders in the previous three 
year period starting six month before the repurchase announcement. All trades are 
normalized by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. Pre-3(6)-
month net sales is the difference between the number of shares sold and bought by 
insiders in the three (six) month period before repurchase announcement normalized 
by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. 
Panel C provides summary statistics on firm characteristics for my data. Firm size is 
the log of book value of assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total firm assets. 
Book-to-market is the ratio of book value of firm assets to its market value. Cash 
(Cash flow) is the cash (operating income before depreciation) divided by book assets. 
Capital expenditure (R&D expense) is the capital expenditures (research and 
development expenditures) scaled by book assets. Cash, cash flow, capital expenditure 
and R&D expense are shown as percentages. Tobin’s Q is the ratio of market to book 
value of assets. Return volatility is the volatility of stock returns measured over 1 year 
prior to repurchase announcement. 
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        Percentiles 
Variables N Mean SD 1st 50th 99th 
Panel A: Returns 
     
3-day CAR  8945 2.40 7.90 -23.0 1.80 31.0 
3-day BHAR 8945 2.30 7.70 -22.6 1.60 30.3 
1st-year BHAR  8944 4.50 47.90 -84.8 -1.60 212.9 
2nd-year BHAR 8652 6.60 49.90 -88.4 0.10 229.8 
Stock price runup 8942 -6.70 17.80 -57.5 -4.90 41.2 
Panel B: Insider trades 
    
1-month Sales 8945 6.40 26.24 0.00 0.00 206.1 
1-month Purchases 8945 2.00 9.04 0.00 0.00 70.5 
1-month Net sales 8945 4.33 27.20 -68.2 0.00 199.8 
1-month Abnormal net sales 8945 -1.92 38.11 -186.3 0.00 164.5 
1-month Abnormal net sales 2 8945 -1.88 32.72 -122.1 -0.29 157.1 
3-month Net sales 8945 12.72 65.58 -144.3 0.00 492.5 
3-month Abnormal net sales 8945 -11.76 124.57 -785.1 0.00 372.8 
3-month Abnormal net sales 2 8945 -5.89 86.08 -375.5 -0.42 360.6 
Pre-3-month Net sales 8945 9.79 56.34 -156.8 0.00 409.1 
Pre-6-month Net sales 8945 41.64 197.82 -286.8 0.95 1551.4 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
    
Firm size 8945 2.78 0.87 0.98 2.74 5.1 
Leverage 8919 0.54 0.26 0.07 0.53 1.0 
Book-to-Market 8900 0.64 0.44 0.06 0.55 2.5 
Cash 8945 16.15 18.34 0.09 8.28 77.3 
Cash flow 8859 12.12 11.06 -25.72 12.05 47.7 
Capital expenditure 8945 4.58 5.44 0.00 3.02 30.0 
R&D expense 8945 2.65 5.09 0.00 0.00 24.4 
Tobin's Q 8900 2.61 2.57 0.40 1.83 17.4 
Return volatility 8942 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.1 
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Table 4.3: Pre-announcement net insider sales and returns  
The table shows mean short-term and longer-term returns by high and low net insider sales for firms that announced a share repurchase 
programme. The first (second) panel categorises returns by 3 (6) months net sales in the pre-announcement period. Pre-3(6)-month net sales is 
the difference between the number of shares sold and bought by insiders in the three (six) month period before repurchase announcement 
normalized by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. Post-3(6)-month net sales is the difference between the number of 
shares sold and bought by insiders in the three (six) month period post-repurchase announcement normalized by the number of outstanding 
shares and multiplied by 10,000. 3-day BHAR is the 3 day (-1, 1) buy-and-hold abnormal return around the event date (day 0). 3-day CAR is 
the 3 day (-1, 1) cumulative abnormal return around the event date (day 0). 5-day BHAR is the 5 day (-2, 2) buy-and-hold abnormal return 
around the event date (day 0). 1
st
 year BHAR is the 1 year (0, 252 days) buy-and-hold abnormal return starting from the event date. 2
nd
 year 
BHAR is the second year (253, 504 days) buy-and-hold abnormal return starting from the first anniversary of the event date. Abnormal returns 
are estimated against the value weighted market return as the benchmark. High (low) columns report mean returns of firms with pre-
announcement net sales above (below) the mean value of insider net sales. The difference (Diff) column reports the difference between the 
mean returns of firms with high and low pre-announcement net insider sales. T-test is used to test the significance of the difference from zero. 
P-values associated with the t-test are reported in the table.  
 
Variables 
Pre 3 Months net sales   Pre 6 Months net sales 
high low    Diff P-value   high low    Diff P-value 
3-day BHAR   0.016 0.024 -0.008*** 0.0001   0.019 0.023 -0.004** 0.044 
3-day CAR 0.017 0.026 -0.009*** 0.0001 
 
0.021 0.025 -0.004** 0.0336 
5-day BHAR 0.013 0.024 -0.011*** 0.0001 
 
0.014 0.024 -0.010*** 0.0001 
1
st
 year BHAR 0.052 0.044  0.008 0.5409 
 
0.036 0.047 -0.011 0.4192 
2
nd
 year BHAR 0.062 0.067 -0.005 0.7529   0.061 0.067 -0.006 0.6957 
      Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively. 
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Table 4.4: Announcement returns and pre-announcement insider trades 
The dependent variable in all model specifications (column 1-6) is the three-day 
BHAR calculated as the three day (-1, 1) buy-and-hold abnormal return around the 
announcement date (day 0) using value weighted return on the market as the 
benchmark. All the trading variables are calculated in the pre-announcement period. 3 
(6)-month sales (purchases) is the number of shares sold (bought) by insider in the 
three (six) month period before repurchase announcement normalized by the number 
of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. 3-month (6-month) net sales is the 
difference between number of shares sold and bought by insiders in the three (six) 
month period before repurchase announcement normalized by the number of 
outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. Intended percentage is the target value of 
shares the firm plans to repurchase as listed in the announcement normalized by the 
market value of equity. The other control variables are as defined in table 2. T-
statistics in parentheses are based on standard errors adjusted for clustering at the firm 
level. 
     (1)    (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6) 
Intercept 3.29*** 3.23*** 3.53*** 3.53*** 3.53*** 3.54*** 
 
(7.25) (7.09) (7.84) (7.89) (7.83) (7.83) 
6-month purchases 0.53** 
     
 
(2.33) 
     3-month purchases 
 
1.52*** 
    
  
(3.14) 
    6-month net sales 
  
-0.13** 
   
   
(-2.44) 
   3-month net sales 
   
-0.52*** 
  
    
(-2.97) 
  3-month sales 
    
-0.34* 
 
     
(-1.91) 
 6-month sales 
     
-0.11** 
      
(-2.15) 
Stock price runup -4.83*** -4.82*** -4.92*** -4.84*** -4.83*** -4.9*** 
 (-8.00) (-7.98) (-8.12) (-8.01) (-7.99) (-8.1) 
Firm size -1.05*** -1.03*** -1.11*** -1.1*** -1.12*** -1.12*** 
 (-9.29) (-9.08) (-9.97) (-9.91) (-9.97) (-10.01) 
Book-to-market 1.36*** 1.34*** 1.37*** 1.35*** 1.38*** 1.38*** 
 (4.34) (4.29) (4.33) (4.29) (4.38) (4.37) 
Intended percentage 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 (0.76) (0.76) (0.79) (0.8) (0.79) (0.78) 
Leverage 0.78** 0.76** 0.79** 0.78** 0.82** 0.81** 
 (2.13) (2.07) (2.17) (2.13) (2.23) (2.22) 
Tobin's Q 0.07* 0.07* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 
 
(1.71) (1.69) (1.92) (1.85) (1.83) (1.9) 
R-squared 4.03% 4.14% 4.05% 4.08% 4.00% 4.03% 
Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively. 
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Table 4.5: Difference between pre- and post-announcement insider trades 
The table reports the average insider trades in the pre- and post-announcement 3(6)-month periods. Pre (post) column reports trades before 
(after) repurchase announcement. The difference (Diff) column reports the difference between pre- and post-announcement insider trades and 
also shows if the difference is significantly different from zero. The significance test is based on t-test and the associated p-values are also 
reported in the P-value column. Sales (Purchases) are defined the number of share sold (bought) by insiders during the 3 (6)-month window 
before and after repurchase announcement and normalized by the number of outstanding shares and multiplied by 10,000. Net is the difference 
between number of shares sold and bought by insiders during the time window. Abnormal net sales is the difference between net insider sales 
and net insider sales in the time period last year over the same time window. Abnormal net sales 2 is difference between net insider sales and 
normal net insider sales for the same period (number of months) where normal net insider sales are measured as the average monthly 
difference number of share sold and bought by insiders in the previous three year period starting six month before the repurchase 
announcement. The p-value rows are associated with t-test of the difference of abnormal net sales from zero.  
    3 Months trades   6 Months trades 
    Pre Post Diff P-value   Pre Post Diff P-value 
Sales 
 
15.41 18.81 -3.4*** 0.0001 
 
54.17 40.27 13.9*** 0.0001 
Purchases 5.37 5.30 0.07 0.8136 
 
11.13 12.281 -1.15* 0.0619 
Net sales 
 
9.79 12.72 -2.93*** 0.0003 
 
41.64 26.741 14.9*** 0.0001 
Abnormal net sales -10.46 -11.76 1.30 0.4256 
 
-7.99 -29.863 21.87*** 0.0001 
p-value 
 
0.001 0.001 
   
0.006 0.001 
  Abnormal net sales 2 -8.82 -5.89 -2.93*** 0.0003 
 
4.43 -10.474 14.9*** 0.0001 
p-value   0.001 0.001      0.0441 0.001     
        Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively. 
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Table 4.6: Post-announcement insider trades in subsamples  
The table reports post-announcement 1-month and 3-month mean insider trades for different subsamples of firms. Panel A subsamples the 
data based on book-to-market ratio. High (low) book-to-market ratio refers to firms with book-to-market ratio above (below) the sample mean. 
Panel B subsamples data based on stock price runup. High (low) stock price runup refers to firms with stock price runup above (below) the 
sample mean. Panel C subsamples the data based on 6-month pre-announcement net sales. High (low) 6-month pre-announcement net sales 
refers to firms with net sales above (below) the sample mean. Finally, Panel D subsamples the data based on three day (-1, 1) repurchase 
announcement returns. High (low) announcement returns refer to firms with three day BHAR above (below) the sample mean. The trade 
variables are as defined in tables 2 and 4. The difference between column 1 and 2 for each panel is reported in the Diff column. One sample t-
test tests for the difference to be significantly different from zero. P-values associated with t-test are also reported in column 4 of each panel. 
  Panel A: Book-to-Market ratio   Panel B: Stock price runup 
Variables low high Diff P-value 
 
high low Diff P-value 
1-month Sales 7.43 4.83 2.6*** 0.0001 
 
7.45 5.14 2.31*** 0.0001 
1-month Purchases 1.66 2.52 -0.86*** 0.0001 
 
1.43 2.69 -1.26*** 0.0001 
1-month Net sales 5.69 2.26 3.43*** 0.0001 
 
5.96 2.37 3.59*** 0.0001 
3-month Sales 21.32 15.00 6.32*** 0.0001 
 
20.41 16.89 3.52** 0.017 
3-month Purchases 4.32 6.79 -2.47*** 0.0001 
 
3.89 6.99 -3.1*** 0.0001 
3-month Net sales 15.95 7.81 8.14*** 0.0001 
 
15.66 9.2 6.46*** 0.0001 
  Panel C: Net sales 6m Pre-announcement  Panel D: Ann. Return (3-day BHAR) 
Variables high low Diff P-value 
 
high low Diff P-value 
1-month Sales 15.61 4.4 11.21*** 0.0001 
 
7.44 5.57 1.87*** 0.0001 
1-month Purchases 1.61 2.09 -0.48** 0.0313 
 
1.97 2.03 -0.06 0.778 
1-month Net sales 13.85 2.27 11.58*** 0.0001 
 
5.43 3.45 1.98*** 0.000 
3-month Sales 43.58 13.45 30.13*** 0.0001 
 
20.82 17.21 3.61** 0.015 
3-month Purchases 4.81 5.41 -0.60 0.3225 
 
5.46 5.17 0.29 0.537 
3-month Net sales 36.98 7.47 29.51*** 0.0001  14.3 11.46 2.84** 0.041 
        Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively.  
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Table 4.7: Two-way sorted subsamples for repurchase announcing firms 
The table reports average post-announcement insider net sales in the 1-month and 3-month time windows for subsamples sorted on two 
variables. Vertically, every year the data is sorted into two groups based on repurchase announcement ranks. Low (high) rank refers to firms 
that have lower (higher) announcement returns. Horizontally, panel A subsamples the data based on book-to-market ratio. High (low) book-to-
market ratio refers to firms with book-to-market ratio above (below) the sample mean. Panel B subsamples the data based on firm size. Small 
(large) refers to firms with firm size below (above) the sample mean. Panel C subsamples the data based on stock return volatility. High (low) 
stock return volatility refers to firms with stock return volatility above (below) the sample mean. Variables are as defined in tables 2 and 4. 
The difference between column 1 and 2 for each panel is reported in the Diff column. One sample t-test tests for the difference to be 
significantly different from zero. P-values associated with t-test are also reported in column 4 of each panel. 
Ann. Return Rank  
  
  Panel A: Book-to-market   
Variable low high Diff P-value 
Low 
 
1-month Net sales 4.47 1.65 2.82*** 0.0004 
  3-month Net sales 14.76 6.32 8.44*** 0.0001 
high 
 
1-month Net sales 7.02 2.79 4.22*** 0.0001 
 
3-month Net sales 17.25 9.13 8.11*** 0.0001 
 Ann. Return Rank 
  
  Panel B: Firm size   
Variable small large Diff P-value 
Low 
 
1-month Net sales 3.45 3.38 0.06 0.9332 
  3-month Net sales 14.12 9.39 4.73** 0.0147 
high 
 
1-month Net sales 6.07 4.12 1.95** 0.0234 
 
3-month Net sales 15.95 11.00 4.94** 0.0138 
 Ann. Return Rank 
  
  Panel C: Return volatility   
Variable high low Diff P-value 
Low 
 
1-month Net sales 3.37 3.43 -0.06 0.9378 
  3-month Net sales 13.13 10.82 2.30 0.2598 
high 
 
1-month Net sales 5.16 5.30 -0.15 0.8639 
  3-month Net sales 15.29 12.65 2.65 0.1851 
                Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively. 
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Table 4.8: Relationship between post-announcement insider trades and returns 
The table reports regression results of insider trades on short-term and longer-term returns of firms that announce a repurchase programme. 
The dependent variable in models (columns) 1-3 is the 1-month net insider sales. Models (columns) 4-5 regress 1-month insider sales and 1-
month insider purchases on explanatory variables respectively. In models (columns) 6-8, the dependent variable is the 3-month net insider 
sales. T-statistics are in parenthesis and are reported after adjusting standard errors for heteroskedasticity as suggested by White (1980). The 
variables are as defined in table 2. 
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    (1)   (2)   (3)   (4)   (5)   (6)   (7)   (8) 
Intercept 9.15*** 9.14*** 9.35*** 11.93*** 2.91*** 28.12*** 28.02*** 28.64*** 
 (5.7) (5.69) (5.79) (7.7) (5.5) (7.32) (7.31) (7.37) 
3-day BHAR 25.58*** 25.6*** 25.8*** 16.59*** -7.83*** 48.49*** 48.35*** 53.26*** 
 (5.65) (5.64) (5.58) (3.78) (-4.27) (4.39) (4.38) (4.75) 
1
st
 year BHAR  
 
0.29 
    
4.68*** 
  
 
(0.41) 
    
(2.71) 
 2
nd
 year BHAR 
  
-0.89* 
    
-2.66* 
   
(-1.71) 
    
(-1.86) 
Stock price runup 16.25*** 16.25*** 16.75*** 11.92*** -4.01*** 30.08*** 30.04*** 31.4*** 
 (7.95) (7.95) (8.08) (5.99) (-6.13) (6.36) (6.36) (6.6) 
Firm size -0.28 -0.29 -0.35 -1.54*** -1.29*** -2.56*** -2.59*** -2.61*** 
 (-0.73) (-0.74) (-0.89) (-4.18) (-9.77) (-2.76) (-2.8) (-2.79) 
Book-to-market -2.76*** -2.77*** -2.93*** -1.37 1.28*** -7.36*** -7.56*** -8.1*** 
 (-2.7) (-2.72) (-2.89) (-1.44) (3.17) (-3.11) (-3.23) (-3.5) 
Intended percentage 0.05 0.06 0.06* 0.07** 0.02 0.23** 0.23** 0.24** 
 (1.49) (1.5) (1.7) (2.04) (1.45) (2.09) (2.13) (2.19) 
Leverage -6.76*** -6.74*** -6.39*** -4.19*** 2.55*** -13.56*** -13.35*** -12.96*** 
 (-5.45) (-5.42) (-5.08) (-3.55) (5.64) (-4.67) (-4.6) (-4.39) 
Tobin's Q 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.51** 0.65*** 0.09 1.07** 1.05** 1.01** 
 (2.69) (2.69) (2.47) (3.33) (1.57) (2.23) (2.19) (2.09) 
Adj. R-Squared 2.37% 2.37% 2.43% 1.75% 2.64% 1.86% 1.97% 2.02% 
      Significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *respectively. 
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Chapter 5   
 
Conclusion 
5.1 Concluding Remarks 
The last couple of decades have witnessed a remarkable increase in stock 
repurchase programmes. As a result of their increasing popularity and the 
amount of money involved, stock buybacks have attracted a lot of attention 
from academic researchers as well as from business analysts and the financial 
media. This thesis comprises of three empirical papers (chapters) on open 
market share repurchase programmes with particular focus on agency issues 
associated with such programmes.  
In general, the market views the repurchase announcement as good 
news and hence responds positively. Vermaelen (1981) regards repurchase 
announcements as a managerial signal of equity undervaluation and explains 
the associated positive abnormal returns as a market response to the 
undervaluation signal. Consistent with this, Brav et al. (2005) find that 
undervaluation is the most commonly referred to motive in share repurchase 
programmes. Earlier research documents significant short term announcement 
returns as well as positive drift in the longer-term returns of repurchase 
announcing firms (e.g., Vermaelen (1981); Ikenberry et al. (1995, (2000); Chan 
et al. (2004)).  
However, recent studies raise doubts about repurchase announcements 
as a (strong) signal of stock under-pricing. This is partly because repurchase 
programmes can be used for other reasons such as distributing excess cash, 
adjusting capital structure etc. and partly because such announcements are not 
binding obligations on the part of firm management to implement. In addition, 
repurchase announcements have a positive effect on executive compensation, 
especially stock based compensation, as compared to dividends that decrease 
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the value of the stock by the amount of dividend. Fried (2001; 2005) argues 
theoretically that repurchase programmes are more beneficial to managers and 
have little value signalling content for shareholders, if any. Thus repurchase 
announcements can be used opportunistically (i.e., agency driven) by managers 
for their personal wealth incentives, or at least cosmetically due to their 
flexibility. So, how credibly a repurchase announcement signals stock 
undervaluation represents an empirical question. 
In my first empirical study in chapter 2 of this thesis, I test whether the 
market distinguishes between agency driven and value signalling open market 
share buybacks by observing the underlying managerial wealth and repurchase 
incentives. In theory, better convergence between executive and shareholder 
wealth interests and risk preferences should lower agency costs thus increasing 
the “perceived” credibility of managements’ buyback announcements (signals). 
My findings suggest that executive compensation arrangements play an 
important role in explaining the market reaction to, and actual share repurchase 
decisions of, firms that announce repurchase programmes. This study 
contributes to the literature by demonstrating that the market approximates the 
value signalling effect of a buyback announcement by observing the underlying 
managerial wealth and repurchase incentives and hence responds accordingly. 
My third chapter addresses the open market buyback announcement 
credibility issue directly by capitalising on the soft information conveyed in 
repurchase announcements press releases. This is novel to the literature on 
share buybacks. Recent studies suggest that news disclosure tone affects 
investors’ reaction to an information event. In this study, I demonstrate that the 
narrative disclosure tone of buyback press releases contains value relevant 
information and has significant explanatory power for short-term 
announcement returns. I find, however, disclosure tone of repurchase 
announcement is unrelated to longer-term returns and actual repurchase rates 
post-announcement. This finding is consistent with literature in this area that 
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shows narrative disclosure tone only impacts short-term returns. The hand 
collected data I employ in this study also allows me to explore other aspects of 
buyback announcements where the extant literature is limited. 
In chapter 4 I analyse insider trading behaviour around buyback 
announcements. The key insight of this paper is to infer insiders’ private 
information about firm value by observing their trading behaviour around the 
repurchase announcement. Insiders add credibility to the (repurchase) 
undervaluation signal by trading parallel to their signal (i.e., purchasing more 
or selling fewer shares before the repurchase announcement). However, 
insiders seeking to time the market (cash out at a higher price) will sell more 
shares post-announcement. My analysis shows that, consistent with the 
undervaluation signalling argument, investors respond more positively to 
buyback announcements where insiders buy more or sell less equity before the 
announcement event.  
However, I also document that insiders sell more shares in the first 
three months post-announcement. This is especially true for firms that are less 
(more) likely to be undervalued (overvalued) and for smaller firms that present 
the greatest potential for gain from exploiting insider trading. Net insider sales 
are significantly positively related to announcement returns. Finally, I show 
that higher post-announcement net insider sales are slightly negatively related 
to longer-term returns suggesting that such firms do not out perform in the 
long-run. 
I believe this research adds significantly to the literature on share 
buybacks, in particular by highlighting the agency issues associated with share 
repurchase programmes. My findings indicate that the market is conscious of 
the managerial incentives attached to stock buybacks and their potential for 
opportunistic use. Investor reaction to repurchase announcements is sensitive to 
(i) executive compensation arrangements, (ii) the information content and 
disclosure tone of buyback announcement press releases, and (iii) insider 
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trading patterns around the repurchase announcement. I view my research as 
adding significantly to our understanding of the competing motives behind 
share buyback announcements and how the market treats and reacts to these. It 
appears that the market realises that a management’s promise to spend billions 
of dollars on share repurchases may not necessarily add to shareholder wealth. 
Thus, repurchase announcements cannot be uniformly viewed as a signal of 
better firm prospects or current undervaluation. Insiders also use such 
programmes for personal gain. In summary, my research highlights novel 
factors that contribute in explaining investor reaction to repurchase 
announcements. 
5.2 Further work 
While working on my PhD thesis, several interesting and related research ideas 
have emerged and I intend to pursue some of these after my doctoral degree.
51
 
For example, the different trading patterns of institutional and individual 
investors around the repurchase announcement event have not been explored in 
the literature. Conditional on data availability my idea is to explore how 
different investor clienteles react to repurchase announcements and to what 
extent sophisticated investors can “see through” those of an opportunistic or 
cosmetic nature.  
Research suggests that institutional and retail investors trade in 
different directions. Kausar et al. (2013), for example, suggest that this 
differential trading behaviour of retail and institutional investors can help 
explain anomalous market reaction to news events. As buyback announcements 
can be seen as a dubious signal, it is important to understand how different 
investor clienteles react to this disclosure. The literature also suggests that 
individual investors are drawn by attention grabbing events independent of 
direction of news whereas sophisticated/professional investors are more careful 
in their reaction to news events. There is a research gap in the share buyback 
                                                          
51
 I have discussed these with my supervisor and we may collaborate on these in near future. 
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literature here in terms of how the overall market reaction might be driven by 
these different investor groups. In my future work, I specifically intend to 
explore the differential trading behaviour of institutional and retail investors 
associated with share repurchase information. Also, building on my second 
empirical study in chapter 3 I am interested in exploring how sophisticated and 
unsophisticated (retail) investors react to narrative information issued with the 
share repurchase announcement.  
Chapter 3 further suggests that narrative disclosure tone is positively 
related to announcement returns but unrelated to longer-term returns. I 
speculate that this short-term market reaction may be solely driven by 
increased trading activity of retail investors in response to such attention 
grabbing repurchase news. There may also be a possibility of wealth transfer 
from retail investors to sophisticated investors associated with the news event. 
Retail investors may trade more actively around the repurchase announcement 
because of its saliency but may lose to sophisticated investors in the longer-run 
who are more likely to trade on the information content of the news.  
In addition to these research questions, I am also interested in exploring 
the possible association between managers’ self-serving use of share buyback 
programmes and their accounting manipulations, and other opportunistic 
reporting behaviour, as well as other self-serving behaviours discussed in the 
literature such as option re-pricing which raise further agency issues. 
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Appendix 
Appendix I 
The value of executive’s stock option is calculated using Black and Scholes 
European option price formula as modified by Merton (1973) that takes into 
account dividend payments. Options value is defined by the following formula 
             
         
where 
   
                      
   
 
   
                      
   
 
S = Price of the underlying stock 
X = Strike price of the option 
T = Time to maturity of the stock option 
r = Risk free rate 
d = Dividend rate 
σ = Volatility of the stock returns 
N = Cumulative normal distribution function 
Since delta is defined as the first derivative of option value with respect to 
price. In order to get the percentage change in option value I have the 
following equation 
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Vega is defined as the first derivative of option value with respect to stock 
return’s volatility.  
      
               
                   
          
                       
In order to estimate the dollar changes in the value of the executive’s wealth I 
multiple the estimated value of delta and vega with the total number of options 
held by the executive. I compute the delta of the executive’s portfolio of stocks 
and options by adding the delta of restricted stock and shares held by the CEO 
to the Delta of his options portfolio.  
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Appendix II 
Accruals are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to a repurchase 
announcement to avoid look-ahead bias using the following equation. 
Accruals = (ΔCA – ΔCash – ΔCL + ΔSTD – DEP) / TA 
where 
ΔCA  = change in current assets  
ΔCash  = change in cash  
ΔCL  = change in current liabilities  
ΔSTD  = change in debt included in current liabilities  
DEP  = depreciation and amortization expense  
TA  = Total Assets 
 
Accruals calculated using the above formula are then decomposed into 
discretionary and non discretionary accruals using Jones (1991) model; 
        
   
   
 
   
   
       
   
   
     
   
    
where 
ΔSales  = change in sales  
ΔPPE   = change in Plant Property and Equipment (PPE) 
 
Non-discretionary accruals are defined as the fitted value from the above 
model for a particular firm and discretionary accruals are then defined as the 
residual value which is the difference between the total accruals and the 
expected or fitted value scaled by total assets of the firm. In the above model, 
regression coefficients are estimated every year using the Fama and French 
(1997) 48 industries classification for all stocks listed on 
NASDAQ/AMEX/NYSE. Non-discretionary and discretionary accruals are 
then calculated as follows. 
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